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Letter from the Editor
Letter from the Editor 
On behalf  of  the Editorial Board, I am proud and 
honored to present the newest edition of  the Penn History 
Review. Since its inception, the Penn History Review has published 
select articles reflecting high-level scholarship, researched and 
written by undergraduates of  the University of  Pennsylvania. 
Additionally, this issue includes an article written by Sahand K. 
Rahbar, a junior at Princeton University. As one may expect, the 
Penn History Review is dedicated to publishing historical scholarship 
from all geographic and thematic areas; as a result, perhaps 
it is striking that this issue highlights one region in particular, 
North America. Furthermore, each paper revolves around topics 
pertinent to or in the same time period, the nineteenth century. 
While the decision to publish a selection of  papers centered in 
the same region and century with overlapping themes was not 
purposeful, I nonetheless believe that these attributes strengthen 
and complement each piece. Indeed, the questions, concerns, and 
narratives addressed by each author emphasizes how the leading 
individuals discussed within each respective paper possessed a 
shared ethos and enthusiasm for making a difference upon our 
contemporary world.
 The first article is entitled, “Spies All Their Lives”: African 
American and Military Intelligence During the Civil War, by Carly S. 
Mayer. This work highlights an otherwise poorly documented 
but vital strategy employed by the Union military during the 
American Civil War: the recruitment of  African Americans as 
spies. In doing so, the Union infiltrated the South, gathered an 
immense amount of  intelligence, and helped shift the balance 
of  the war to save an otherwise splintering country. Specifically, 
the reader will understand the unique and natural skills African 
Americans provided, ultimately proving themselves to be one of  
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the most indomitable and furtive weapons that helped cause the 
collapse of  the short-lived Confederate States of  America.
 The War That Congress Waged, written by Varun K. Menon, 
is the second work featured in this publication. This paper is 
a chapter excerpt of  a thesis, which describes the setting and 
impact of  the role of  the United States Congress in asserting 
itself  in American foreign relations from 1811 to 1826. In this 
particular chapter, the author notes how Congress’ decision was 
led by the determined Henry Clay, who not only transformed the 
role of  Speaker of  the House, but who also used his powers to 
induce war between the United States and Great Britain starting 
in 1812. In this piece, the reader will realize how under Clay’s 
leadership, Congress adopted a new means of  authority that 
would impact the future role and history of  the United States.
 The third article in this issue is The Fallacy of  the Ideological 
Press: How American National Newspapers Reacted to the French Revolution 
from 1789-1793, by Aaron R. Senior. The author introduces his 
research by noting the significance of  the inception of  national 
newspapers in the United States in the 1790s, then analyzes how 
three specific newspapers confronted and responded to the early 
developments of  the French Revolution unfolding across the 
Atlantic Ocean. Indeed, the author demonstrates how national 
newspapers embraced and espoused their respective political 
ideologies; however, the author then distinguishes his work 
with careful analysis to discover that this relationship was not 
as resolute as historians previously believed. Indeed, the reader 
learns how newspapers altered national politics in the United 
States by not conforming to their expected political ideologies.
 The final work printed is Sahand K. Rahbar’s “The Evil 
of  the Age”: The Influence of  The New York Times on Anti-Abortion 
Legislation in New York, 1865-1875. In this essay, the author 
objectively reviews how the emergence of  The New York Times, 
particularly through an article written by Augustus St. Clair, 
galvanized the New York Legislature to reevaluate and compose 
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new laws pertaining to abortion. As the author points out, this 
decision by the state legislature is especially shocking when one 
considers that these amendments to the legal canon were codified 
quickly in an organized and efficient manner after a period of  
legislative dormancy regarding the issue. Ultimately, the reader 
grasps how The New York Times emerged as a leading newspaper 
and how it effected government in the American Postbellum 
Period.
 Additionally, this issue presents abstracts submitted by 
seniors who undertook the challenging, yet rewarding, process 
of  writing honors theses in history. In doing so, the Penn History 
Review promotes additional research and scholarship in the field 
of  history, by offering its readership a preview of  the eclectic 
and fascinating variety of  topics. Congratulations to all of  the 
senior honors students who have embarked upon this endeavor.
 The Editorial Board also would like to extend a much 
deserved thank you to Dr. Siyen Fei, Undergraduate Chair 
of  the History Department, and to Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the 
Undergraduate Advisor of  the History Department. As a result 
of  their advice, support, and advocacy, the Penn History Review 
demonstrates its commitment to publishing high-caliber original 
work written by undergraduate students. Moreover, the Editorial 
Board would like to thank both the faculty at the University 
of  Pennsylvania and at other schools across the country who 
promoted this publication to their students and to those students 
who submitted their work for consideration. Finally, the Editorial 
Board wishes to express its gratitude to the Department of  
History and the University of  Pennsylvania for providing us with 
the opportunity to expand and to enrich the field of  history with 
unique and academic literature.
 On a more personal note, I would like to thank all 
of  the members of  the Editorial Board for their efforts and 
dedication to making this issue of  the Penn History Review a 
reality. Admittedly, it will be difficult to lose our graduating 
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editors, Kate Campbell, Leila Ehsan, and Taylor Evensen; they 
have contributed so much over the years. I especially want to 
thank and congratulate Taylor, our Editor-in-Chief  Emeritus, for 
everything she has done, including her guidance and patience 
with me during this transitional semester. Nevertheless, I remain 
excited about this publication’s future; it is with tremendous 
pleasure that this semester, we welcome two new editors to our 
team, Michael Torcello and Alex Weissfisch. Lastly, I want to offer 
my appreciation to my friends and family, whose encouragement 
and support cannot be overstated. 
Congratulations to all of  the editors and authors who 
have contributed to this Spring 2016 issue of  the Penn History 
Review!
Aaron C. Mandelbaum
Editor-in-Chief
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Kilkenny Cat Fight Cartoon with Union General Ulysses S. Grant,
published in June 25, 1864 issue of Harper’s Weekly
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“Spies All Their Lives”:
African Americans and Military 
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly S. Mayer
In December 1863, an Irish-born Confederate officer of  
the Army of  Tennessee concluded that only one measure could 
possibly save the slaveholders’ republic. Major-General Patrick 
Cleburne, panicking about the sequence of  devastating defeats 
suffered by his army, proposed that the Confederacy arm and 
emancipate its slaves. Such an assertion from a southern senior 
military officer was astonishing, to say the least. The Confederacy 
went to war to preserve the institution of  slavery and to defend its 
right to exist as the only independent slaveholding republic.1 Yet, 
Cleburne’s memorandum starkly revealed the reality of  the war—
that slavery was no longer the “great…truth” that Confederate 
Vice President Alexander Stephens had claimed it to be in March 
1861.2 Over the course of  the struggle, Cleburne insisted, the 
institution of  slavery had become one of  the Confederacy’s 
“chief  sources of  weakness.”3 Although Cleburne’s proposal 
was never adopted, his core contention highlighted the immense 
threat enslaved African Americans posed to the embattled 
Confederacy.
 In the address to his fellow officers, Major-General 
Cleburne recounted the humiliating circumstances of  the 
Confederacy during the war. “Every soldier in our army already 
knows and feels our numerical inferiority to the enemy,” he 
affirmed, and, “if  this state continues much longer we must 
be subjugated.” Moreover, Cleburne identified “the three 
great causes operating to destroy us,” specifically, numerical 
inferiority of  southern troops, inadequate supplies, and, most 
shockingly, the increasing military cost of  slavery.4 He explained 
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that slaves worked actively against the Confederacy, serving as 
an “omnipresent spy system” and deterring Southerners from 
fighting Union troops because they had to ensure that their slaves 
were “not free to move and strike like the enemy.”5 Because of  
slavery, Cleburne affirmed, the South was forced to wage war 
“with the Union army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear.’”6 
Slaves had become, in every sense, “the enemy within.”7 
Even prior to Cleburne’s realization of  slaves’ 
contributions to Union military intelligence, southern planters 
and military officials recognized the immense problem of  slave 
allegiance. Planters routinely complained about their slaves’ 
insubordination, unsure of  how to control the restive population. 
These planters feared that slaves were endlessly assisting Union 
officials throughout the South, posing an acute threat to the 
Confederacy that was seemingly impossible to halt. From the 
civilian viewpoint, slaves, who were “absen[t] of  the political ties 
of  allegiance,” were utterly undermining the Confederacy; they 
had indeed become the Confederacy’s “most vulnerable point.”8 
The reality was undeniable—enslaved, escaped, and 
freed African Americans greatly assisted the Union war effort. 
This thesis aims to uncover the military and naval intelligence 
contributions of  African American men and women during 
the American Civil War (1861-1865). In particular, it focuses 
on why and how African Americans participated in clandestine 
activities—what made them excellent scouts and guides, how 
they contributed in Union campaigns, and the means they used 
to undermine the Confederacy on its plantations and in its 
households. 
The independent slaveholding republic fell victim not 
just to Union forces but also, significantly, to the determined 
resistance of  its enslaved population. The Confederacy’s fleeting 
existence demonstrates that, in so many ways, human chattel 
made history: they cemented the destruction of  the Confederacy 
and the institution of  slavery. War transformed enslaved men 
Penn History Review     13 
Spies All Their Lives
and women into the “enemy within” that the Confederate South 
was simply unable to suppress. 
In May 1861, Union Major General Benjamin Butler 
occupied Fortress Monroe, Virginia, which served as an 
important staging ground for naval operations and intelligence-
gathering activities along the coastlines of  the Carolinas. Beyond 
its strategic significance, Fortress Monroe served as the grounds 
where Butler and the region’s slaves forged the first alliance 
between the Union Army and the South’s enslaved population. 
Butler recognized that fugitive slaves possessed exceptionally 
valuable information regarding Confederate activities and a 
superior understanding of  local southern terrain.9 Accordingly, 
he deployed fugitives’ talents against the Confederacy.10 When 
Butler was transferred from Fortress Monroe to the Department 
of  the Gulf  in early 1862 to lead “the land forces destined to 
cooperate with the Navy in the attack upon New Orleans [in 
Louisiana],” he knew that slave military intelligence would again 
play a critical role.11 Thus, Butler recruited Abraham Galloway, a 
fugitive slave and northern spy, to assist in the perilous campaign. 
This was far from Galloway’s first Union intelligence 
task. In April 1861, by the recommendation of  abolitionist 
George Stearns, Massachusetts’s war leaders recruited Galloway 
to serve as a spy in the Confederacy.12 Galloway did not stumble 
upon the Union camp in his attempt to escape the South nor did 
he beg for admittance into the camp as a safe haven; rather, in 
all certainty, he was sought after to participate in the northern 
intelligence network.13 Galloway routinely aided in Union military 
operations, traveling extensively behind enemy lines and risking 
his life infiltrating unfamiliar southern plantations. 
The logic behind Galloway’s recruitment was seemingly 
incontrovertible. Who better to stealthily blend into Confederate 
society than a black man born and raised in the South? Who 
more adept to penetrate the Confederacy than an ex-slave 
who previously escaped to the North? And yet, Galloway’s 
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recruitment to the Union intelligence network marked one of  
the first instances that Union military leaders recognized the 
potential of  slaves to undermine the Confederate war effort.14 
At the start of  the American Civil War, President 
Abraham Lincoln and the federal government were politically 
committed to defeating the South, irrespective of  slavery.15 In 
his proclamation on April 15, 1861, President Lincoln promised 
“to avoid any destruction of, or interference with, property,” 
namely slavery.16 “Certain it is that the Republicans…are ‘no 
friends of  slavery,’” Treasury Secretary Samuel Chase assured a 
prominent Kentuckian, “but it is just as certain that they have 
never proposed to interfere…with slavery in any State.”17 Thus, 
the fluid relationship between Galloway and Butler would not 
have been feasible in most Union commands.18 That spring, the 
prevailing military opinion was that a northern victory should 
pose no threat to the rights of  southern slaveholders to hold 
African Americans in bondage. A few days after Butler occupied 
Fortress Monroe, for instance, Major General George B. 
McClellan, later commanding field general, reassured Virginia’s 
Unionists that he would not confiscate their slaves. Indeed, 
McClellan promised to fight “for my country and the Union, not 
for abolition…” and to “crush any attempt at insurrection.”19 
Abiding by this sentiment, Union forces routinely vowed that 
they would not interfere with southern property, most essentially 
slavery, upon attacking the South.20 
Accordingly, when Major General Butler encountered 
slaves entering Fortress Monroe, he specifically labeled them 
“contraband of  war” to obliterate any obligation to return them 
to slaveholders who claimed them as property.21 If  his troops 
had acquired a Confederate wagon or mule, would they have 
contacted their rightful owners to return them? In reality, the 
Union troops simply would have put the acquired resources 
to good use. Thus, while Butler’s use of  the term “contraband 
of  war” was loose, his argument made logical sense. When he 
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justified his decision to the Union War Department, President 
Lincoln deemed it unobjectionable. In early August 1861, the 
United States Congress formulated the general principle into 
The First Confiscation Act, which ordered the forfeiture of  any 
slaves utilized in direct assistance to the Confederate war effort.22 
This resolve was directly tested at the end of  August 1861, when 
Major General John C. Frémont, Commander of  the Western 
Department, exercised stern measures to suppress guerrilla 
activity.23 On August 30th, he declared martial law throughout 
Missouri, mandating, “the court-martial and execution of  all 
persons taken with arms in their hands within Union lines.”24 As 
a way to punish those who abetted southern partisans, Frémont 
ordered the property of  active dissenters confiscated and their 
slaves declared free, asserting that the proclamation was of  
military necessity. President Lincoln contested the order, stating 
that the permanent future condition of  slavery “must be settled 
according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military 
proclamations.”25 Frémont was thereby instructed to rescind 
the emancipation provision. Accordingly, Butler’s “contraband” 
order and Frémont’s unsuccessful proclamation determined the 
limits of  acceptable military interference with slavery during the 
first years of  the American Civil War.26 
Growing recognition of  fugitive slaves’ military value, 
specifically of  their local knowledge and their experience to 
spy, scout, or guide Union troops, slowly eroded the policy 
of  exclusion. Yankee Colonel Simon H. Mix of  the 2nd New 
York Cavalry attested to their importance in assisting military 
expeditions into Confederate territory. “In all our expeditions in 
North Carolina we have depended upon the negroes as guides,” 
Mix claimed, “for without them we could not have moved with 
any safety.” He was particularly grateful for slaves’ guidance in 
the Low Country, as “nowhere in the swamps of  North Carolina 
can you find a path where a dog can go that the negro does 
not understand.”27 “Upwards of  fifty volunteers of  the best and 
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most courageous,” reported Vincent Colyer, superintendent 
of  the poor in New Bern, North Carolina in 1862, “were kept 
constantly employed on the perilous but important duty of  
spies, scouts, and guides.”28 In these tasks, Colyer recounted, 
slaves barely escaped with their lives, as they were pursued on 
several occasions by bloodhounds and taken as prisoners.29 He 
affirmed that African American operatives were “invaluable and 
almost indispensible [sic]” and “frequently went from thirty to 
three hundred miles within the enemy’s lines” to “bring back 
important and reliable information.”30 Such accounts confirmed 
that many Union leaders had begun to recognize the advantages 
and the value of  slaves’ intelligence. 
In March 1862, Congress instituted The Act Prohibiting 
the Return of  Slaves, which barred Union soldiers from returning 
fugitive slaves to their owners. The new article undermined the 
Fugitive Slave Act of  1850—which legally required all runaway 
slaves to be returned to their masters—and marked a turning 
point in federal policy.31 In April 1862, Major General Abner 
Doubleday’s instructions to Colonel J.D. Shaul, Commander 
of  the 46th New York Infantry, cited the new article of  war in 
requiring his troops to treat fugitive slaves “as persons and not 
as chattels.” “Under no circumstances has the commander of  
a Fort or camp the power of  surrendering persons claimed as 
fugitive slaves as this cannot be done without determining their 
character,” Doubleday affirmed. When asked by the commander 
if  it would be better to exclude fugitive slaves altogether from 
Union lines, Doubleday responded, “…they bring much valuable 
information which cannot be obtained from any other source. 
They are acquainted with all the roads, path fords and other natural 
features of  the country and they make excellent guides. They 
also know and frequently have exposed the haunts of  secession 
spies and traitors and the existence of  rebel organization. They 
will not therefore be excluded.”32 
A July 1862 article in the Chicago Tribune cemented this 
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opinion, advocating for an “immediate alliance with the slaves 
of  rebels” as they were the most versatile guides, a sort of  “live 
map.”33 The article continued:
Oh, how must the Genius of  rebellion have 
grinned, from her outlook, at the misguided 
wandering in an unmapped wilderness of  
an army of  invasion! Maps! Useless works 
of  the engineering art, when negroes, live 
maps, that could see, and walk, and talk, 
and point with the index finger—crowds 
of  them—stood expectant within reach of  
our army, and hungered and thirsted to be 
employed to conduct us to the enemy by 
the driest and best paths—maps capable of  
leading us, with unerring certainty, through 
the woods to the lowest and weakest parts 
of  the line of  entrenchments the rebels had 
thrown up…aged maps, sold from plantation 
to plantation, through the Peninsula, and 
familiar from ancient coon-hunting, and still 
persistent night wandering, with every road 
and swamp in it…would have led our army 
right up to the places of  weakness…I knew 
108,000 men in April last who, under such 
guidance and such God-speed, would have 
stormed the gates of  hell.34
The Chicago Tribune reporter, like Doubleday, promoted the 
Union’s collaboration with slaves in gaining military intelligence. 
Many Union military officials, however, resisted utilizing 
slaves in their military campaigns. “Not all Union officers 
welcome blacks into their lines,” explained Captain C.B. Wilder, 
Superintendent of  Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, as “many 
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were suspicious of  the abandoned and self-liberated slaves.” 
These officers “lacked a forthright commitment to emancipation” 
and “placed a higher value upon potentially loyal slaveholders 
than upon demonstrably loyal slaves.”35 Specifically, Major 
General Don Carlos Buell, Commander of  the Army of  Ohio in 
Kentucky, sought to exclude all slaves from Union lines despite 
the fact that slaves provided “in every case the most reliable 
as well as important information of  the rebel movements” to 
officers in Kentucky and Tennessee. In April 1862, the Chicago 
Tribune reported that Major General Buell received “the means of  
detecting officers and spies lurking in Nashville [in Tennessee],” 
critical information that enabled him “to nip a conspiracy in the 
bud and prevent an insurrectionary movement.” Nonetheless, 
Buell denied the intelligence of  slaves, “…a people who are 
naturally enemies to those who hold them in bondage.”36  
Yet, other Union military officials quickly learned the 
value of  African Americans’ willingness to provide intelligence 
and became staunch opponents of  proslavery military policies. 
Initially, like most Union generals at this pre-emancipation stage 
of  the war, Major General Ormsby M. Mitchel, commander 
of  a division of  the Army of  Ohio, did not encourage slave 
rebellion. He scrupulously conformed to Buell’s orders regarding 
fugitive slaves. However, Mitchel’s subordinates denounced 
such obedience. One commander of  an Ohio regiment offered 
his resignation in protest against Mitchel’s order–issued at the 
express direction of  Buell–to expel fugitive slaves from the 
camps of  their division. Characterizing the order as “repugnant 
to my feelings as a man,” the officer threatened to abandon his 
service if  forced to obey it. Although only a few other officers 
and enlisted men took such a principled stance, several faulted 
Mitchel for “inconsistency in regard to the eternal negro 
question.”37 Their resentment toward Buell’s solicitude for the 
rights of  slaveholders, and of  Mitchel’s subservience to Buell, 
was made blatantly apparent.38 
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Military circumstances prompted Mitchel to dissociate 
himself  from Buell’s policy though. In late March and early April 
1862, as the majority of  Buell’s army moved southwest from 
Nashville to join the other western armies at Pittsburg Landing, 
Tennessee, Mitchel’s division marched south toward Huntsville, 
Alabama, in the heart of  the Tennessee Valley plantation district. 
Deep in enemy territory and attempting to guard several hundred 
miles of  railroad and river, Mitchel depended on slaves for 
information about Confederate concentrations and movements. 
“With the assistance of  the Negroes in watching the River,” 
Mitchel expressed, “I feel myself  sufficiently strong to defy the 
enemy.” He later revealed that African Americans were “our 
only friends” and that “in two instances I owe my own safety 
to their faithfulness.”39 In gratitude, Mitchel promised military 
protection to his slave allies, “who have given me valuable 
assistance and information.” In May 1862, he wrote to Secretary 
of  War Edward M. Stanton requesting the “protection of  my 
government” for “slaves who furnish us valuable information.” 
Like his subordinate, Mitchel affirmed that if  his request 
were disapproved, “it would be impossible for me to hold my 
position.”40 Stanton endorsed the appeal. “The assistance of  
slaves is an element of  military strength which under proper 
regulations you are fully justified in employing for your security 
and the success of  your operations,” Stanton replied, and to 
abstain from its use “would be a failure to employ means to 
suppress the Rebellion.”41 
Mitchel corresponded with Stanton one month later 
in defense of  the slaves who assisted him. After reading a 
republished letter in The Philadelphia Inquirer that caused him “to 
fear that the Commanding General of  the Army has returned 
to their masters, Slaves, to whom I promised the permanent 
protection of  the Government of  the United States,” Mitchel 
wrote to Stanton attesting that these slaves “had rendered 
valuable services, and had obtained for me most important 
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information.” He begged for Stanton’s intervention on behalf  
of  these slaves, for “if  they fall into the hands of  their masters, 
their lives will not be safe.”42 Assistant Secretary of  War Peter H. 
Watson responded to Mitchel’s panicked letter, avowing that the 
newspaper’s statement had “no significant authority to sustain it” 
and thus Mitchel’s promise to the slaves was upheld.43 
At this pre-emancipation stage of  the war, Mitchel’s 
appreciation of  slaves’ assistance to Union troops fighting in 
the South was quite progressive. Even after January 1, 1863, 
Union military officers baselessly differentiated between fugitive 
slaves and outlined in a complex array the circumstances under 
which they should and should not be welcome in Union camps.44 
For example, Brigadier General Henry Hayes Lockwood, a 
commander of  volunteers in the lower Potomac, affirmed that 
“military camps shall not be used as places of  public resort or for 
idlers” and all should be denied admittance except those providing 
information. “Information will be sought for from all sources 
and rewards in money,” Lockwood declared, “with protection 
from danger from giving information may be promised to all, 
White and Black.”45 There was, seemingly, a difference drawn 
between accepting slaves as fugitives and accepting the integral 
intelligence that they brought with them. 
The value of  military intelligence held by enslaved, 
escaped, and freed African Americans became undeniably 
apparent. “It is utterly impossible for us to subdue the rebels, 
without an alliance with their slaves,” the Chicago Tribune detailed 
in July 1862, as “we have everywhere been helpless without 
these blacks, or exposed to hap-hazard.” The report recounted 
numerous Union military blunders and claimed that “this 
alliance with the slaves would have saved the precious, time-
wasting preparations.”46 Moreover, Union Colonel of  the 1st 
South Carolina Volunteers Thomas W. Higginson astutely noted 
that slaves “have been spies all their lives.” “You cannot teach 
them anything” with respect to clandestine activity, Higginson 
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revealed, and “I should not attempt to give them instructions…
they would better be able to teach me.” Higginson realized that 
slaves had practiced dissemblance and stealth throughout their 
lives. Nearly from birth, they learned “to travel furtively at night, 
to communicate surreptitiously, and to defend themselves”; they 
already mastered the arts of  masquerade, disguise, and forgery.47
Abraham Galloway was chief  among them. At the 
commencement of  the war, he traveled to the Confederacy seeking 
“to go South to incite insurrections.”48 Galloway joined Butler’s 
command at Fortress Monroe in May 1861 and “possess[ed] 
the fullest confidence of  the commanding General.”49 In the 
following two and a half  years, Galloway deployed his covert 
intelligence against the Confederacy from the Chesapeake Bay to 
the Mississippi River, risking his life skirting slave patrols, enemy 
scouts, and Confederate army units. Reporting directly to one 
of  the Union Army’s highest ranking field officers, Galloway 
seemingly played a significant role in Union intelligence in 
Virginia. In a letter to a colleague in the fall of  1863, Brigadier 
General Edward A. Wild, a colonel in the Army of  the Potomac, 
succinctly noted Galloway’s service as a spy: “I would like to do 
all I can for Galloway, who has served his country well.”50 
Former slaves such as Galloway were uniquely suited to 
operate behind enemy lines: they were familiar with southern 
life, able to fade unobtrusively into local slave communities, and 
conditioned to living by guile and by stealth. African Americans 
utilized their local knowledge and their experience to guide Union 
troops through the southern terrain. Accustomed to traveling 
furtively between southern plantations, they “were as thoroughly 
acclimated as the black snakes and alligators that bask in these 
Southern waters.”51 Additionally, African Americans’ knowledge 
of  the physical geography was especially helpful to Union 
soldiers. When two Northerners escaped from a Confederate 
prison camp in Columbia, South Carolina, they chanced upon a 
large plantation in Pickens District. The plantation’s slaves readily 
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“provided information about the local terrain, the movement of  
Confederate troops, the location of  practical supplies, and the 
presence of  rebels and political sympathizers alike.” They also 
advised the soldiers “to stop at the home of  John W. Wilson, 
a strong Union man.”52 Virtually everywhere Union soldiers 
traveled, they encountered slaves such as these ready to provide 
geographical information about the local terrain, the movement 
of  Confederate troops, the location of  pickets and armaments, 
and the presence of  rebels and political sympathizers alike. 
Additionally, slaves crafted maps of  the South, consisting 
of  paths unknown to their masters. Such cartographic diagrams—
shared amongst slaves and with Union troops—illustrated “the 
shortcuts and winding paths that crisscrossed the land and 
plantation boundaries and led out into the woods, along which 
people and goods moved clandestinely.”53 When W.L. Curry of  
the 1st Ohio Cavalry was cut off  from his command south of  the 
Tennessee River and was seeking safety, he met “a colored man 
going to mill with a sack of  corn on his back” who revealed that 
he was only ten miles away from his destination. “He directed me 
the way I should go,” Curry recalled, “and cautioned me to keep 
away from public roads, as the country was full of  rebel cavalry 
and I was liable to be picked up at any moment.”54 
Similarly, James Pike, a Texas-born white Union spy, 
received vital assistance from slaves he encountered while 
struggling to find his way back to his command in northern 
Alabama in the late summer of  1862. Having spent the night 
soaking wet after falling into a swamp, Pike chanced upon a 
plantation, where he befriended the working slaves and sought 
out their assistance. One young slave guided Pike away toward 
Huntsville, Alabama. Pike recounted, “My guide seemed to be 
perfectly at home in the swamp, and piloted the way for three 
miles over a string of  logs, which seemed to be arranged by 
accident, and not design, so as to form a complete chain across 
it, so that we were landed on the opposite side without wading a 
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step.”55 Curry and Pike, astounded at the secret pathways that were 
revealed to them, were lucky beneficiaries of  slaves’ surreptitious 
travel methods.56 Such instances affirmed that “contrabands” 
provided “some of  the most valuable information” regarding 
the “position, movements, and plans of  the enemy, use of  
topography of  the country.”57 
African Americans’ greatest concealment was, naturally, 
their skin color, which allowed them to observe, eavesdrop, 
and carry back information to Union lines without suspicion. 
“Slave cover” rendered African Americans “so ubiquitous” in 
a southern household “that neither the table, the parlor, nor 
the sleeping room has any secrets from them.” They “catch up 
on everything that is said,” a Chicago Tribune reporter attested in 
August 1861, and “their opportunities for getting information 
are vastly better than those of  the poorer class of  whites…”58 
William Robinson, a driver and house servant on a North Carolina 
plantation, was “the kind of  slave whose mobility and access 
to white conversations provided him with valuable information 
and the means to relay it.”59 Although he was illiterate, he 
nonetheless outfoxed slaveholders by learning how to “listen 
carefully to every conversation held between white people.”60 
According to the Chicago Tribune, slaves such as Robinson “hung 
about groups of  whites,” their “countenances unutterably stolid, 
or grinning with stupid indifference,” as if  they neither heard 
nor understood, yet actually retained and transmitted everything 
said.61 In his autobiography, late nineteenth century black activist 
Booker T. Washington recounted that slaves “got knowledge of  
the results of  great battles before the white people,” owing to 
the clever machinations of  the bondman assigned to pick up the 
mail. “The man who was sent to the office would linger about 
the place long enough to get the drift of  the conversation from 
the group of  white people,” Washington revealed, and “the mail-
carrier on his way back to our master’s house would as naturally 
retail the news that he had secured among the slaves.”62 In these 
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ways, slaves were constantly a step or two ahead of  their masters.
Union military officials such as Lieutenant Colonel 
Josiah Given, a commander of  an Ohio regiment, benefited 
from such covert activities. While stationed in Tennessee in 
December 1862, Given received information from a slave named 
Johnston, who arrived at his pickets and informed him “that he 
overheard [a party of  the southern cavalry] tell his master that 
they were going to a certain point on the road from Shelbyville 
to Fayetteville that night and would attack and capture a supply 
train that was to pass there in the morning.” Acting upon this 
information, Given sent two infantry companies, accompanied 
by Johnston who served as a guide, to surround and to capture 
the enemy. “They reported to me to have found everything just 
as [Johnston] represented,” Given attested.”63 Simply by working 
as human chattel within southern homes, slaves were capable of  
utterly undercutting those who were fighting a war to keep them 
in bondage.  
“Slave cover” proved so effective for Union intelligence 
that Sarah Emma Edmonds, a white northern woman, disguised 
herself  as an African American male to infiltrate the Confederacy, 
crossing gender and racial lines. Edmonds “dyed her skin with 
silver nitrate, donned a minstrel wig, and posed in a double 
disguise as a man and an African American.”64 Playing the role 
of  a man named “Cuff,” she worked in Confederate kitchens 
and ramparts, and collected information on troop figures, 
fortifications, and morale. “Of  one thing I am sure,” the Chicago 
Tribune reported, “that the negroes, whose cunning and duplicity 
are wonderful, have a pretty fair idea of  what is going on, and 
only await the word to work fearful mischief.”65 
Beyond their own aptitude for clandestine activities, 
African Americans advantageously exploited the ways in which 
white men perceived black men and defined the American Civil 
War. At the war’s onset, the majority of  white men, northern 
and southern, did not seriously consider African Americans 
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part of  the war effort.66 Historian Stephanie McCurry explains 
that whites on both sides of  the war viewed the conflict as the 
“Brothers’ War,” meaning white man against white man, not one 
in which slaves were included to participate. It was “the brothers 
who brought it on in their (divided) capacity as the people,” she 
explains, “and the brothers assumed it would be theirs to fight.”67 
Despite being excluded from political life (i.e. citizenry), slaves 
were counted, as labor, in the southern war effort; Confederate 
white men believed firmly that slaves were one of  the 
Confederacy’s “most potent elements of  strength.”68 McCurry 
reveals that Confederates assumed adamantly that “the southern 
negro ha[d] no sympathies with Northern abolitionists.”69 African 
Americans could not seek out more than that kind of  oblivion, 
which allowed for their penetration of  Confederate lands. Thus, 
African Americans were capable of  taking advantage of  the 
southern collective mindset that could not envision them as 
agents actively undermining the Confederate war effort. 
In fact, southern slaveholders entered the war confident 
in their slaves’ devotion to the Confederacy. No master pondered 
if  his slaves would participate in the war, McCurry notes, as “racial 
ideology provided all of  the proof  needed of  slaves’ willingness 
to serve the masters’ cause.”70 In his March 1861 “Cornerstone 
Speech,” Confederate Vice President Stephens explained that 
the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, 
upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white 
man; that slavery is his natural and moral condition.”71 Thus, the 
Houston Telegraph declared, “if  slavery is what we believe it to 
be—the best form of  society—it is not only fitted for peace but 
for the exigencies of  war.”72 Human bondage was not considered 
a “necessary evil”—it was deemed a legitimate advantage to the 
southern war effort. 
Such racial ideology solidified slaveholders’ risky 
undertaking. “One salutary result of  the movement in favor of  
Southern independence has been the awakening of  Northern 
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minds to the true relations existing between the negro and the 
white man,” wrote a Louisiana editor in March 1861. “The idea 
of  the equality of  race is a figment,” he maintained, as “the 
negro is happiest” when in servitude.73 Accordingly, Chief  of  
the Confederate Bureau of  War Albert T. Bledsoe affirmed 
“that almost every slave would cheerfully aid his master in the 
work of  hurling back the fanatical invader.”74 “They would as 
soon suspect their children of  conspiring against their lives,” a 
correspondent of  the Charleston Mercury stated, affirming that 
planters had absolutely nothing to fear regarding their slaves 
in wartime.75 In fact, “many masters…have actually called their 
slaves together and given them long pretended ‘explanations’ 
of  the pending troubles,” the Chicago Tribune reported in August 
1861, “and told them bug bear stones of  what the Abolitionists 
in ‘Old Abe’s’ army would do to them if  they ever got them 
in their clutches.”76 Thus, enslaved men and women were to be 
entirely disposed depending upon their masters’ consent.77 Early 
thoughts of  slavery as an element of  strength in the war rested 
upon the baseless assumption that slaves would simply join the 
southern effort. 
As secessionists boasted about the advantages of  
slavery to a republic at war, their slaves sought to undermine 
directly that very notion. Nearly everywhere behind Confederate 
lines, slaves attempted to be informed of  military and political 
developments, which, in a variety of  ways, eroded the customary 
masterly authority. According to Booker T. Washington, slaves 
in the hills of  western Virginia “watched…every success of  the 
Federal armies and every defeat of  the Confederate forces…with 
the keenest and most intense interest.”78 Indeed, a former slave 
who lived in a remote section of  east-central Texas divulged, 
“during them times just like today nearly everybody knows what 
going on” and that slaves helped “news travel pretty fast.”79 
Major General Butler’s experience outwitting local 
planters in New Orleans demonstrated slaves’ intimate knowledge 
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of  southern activities. Following his successful amphibious 
assault on Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina in August 1861, 
Butler traveled to New Orleans and took command of  the city. 
While attempting to bring order to the city, he implemented 
“speedy and condign punishment” of  southern offenders, which 
fostered a prevailing belief  “that nothing could be done there 
that [he] could not find out.” It was supposed that Butler had 
“the best spy system in the world.” That was quite true, yet not 
in the way Confederates imagined. In early June 1862, Butler was 
informed of  a series of  “sewing bees” taking place in the house 
of  a Confederate woman, where secessionist women gathered to 
craft a flag to send to a Confederate New Orleans regiment. When 
he confronted the ringleader, she instinctively denied his charges. 
“General, you must be mistaken; you have been misinformed 
as to the person,” she claimed. Butler retorted, “Madam, if  I 
were you I wouldn’t deny that which you know and I know. You 
have had that flag made; it is finished and in your house; and I 
should get it from there now, as I have seen fit to move about 
it, if  I had to take down your house from roof  to hearth-stone.” 
After revealing the flag, she asked Butler, “which of  those girls 
gave information about this flag?” as she was certain that “it was 
not one of  my servants.” “‘I have no objection to you secession 
women eating each other like Kilkenny cats,” Butler replied, “but 
you may accuse her unjustly. It may be your servants, which I 
suppose you have.” She adamantly retorted, “No, it was not my 
servants, General; that won’t do.” Butler later revealed in his 
private writings that, in truth, “the negroes all came and told me 
anything they thought I wanted to know.”80
A similar instance of  surreptitious slaves emasculating 
their ‘patriarchs’ was recorded in the diary of  Julia LeGrand, the 
daughter of  a successful Louisiana planter and a New Orleans 
resident.81 James Woodson, a slave of  Jack Toney in Fluvanna 
County, Virginia, escaped from his cruel master and reached 
Union troops under the command of  General Philip Sheridan, 
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then raiding Virginia. The fugitive directed Union soldiers to 
the home of  his former employer and had his master tied up 
and whipped as Woodson’s master had done to the former 
slave countless times. Woodson then guided the Union soldiers 
to abundant stores of  armaments, which they took away or 
destroyed on the spot.82 Such activities aggravated Southerners 
and prompted them to further punish their slaves. Likewise, 
the slaves on John Williams’s plantation in Helena, Arkansas, 
exposed their master’s small supply of  arms and ammunition. 
Lieutenant M.H. David recalled, “When upon investigating his 
‘negroes’, I ascertained that Williams had in his possession [guns 
and rifles], which he had just denied saying he was an honest 
man and did not have any use for arms, or ammunition…
consequently I had his house minutely searched…” David found 
many guns, some of  which were even hidden within his wife’s 
belongings. Similar to Butler’s confession, David admitted, “The 
‘negroes’ told me that [Williams] had [the arms and ammunition] 
the night before…”83 Ultimately, masters least appreciated 
being undermined. A Louisiana editor and slaveholder, John H. 
Ramsdell characterized this best when he described his slaves 
as “ungrateful and vindictive scoundrels who took possession 
of  their master’s property, pointed his place of  refuge out to 
the enemy, or voluntarily acted as guides to them in their 
marauding overspreading of  our country.”84 Yet, slaveholders 
were helpless—the slaves were the enemy within. 
The continuation of  extensive black communication 
networks formed during the antebellum period allowed 
intelligence to travel over long distances, which further revealed 
the limits of  slaves’ supposed allegiance.85 “Somehow or other, by 
some secret telegraph which cannot be detected, whatever one 
learns is speedily communicated to the rest,” the Chicago Tribune 
reported in August 1861.86 John Azor Kellogg, Colonel of  the 
6th Wisconsin Infantry Volunteer Regiment, found the slave 
“telegraph line” in Georgia’s northeastern highlands particularly 
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useful in reporting on military activity within the region. Kellogg 
was so impressed with the information slaves provided that 
he characterized slaves “as a class, better informed of  passing 
events and had a better idea of  questions involved in the struggle 
between North and South, than the majority of  that class known 
as the ‘poor white’ of  the South.”87 
George Washington Albright, born a slave but who 
would later serve in the Mississippi State Senate as a free man 
in the 1870s, revealed a far better coordinated network of  
communication in Marshall County.88 “That was my first job in 
the fight for the rights of  my people,” he recalled, “to keep [slaves] 
informed and in readiness to assist the Union armies whenever 
the opportunity came.” Fifteen years old at the time, Albright 
had been “a runner for what we called the 4-Ls—Lincoln’s Legal 
Loyal League” and consequently, “traveled about the plantations 
within a certain range and got together small meetings in the 
cabins.”89 The South Carolina planter and politician James Henry 
Hammond was certain that he could see the disconcerting results 
of  such communication networks “on all the negro faces” on 
his plantation, Redcliffe, in late June 1863. Hammond took little 
comfort in the “peculiar furtive glance with which they regard me 
and a hanging off  from me that I do not like.”90 Such complaints 
resounded in the diaries and letters of  numerous slaveholders 
remaining at home or refuged at other sites, and testified to what 
could be considered a “second front” opened by slaves within 
the Confederacy.91  
Masters’ knowledge of  the lengths to which their slaves 
went to assist the enemy obliterated their fictions of  passivity and 
loyalty. “It eventually registered at every level of  the Confederate 
regime, from the plantation to the high officials of  central state 
authority,” McCurry affirms, and spawned a series of  significant 
adjustments in the southern conduct of  war. In August 1862, 
slaves from Beaufort, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia 
arrived at Union lines carrying valuable information threatening 
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the safety of  local Confederate troops. Accordingly, southern 
officers instructed to “make a reconnaissance up the country 
around Summerville, South Carolina” due to the “disturbance 
and alarm…caused by gangs of  runaway negroes, leagued 
with deserters in that neighborhood.”92 A few months later, 
Confederate Colonel Lawrence Keitt confirmed the persistent 
need for troops in coastal South Carolina to guard all of  the 
inlets along the coast. McCurry notes, “It was knowledge of  
those kinds of  inland waterways and the number and precise 
position of  Confederate troops, pickets, fortifications, and guns” 
that slaves “conveyed in astonishing detail to federal forces in 
Beaufort.”93 Thus, Keitt assigned more men, whom he could 
not afford to relinquish from his own operations, to join the 
“three cavalry companies…and two infantry companies” already 
assigned to guard and patrol the coast.94 Keitt’s understanding 
of  vulnerable points of  exit and entry along the coast of  South 
Carolina demonstrated the challenges slaveholders faced in 
trying to keep the enemy out when there was another enemy to 
guide them in.95 
Similarly, in November 1862, a Confederate Major 
Jeffords ordered the removal of  the slaves of  Mr. Warren, an 
Ashepoo River planter, on “incontestable proof ” that they were 
“in continual intercourse with the enemy” and thus endangered 
his picket line. Jeffords’ commanding officer confirmed the truth 
of  the charges against local slaves. When he sent a scout “who 
pretended to be a Yankee” to test “one or two negroes near the 
enemy’s lines,” they provided him with “all the information an 
enemy could desire in regard to position and strength of  my 
pickets.”96 Union naval men operating on the South Carolina 
rivers relied on this type of  intelligence to strategize and 
plan their operations. “It is a matter of  notoriety,” lamented 
Confederate States District Attorney P.H. Aylett, “in sections of  
the Confederacy where raids are frequent that the guides of  the 
enemy are nearly always free negroes and slaves.”97 
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In an attempt to maintain southern order and prevent 
slaves from assisting the Union, the Confederacy created 
the “Twenty Negro Law” in October 1862, which provided 
exemptions from military service to those who owned twenty 
or more slaves.98 Among planters and state officials, the “Twenty 
Nigger Law,” as white southerners called it, generated demands 
to protect plantations and curtail escape to the enemy. In late 
1863, near the town of  Charlotte, North Carolina, a planter 
requested a military exemption for his brother so that “order and 
discipline” might be better maintained “in the neighborhood.”99 
Women, who remained on plantations as their husbands served 
in battle, also voiced their fears publicly, writing hundreds of  
letters to state and Confederate officials imploring that men be 
released from military service to control slaves. “I fear the blacks 
more than I do the Yankees,” confessed Mrs. A. Ingraham of  
Vicksburg, Mississippi. In Virginia, one woman observed that 
living with slavery in wartime was like living “with enemies in 
our own households.”100 The imperatives of  controlling a restive 
slave population strained relations within the Confederacy 
and confirmed that slaves were, in fact, the Confederacy’s 
“open enemies” who were “well calculated to do [the South] 
immense injury.”101 The “Twenty Negro Law” was only the most 
conspicuous political example of  how slaves, the “second front,” 
came to undermine the slaveholders’ republic.102
Having first been seen as an element of  strength, slaves 
unquestionably became the enemy within the Confederacy, as 
they fled readily to Union lines and provided Union soldiers 
with pertinent information. Thus, in January 1864, Major-
General Cleburne proposed to emancipate slaves to “enlist 
their sympathies” in the Confederate cause, which blatantly 
acknowledged slaves’ potent impact on southern society. 
“Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by 
the actual presence or the approach of  the enemy, or even by 
a cavalry raid,” Cleburne recorded, “the whites can no longer 
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Application submited by Confederate Private Lycurgas Rees in May 1864 
for exemption from military service on the grounds of owning fifteen slaves, in 
accordance with the terms established by the “Twenty Negro Law” 
passed by the Congress of the Confederate States of America in October 1862
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with safety to their property only sympathize with our cause.”103 
Slavery forced the Confederacy “to wage war with the Union 
army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear,’” becoming “in a 
military point of  view, one of  our chief  sources of  weakness.”104
Despite the fact that both sides in the war starkly 
recognized the clandestine activities of  freed, enslaved, and 
runaway African Americans, their legacies are fleeting in 
historical memory. Cloaked in secrecy and often illiterate, African 
Americans’ covert work is rarely recorded. “Not surprisingly,” 
historian David S. Cecelski writes, “Galloway’s duties as a spy 
consigned the details of  his missions to the shadows.”105 Galloway, 
Butler, and other Union officers whom the former slave assisted 
were continually reticent about precisely where Galloway 
traveled and what he did; they put little, if  anything, into writing. 
While Galloway occasionally alluded to his service as a spy in 
postwar years, he never divulged the particulars of  his covert 
activities behind enemy lines.106 An excerpt of  a later speech to 
the Republican State Convention in Raleigh, North Carolina, in 
September 1867, demonstrated Galloway’s oblique manner of  
discussing his service as a Union spy: “I rendered good service 
to this government—if  I didn’t do it publicly, I did it privately.”107 
In particular, how Galloway survived in the Deep South after 
being captured at Vicksburg in 1862 and suddenly reappearing 
at a Union camp in New Bern, North Carolina, in mid-1863 
remains unknown. He was illiterate and never transcribed how 
he managed to escape from a Confederate stockade or prison 
camp in Mississippi and how he traversed from the heart of  
the Confederacy back to New Bern.108 A later edition of  the 
newspaper Anglo-African proved the only exception, as it alluded 
to Galloway being captured on the “distant Southern strand,” 
but provided no further information.109 Most likely, Galloway 
never fully revealed his experience as a captured Union spy in 
Mississippi.110 His life as a slave, fugitive, and spy trained him 
to take caution habitually, hardly provoking him to publicize his 
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efforts.111 
Like Galloway’s records, most military records of  African 
Americans’ covert activities are utterly incomplete.112 What remains 
are military correspondences noting the assistance of  “negroes,” 
indistinctly termed together and devoid of  any recorded identity. 
Nonetheless, each and every “negro” undoubtedly shaped the 
five-year conflict that resulted in a Union victory. 
By April 1865, the reality was evident: the attempt to 
build an independent slaveholding republic had failed. The 
southern vision crumbled in the face of  Union forces and the 
heroic resistance of  its own enslaved population. Rather than 
furthering its own ideals, the Confederate war effort cemented 
the destruction of  slavery.113 The war itself  highlighted that the 
slaves’ “war within” was boundless, that they undermined the 
Confederacy in ways unimaginable.114 The slaves proved, time 
and again, their vast abilities to assist the Union Army and Union 
Navy, so much so that by 1865, some Confederates even argued 
for the eradication of  slavery to ensure their own safety and the 
survival of  their own country. 
The war itself  produced the very conditions that enabled 
African Americans to participate in northern clandestine 
activities and become so detrimental to the southern cause—it 
was precisely because of  their exclusion from the political, and 
thereby military, arena that allowed for their casual exploitation 
of  the Confederacy. Despite the fact that southern planters and 
mistresses suspected and feared their slaves’ insurgent activities 
throughout the war, African Americans continually participated 
in covert activities throughout the five-year struggle. The war 
transformed the society it sought to preserve.
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Varun K. Menon
 As the leaves began to reach their boldest reds, oranges, 
and yellows across the Potomac River Valley in early November 
1811, Henry Clay and his family finally arrived in the nation’s 
capital after a seemingly endless journey along the rugged roads 
from their Kentucky home. His wife, Lucretia, had insisted 
that their six children accompany her if  she were to sustain the 
long trip to Washington D.C. Ever the “Great Compromiser,” a 
reputation he was destined to earn over a long career ahead of  
him in the United States (U.S.) Congress, Clay acquiesced to her 
demands in order to gain the desired outcome: he wanted his wife 
to be at his side for the beginning of  this next exciting chapter 
in his life.1 The 34-year-old Kentucky Republican had come to 
Washington D.C. to begin his third stint in Congress, having been 
previously appointed by the Kentucky Legislature two times to 
temporarily replace outgoing senators. This time, Clay returned to 
the capital for his first full congressional term in the U.S. House 
of  Representatives after his election by the voters of  Kentucky’s 
5th district.2
Washington City, as it was called in those days, was a far 
cry from the magnificent marble capital it would later become. 
Built in the middle of  a swamp off  the Potomac River on land 
ceded from Maryland and Virginia to create the permanent federal 
District of  Columbia, the settlement possessed hardly any of  the 
trappings that might lead one to even call it a city, much less the 
capital of  an independent country. In fact, it paled in comparison 
to even its neighboring towns in the District, Georgetown and 
Alexandria. European ministers representing their home nations 
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Representative Henry Clay (DR-KY) transformed the 
office of Speaker of the House into a position of un-
precedented political power in the Federal Government
in the American capital considered it a “hardship post,” as far 
removed from what they considered the civilized world as pos-
sibly imaginable. Members of  Congress would have strongly 
agreed. The landscape of  the city was marked by disorganized 
clusters of  disparate wooden houses and storefronts that dotted 
muddy lanes.3 Senators and representatives lodged in one of  the 
few ramshackle boarding houses populating the city during the 
sessions, which usually ran from December to April or to May 
of  the next year, depending on how much business had to be 
addressed. Given the wretched conditions of  the nation’s capi-
tal, the legislators left town in a hurry as soon as Congress ad-
journed,  leaving  the  city  with  hardly  any  residents.  Since  the 
livelihood of  the city was almost entirely dependent on govern-
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ment, business essentially halted after adjournment.4
At the top of  Jenkins Hill, what we call Capitol Hill 
today, was perched a beautiful white marble building designed 
by Dr. William Thornton, with two wings on either side that 
held the respective chambers of  the Senate and the House of  
Representatives.5 The gleaming United States Capitol and the 
President’s House (the White House) stood in stark contrast to 
their bleak surroundings, but nonetheless were the first symbols 
of  a burgeoning capital city and a rapidly ascendant American 
Republic. Outside of  deliberative sessions held at the United 
States Capitol, members would normally conduct most of  their 
personal business at their rented rooms at the boarding houses. 
There they wrote and read correspondence, received constituents, 
and parleyed with other congressmen. Clay and his family took 
up residence for the session at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house, 
down one of  the unpaved alleys leading up to Capitol Hill.6
Even before arriving in Washington City, Clay was 
devising his next move regarding what had become the 
paramount political issue of  the day: the prospect of  war against 
Great Britain. Since his last time in the capital, he had become 
the leading voice for a faction that believed the United States 
faced a crisis of  national honor in the face of  continued British 
aggression. The present tensions had begun when the U.S. 
professed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars that were consuming 
the European continent and much of  the Atlantic World. Neither 
Britain nor France seemed to respect this position, instead opting 
to seize private American vessels attempting to trade in the ports 
of  the enemy. At the recommendation of  President Thomas 
Jefferson, Congress enacted an embargo on all goods imported 
or exported overseas in order to pressure Britain and France to 
respect American neutrality.
This policy backfired, proving disastrous to the young 
republic’s economic health while extracting no concessions from 
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either power.7 Despite several instances of  French violations, 
it was the former motherland’s especially bold offenses against 
U.S. sovereignty that pricked the American conscience most. 
Repeated instances of  naval seizures on the high seas and 
ongoing military aid to agitated Native American tribes on the 
western frontier reinforced Clay’s publicly-stated conclusion that 
the young republic had no other choice but to fight a second 
war of  independence. “Is the time never to arrive when we may 
manage our own affairs without the fear of  insulting his Britannic 
Majesty?” Clay had implored his colleagues in the Senate a year 
earlier, “Is the rod of  British power to be forever suspended over 
our heads?”8
With animated orations such as that, Clay carved out 
a reputation across the country as the impassioned firebrand 
for the movement to defend the nation’s integrity through war 
with Great Britain. “The Western Star,” as he was being called, 
was not alone in this quest. In fact, the 34-year-old Kentuckian 
formed the vanguard of  a rising coalition of  Republicans 
derisively labeled by their enemies as the “War Hawks.” These 
younger members from the southern and western regions mainly 
sat in the House, and prominently included John C. Calhoun 
(DR-SC), Langdon Cheves (DR-SC), William Lowndes (DR-
SC), Felix Grundy (DR-TN), and William Wyatt Bibb (DR-GA). 
They agitated for armed conflict with Great Britain in retaliation 
for the offenses they believed that nation had committed against 
U.S. sovereignty. There was also a controversial claim that the 
War Hawks meant to expand the nation territorially through 
war, especially by invading and annexing British Canada. The 
War Hawks surprised the Republican Party establishment by 
organizing quickly following their election and by coalescing 
around a central legislative strategy to lead the nation into 
war.9 On the eve of  the first session of  the 12th United States 
Congress, the young War Mess, as the core Hawks were known, 
Penn History Review     47 
The War That Congress Waged
met for dinner at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house to discuss their 
strategy for the next day and the coming months.10 Little did 
they know that they were on the verge of  ushering in a new 
age in American politics and foreign affairs, one that would see 
the Congress come to exercise unprecedented influence over the 
foreign relations of  the United States.
THE TRAILBLAZING TWELFTH CONGRESS
In the rapidly ascendant American Republic of  the early 
nineteenth century, the 12th United States Congress (elected to sit 
from 1811 to 1813) heralded a new era of  legislative assertiveness 
in national politics and particularly in foreign affairs. There were 
many accompanying trends both domestically and internationally 
that would facilitate the emergence of  Congress as an independent 
pole from the executive branch in the foreign policy-making 
process during the next eighteen years. First, the 12th Congress 
constituted one of  the youngest groups of  lawmakers in 
American history to take control of  the legislative branch. Public 
discontent with the inept gridlock of  the previous Congress had 
caused angry constituents to clean the House and the Senate of  
its many seasoned incumbents in favor of  young challengers who 
promised decisive action. The result was perhaps the greatest 
electoral purge in American political history: with 62 freshmen, 
44 percent of  the entire House membership in the 12th Congress 
was new amid some states replacing their entire delegations.11 
Following this slaughter at the ballot box, the majority of  new 
members in the House were under the age of  forty, including 
the 34-year-old Clay.12 These young representatives accurately 
represented a young nation whose average national age was only 
sixteen years old.13 This unprecedented youth and inexperience 
in Congress, coupled with a clear voters’ mandate for legislative 
action to confront the ongoing international conflict, no doubt 
had an effect in reforming modes of  thinking about how the 
legislative branch should engage in international affairs and 
Penn History Review     48 
The War That Congress Waged
American statecraft.
The significance of  this shift is reinforced by examining 
the career trajectories and legacies of  the freshmen entering 
Congress between 1811 and 1815. The two momentous sittings 
of  the legislative branch that witnessed the full declaration and 
prosecution of  the War of  1812, as well as the 12th and 13th 
Congresses (the “War Congresses”), would give birth to the 
careers of  some of  the finest statesmen in American history. 
A prominent sketch and series of  biographies from Congress 
written in 1850 names the men who were viewed as the most 
important legislators of  that time. In addition to Clay and 
Calhoun, there was Daniel Webster (F-NH), John Forsyth (DR-
GA), Nathaniel Macon (DR-NC), William Gaston (F-NC), 
Thomas Pickering (F-MA), John W. Taylor (DR-NY), Charles J. 
Ingersoll (DR-PA), and William Rufus King (DR-AL).14 All were 
members of  the House and, with the exception of  the veterans 
Pickering and Macon, were freshmen in either the 12th or 13th 
Congress. As the 1850 biographer would later observe of  these 
prominent lawmakers, “most of  them [were] just starting, with 
generous rivalry, upon their race of  distinction.”15 Simply put, the 
young men that were entering the federal legislature during the 
12th and 13th Congresses amid the buzz of  war were to reshape 
the landscape of  American politics in the next half  century. It is 
interesting to note for our purposes that of  the eight freshmen 
mentioned, five received their start on committees of  foreign 
affairs or gained early prominence in foreign policymaking.16 
The assertive transformation in legislative thinking 
symbolized by the entrance of  an emboldened generation of  
young lawmakers was also augmented by a second ongoing trend 
in the country: the meteoric expansion of  the nation and the 
resulting legislative apportionments in the West. As the nation’s 
population had roughly doubled in the approximately twenty 
years since the Constitution’s ratification in 1788, the House 
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in particular was growing at a rapid pace. Between the census 
years of  1800 and 1810, the national population soared from 
5.3 million to 7.2 million, while the geographic land area of  the 
country expanded by 865,000 square miles to 1,682,000 square 
miles.17 As a result of  the nation’s exponential growth, the House 
ballooned from 65 seats at its inception in 1789 to 181 seats for 
the 13th Congress in 1813.18 This proliferation would have major 
implications for the structure, operation, and temperament of  
the House: with each admitted state and newly-created seat, it 
was increasingly untenable for the body to function in its original 
form as a collegial assembly that lacked deliberation restrictions 
and a hierarchical leadership order. 
These constraints most assuredly caused the House 
to reshape itself  during this period, a process which would 
accelerate during the 12th and 13th Congresses with the War of  
1812. The reformed House of  Representatives would emerge 
from the metamorphosis with more responsive, polished, and 
effective mechanisms that would facilitate its freshmen members’ 
legislative assertiveness in foreign policymaking and international 
statecraft in the coming years. Additionally, it is significant to note 
that population gains (and thus, legislative apportionment gains) 
were coming largely from the recently admitted western states. 
The interests for war with Great Britain among this region’s 
electorate were intimate and clearly delineated: the British were 
suspected to be actively aiding and abetting Native American 
tribes led by Shawnee Chief  Tecumseh’s confederation in their 
repulsions of  white settlers. Each defeat on the frontier was a 
smarting reminder of  the former motherland’s continued hand 
on the continent.19 Given these circumstances, it is no wonder 
that the young War Hawks faction mobilized so quickly and 
gained a position of  preeminence in the House within one 
election cycle.
The third trend was the breakdown of  the original two-
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party system, at least in terms of  congressional caucuses, which 
was beginning to run its course as early as the 10th Congress 
(1807-1809).20 With the Federalists now nationally irrelevant and 
fading into the sunset of  American history, Thomas Jefferson’s 
dominant Republican Party (the Democratic-Republicans) was 
already splintering into four discernable factions within Congress: 
the Clintonians, disciples of  the aging Vice President George 
Clinton (DR-NY), who harvested votes in New England and 
New York from the flagging Federalists by advocating commercial 
and shipping interests; the Tertium Quids (or simply, Quids), 
“old school” Jeffersonian Republicans who adhered to the strict 
constitutionalism and limited federal government approach of  
their clarion Representative John Randolph of  Roanoke (DR-
VA) and tied their long-term electoral hopes to the potential 
political resurgence of  James Monroe of  Virginia; the Invisibles, 
a peculiar faction largely relegated to the Senate that faithfully 
rallied to the banner of  Senator Samuel Smith (DR-MD) in his 
personal and political crusade against Secretary of  the Treasury 
Albert Gallatin; and finally, a faction of  Republicans who 
remained loyal to the Jefferson Administration and still looked 
to the White House for leadership.21 Nothing better exemplified 
the collapse in the Republican Party’s unity than the boycott of  
some sixty Clintonians (who supported James Monroe) from 
the party’s presidential caucus that nominated Secretary of  State 
James Madison of  Virginia for the 1808 ticket instead.22
These fissures were exacerbated by Jefferson’s increasing 
resignation from national politics as his departure from the 
Presidency grew imminent; during the course of  the 10th Congress, 
he had failed to exercise the leadership and discipline necessary 
to maintain his party’s unity for his successor. Considering that 
neither party had instituted proper partisan leadership structures 
in the legislative branch, the result was a total collapse in party 
cohesion.23 For reasons that will be explored next, President 
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James Madison was powerless to prevent the full fracturing of  the 
Republican caucus in the 11th Congress (1809-1811). So while the 
United States’ two parties remained nominally the Federalists and 
the Republicans, the latter’s commanding majorities in the House 
and the Senate no longer translated into legislative decisiveness. 
The sum outcome of  these circumstances was a power vacuum 
in both chambers that at worst threatened to render Congress, 
and the republican form of  government, irrelevant; but at best, 
it provided the perfect conditions for a new, fervent faction of  
lawmakers to seize command of  the entire body and impose 
their will on the nation with the full constitutional arsenal of  
legislative powers ascribed to the federal legislature.
A fourth unavoidable contribution to an environment 
conducive to legislative assertiveness in foreign affairs was the 
man who occupied the White House when the 12th Congress 
took office in late 1811. James Madison, the “Father of  the 
Constitution” and the first President to have served in a 
post-Constitution Congress, was considered the preeminent 
champion of  legislative supremacy among the Founding Fathers. 
“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates,” Madison had stipulated without qualification in 
The Federalist No. 51, a viewpoint that he more or less maintained 
throughout his entire tenure of  public service.24 In general, the 
Virginian believed that the executive should submit to the will 
of  the national legislature for democratic governance to be truly 
successful. Perhaps because of  this principled commitment to 
legislative government, Madison proved to be different from his 
three presidential predecessors.
Previous executive administrations had featured forceful 
and occasionally overbearing leadership that significantly 
influenced the mechanics of  Congress. President George 
Washington, “Father of  the Nation” as he was, commanded a 
peerless respect over the government with a cabinet of  legendary 
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American Revolution Era figures that included the two major 
partisan poles of  the time: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas 
Jefferson. Despite or probably because of  his refusal to seize 
power for himself  in the wake of  the American Revolutionary 
War (1775-1783), Washington was a particularly powerful 
executive whom the American public and its representatives 
held in the highest regard. His successor, John Adams, was 
survived by a mixed legacy of  enhancing federal power through 
unbridled executive authority during the Quasi-War (1789-1800). 
And Thomas Jefferson, father of  the Republican Party (the 
Democratic-Republican Party as it is called today) and ostensible 
champion of  limited federal and executive authority, exercised 
enormous influence in Congress with overwhelming majorities in 
both chambers keen to prove their loyalty to him with their every 
action. The first two decades of  the American Republic had thus 
witnessed the powerful force of  partisan politics emerge from 
leadership within the executive branch.
But in contrast to his strong-armed predecessors, 
President Madison seemed to depart in varying degrees from 
the first three administrations’ reliance on executive authority 
and on more assertive leadership in both foreign and domestic 
affairs. Madison’s republican ideology and insistence that the 
bulk of  national decision-making remain with and in Congress 
seemed to preclude him from attempting to dominate or to 
coerce the legislative body in the ways that his predecessors 
had.25 Unlike Jefferson, Madison was neither willing nor capable 
of  wielding the presidential influence (especially in terms of  
partisan leadership in the Democratic-Republican caucus) that 
his preponderate forerunner had mastered to gain his desired 
outcomes in legislative action. Furthermore, and unlike his three 
predecessors, Madison’s election by a congressional caucus would 
ensure that his political leash originated in the legislative branch. 
Unlike Jefferson, who raised his congressional colleagues to their 
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positions, Madison owed his own position to his congressional 
colleagues.26 In the words of  Professor Marshall Smelser, “As 
the creation of  the caucus, Madison could never dominate his 
makers.”27 As one shall see, this fact in particular would have 
major ramifications in the charge for war in 1812. In summary, 
while the party collapsed internally amid the factional crisis 
in Congress, help seemed unlikely and unable to come from 
Madison’s White House.
An early sign that Madison was not prepared to confront 
Congress, especially in foreign policy, came when he nominated 
his former Jefferson Cabinet colleague Albert Gallatin as 
his first Secretary of  State in 1809. Instead of  employing his 
recent electoral mandate and unquestioned leadership of  the 
Democratic-Republican Party to squash what appears to have 
been a petty personal fight over patronage as his predecessor 
likely would have done, Madison allowed the Senate to reject his 
appointee with no noticeable backlash.28 Led by the Invisibles 
faction of  Republicans, the Senate then proceeded to impose 
their will upon Madison by pressuring him to appoint their 
candidate of  choice, Robert Smith, the brother of  Senator Samuel 
Smith (DR-MD). The Senate undoubtedly knew that Smith was 
opposed to many aspects of  Madison’s foreign policy and was 
more than willing to collude with members of  Congress in order 
to accomplish his pro-war agenda.29 Instead of  presiding over an 
administration that would execute his wishes without question, 
Madison was mired down by Smith and his congressional allies 
within the Cabinet itself. 
The Senate had trodden over Madison and essentially 
planted one of  its own in his administration’s most important 
post. To accomplish his simplest foreign policy movements, the 
President had to outmaneuver his own primary diplomatic agent, 
who naturally held more of  an allegiance to Congress than his 
constitutional superior. Madison thought he could be his own 
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Secretary of  State, but by 1811, he finally had enough and 
demanded Smith’s resignation after a bitter series of  published 
exchanges regarding their differences.30 This first incident only 
reinforced the growing characterization that Madison would 
more or less accept Congress running roughshod over him 
whenever it pleased in order to avert inner-governmental conflict. 
Time after time in the coming years, Madison would propose 
diplomatic action to Congress that would ultimately die for lack 
of  executive inclination to exert political pressure.31 As one shall 
see, the leadership of  the young 12th Congress would prove more 
effective in pressuring the legislative-minded Madison to enact 
their will rather than his own.
THE HOUSE THAT CLAY BUILT
The combination of  an unusually large freshmen 
population in the 12th Congress, the rapid expansion of  the 
nation’s legislative apportionments (particularly in the West), 
the fracturing of  the two-party system, and the stewardship of  
a hesitant and ambivalent President precipitated the dynamic 
developments in the legislative branch’s foreign policy agency. 
Through political and institutional change within, due to 
the rapid proliferation in the body’s membership mentioned 
earlier, the House of  Representatives in particular would 
become the bellwether of  major developments in this unusual 
era of  legislative preeminence in international affairs. The 
monumental transformations in the making were portended by 
the unprecedented election of  Henry Clay as Speaker of  the 
House on November 4, 1811, the first day the 12th Congress 
convened.32 With the predetermined support of  his War Hawks 
faction, Clay was chosen from a cadre of  well-known Republican 
veterans to lead the House in his first day in the legislative body. 
Never before (excluding the first session of  the House in 1789) 
had a freshman been elected to lead the chamber, a feat that has 
since not yet been replicated. Clay’s elevation to the Speakership 
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signaled the tremendous authority that the House’s young 
freshmen would wield beginning on day one of  the first session, 
as well as the unparalleled period of  institutional and political 
change in Congress that the War Hawks were about to unleash.
Almost in diametric opposition to the institution one 
knows in the present age, the House of  Representatives was 
an indistinctly-formed body that lacked specialization and 
hierarchy. As discussed earlier, the Jeffersonian Republican 
ideal of  equality among legislators dictated that the House of  
Representatives operate much more in the way one thinks of  
the Senate today: members more or less had equal speaking 
rights and opportunities to serve on select committees, while 
strong leadership positions and rigid disciplinary structures 
were virtually absent. All forms of  hierarchy and specialization 
were looked upon with suspicion, meaning that clear leadership 
Although this image depicts Clay speaking in the Senate Chamber in 
1850, the Kentuckian was known for his oration and leadership skills 
throughout Congress
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chains or substantive standing committees were not present.33 
Although likely not realized at the time, even by Clay himself, 
the Kentucky freshman’s elevation to the Speakership was a 
major institutional milestone in American political history that 
would have major implications for the distribution of  power in 
the House of  Representatives and for bringing about the end 
of  the idealized Jeffersonian legislative system. Until that point, 
the Speakership had been largely apolitical and constitutional 
in nature, mimicking the presiding officer of  the British House 
of  Commons. The Speaker enforced House rules and ensured 
that members were accorded equal rights and fair opportunities 
to speak, but normally abstained from active political processes 
occurring within the body. In attempting to further his legislative 
goal of  declaring war on Great Britain, Clay transformed the 
position into one of  unrivaled political authority in the Congress, 
perhaps second nationwide only to the President of  the United 
States.34 
As mentioned before, Clay’s power play was facilitated by 
his War Hawks faction, of  which he was the undisputed leader; 
thus, Clay became the first Speaker of  the House who was 
simultaneously a party leader. Given that both the Democratic-
Republicans and the Federalists lacked a clearly delineated 
structure of  party leadership within either chamber—a feature 
that was to hasten their respective downfalls in the coming 
decades—political leadership had previously originated in the 
executive branch either from Cabinet secretaries or the President 
himself. Clay’s War Hawks changed this. Although they were a 
minority within the Republican Party, these energetic freshmen 
organized themselves remarkably well and coalesced aggressively 
behind a coherent platform of  war with Great Britain. The result 
was a bending of  wills in an amorphous and fractious Republican 
Party that had not filled the leadership vacuum created by 
President Jefferson’s departure from national politics. 
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Holding the Speakership with a partisan mandate from 
his War Hawks, Clay steadily manipulated the position’s nascent 
powers in order to accomplish his faction’s primary objective 
of  declaring war on Great Britain in 1812 and of  effectively 
contriving the major political office that one knows today as 
a byproduct of  that charge. Clay interpreted the House rules 
to further his faction’s war mission, used his constitutional 
discretion to set the chamber’s agenda, and controlled debate 
recognition while sometimes participating and voting, hitherto 
unseen in the Speakership.35 But of  all the Speaker’s powers that 
Clay manipulated to gain undisputed command of  the House’s 
legislation and political action, the most significant was the 
committee appointment powers. The powers themselves were 
a result of  the previously mentioned growth of  the House: it 
had been the original custom for the entire House to elect the 
membership of  every committee as the Senate still continued to 
do, but the need for expediency in an exponentially-expanded 
legislative body forced the House to defer to the Speaker’s best 
judgment.36
Although generally expected to be fair and impartial in 
appointing, Clay did not deploy this power neutrally. Immediately 
after his election, he packed committees with War Hawks and 
other members loyal to him, while appointing faithful chairmen 
to help him prosecute the House’s war mission.37 As a result, 
Clay had consolidated extensive powers into the Speakership 
against the backdrop of  the war charge in early 1812. As both 
party leader and presiding officer of  the House, he was able 
to empower the War Hawks with unprecedented influence in 
driving the House agenda, while crushing his opposition in both 
established parties through ruthless exercise of  the Speaker’s 
constitutional authorities as a means of  keeping order.38 In 
observing the dangers of  Clay’s rapid concentration of  authority 
within the Speakership, Josiah Quincy III (F-MA) remarked in a 
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floor speech, “His power is, in truth, the power of  the House.”39
Of  course, Clay’s maneuvers were not without backlash; 
when the Speaker appeared to be willing to use his recognition 
powers to curb the length of  debate given the size of  the body 
and the necessity for swift action, Representative Hugh Nelson 
(DR-VA) proffered an amendment to the House Rules so that 
“when the previous question is ordered to be taken, upon the 
main question being put, every member, who has not already 
spoken, shall have the liberty to speak once.”40 While Nelson was 
also a Republican, he was closely allied with Representative John 
Randolph and his ultra-conservative Tertium Quid Republicans, 
who quickly became Clay and the War Hawks’ main opposition. 
As a sign that Clay’s anti-war opposition was mounting, 
Nelson’s amendment was also defended by members of  the 
Federalist minority who were also reeling for a shot at the young 
Speaker. Others lamented Clay’s manipulation of  the Speaker’s 
committee appointment powers to satisfy his political will for 
war. Representative Samuel Taggart (F-MA) noted that even a 
random selection of  committee chairs would result in “more 
respectable chairmen than those placed in that situation by the 
Speaker. The business however itself  of  the Speaker selecting at 
pleasure the characters composing the several committees is in 
itself  a monstrous feature in our Government.”41
But this opposition would be unable to ground the 
rising Western Star, who more than anyone in the entire nation 
was adamantly leading the country into war. Even some of  his 
greatest political rivals, including then-Representative Daniel 
Webster (F-NH), could not deny the power that Clay had 
wielded in the Speaker’s chair. His lifelong friend and biographer 
summarized Clay’s position during the 12th and 13th Congresses: 
“Certainly, no one has ever presided over any deliberative body, 
in this country, with more personal popularity and influence 
than Mr. Clay. He governed the House with more absoluteness 
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than any Speaker who preceded or followed him.”42 Through 
the course of  the 1812 warpath, the Speaker would only further 
cultivate his power; as a result, Clay’s practices have become the 
commonly-accepted prerogatives of  House Speakers and are the 
conventions that make the position so powerful today.
Externally and in terms of  relations with the other 
branches of  government, the consolidation of  authority in a 
dominant Speaker empowered the House of  Representatives 
to promote its constitutional and political interests through 
the recognition of  its single and directly accountable voice for 
the large chamber. With the realistic promise of  swift political 
action and party discipline, the Speaker could now negotiate 
authoritatively in meetings with both the Senate and the 
President, and that is exactly what Clay did. Beginning in the 
spring of  1812, he and other House leaders began regularly 
initiating meetings with the President and his Cabinet to advance 
their war charge. The consolidation of  the House’s leadership 
powers in the Speaker would further the lower chamber’s external 
agency and give the War Hawks tremendous leverage over both 
its legislative counterpart and the Executive Branch. Since the 
Constitution only stipulates that the Speaker is a presiding officer 
for the House in a parallel fashion to the Vice President and 
President Pro Tempore in the Senate, it is fascinating to consider 
that the Speakership may have never become more than what 
the Presidency of  the Senate or its British antecedent are without 
Clay’s formative machinations in pursuit of  the war goals of  
1812.
Clay was also riding the waves of  the second major 
institutional transformation in the House of  Representatives: 
the standing committee system. Since the 1st Congress (1789-
1791), both the House and the Senate had opted not to create 
a formalized standing committee system. Instead they retained 
the Continental Congress’ previously discussed practice of  
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appointing temporary “select committees” as needed. In keeping 
with a common belief  held especially among Jeffersonian 
Republicans that the Congress should accord equal standing 
for all legislators, select committees were preferred as a way 
of  diminishing specialization and hierarchy in both chambers 
while retaining the majority’s authority. Many lawmakers also 
began to view temporary select committees as a way to guard 
against undue executive influence. During the first years of  the 
new government under the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, 
Secretary of  the Treasury and father of  the Federalist Party, 
favored the referral of  legislative proposals to executive 
departments before congressional committees in keeping in 
line with his program to build a government characterized by 
a dominant executive branch.43 The Jeffersonian Republicans 
though, who gained control of  the House in the 2nd Congress, 
vehemently opposed this proposed practice under their doctrine 
of  legislative supremacy. This controversy of  institutional 
organization had followed on the heels of  the Pacificus-Helvidius 
debates and further contributed to the great partisan divide 
between the Federalists and the Republicans in the 1790s.
In response to Hamilton’s advances, congressional 
Republicans had barred the President, Cabinet secretaries, and 
other executive agents from initiating reports, coming to speak 
on the House floor, and introducing legislation in Congress, 
conventions that have remained in effect to the present day. All 
were measures taken to combat the growing concern that “the 
Executive had swallowed up the legislative branch,” as Jefferson 
had put it. By the end of  the Washington Administration and the 
first four Congresses, the House and the Senate had both solidly 
committed to developing their own methods for obtaining 
information and for gaining expertise that was independent of  
executive officers and agencies.44 Defeating Hamilton’s procedural 
design and asserting full legislative autonomy “put an end to a 
tendency that could have moved the country in the direction 
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of  British cabinet government,” as historian George Goodwin 
noted in attributing the reasons that the U.S. government 
developed with separate but equal branches despite Congress’ 
original institutional similarity to the British Parliament.45
Although the institution of  the committee provided 
Congress with the means to resist undue executive influence, 
the House of  Representatives and the Senate still largely relied 
only on temporary select committees to fill the essential duties 
of  conducting reports and authoring legislation by the time that 
Clay entered the legislative body. The common practice at the 
time was for the entire House to resolve itself  into a “Committee 
of  the Whole,” not only to hammer out the essential elements 
of  any legislation in open debate, but also to assign a select 
committee to fulfill that action further, although with very 
specific instructions. The lack of  independent, permanent, and 
specialized committees owed itself  to the widespread Jeffersonian 
belief  that “committees with substantial policy discretion and 
permanence might distort the will of  the majority.”46 Thus, select 
committees were dissolved immediately upon completion of  
their carefully delineated task.
But by the end of  the first decade of  the nineteenth century, 
the House, due to its growing size, was finding it inexpedient 
and impractical for the body to resolve aspects of  legislation and 
other actions before committing it to a lower panel. The remedy 
was the standing committee, a subset of  the legislative body with 
well-defined membership, a fixed subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and an indefinite lifespan, rolling over from one Congress to the 
next.47 The permanency and specialized autonomy of  standing 
committees enabled the House to generate more legislation, 
gather more intelligence, exercise greater oversight powers over 
the executive branch, and enhance legislative activism in virtually 
all respects. While the House’s small standing committee system 
was no more than a rudimentary fixture by the 12th Congress, 
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the institution would continue to mature with every session until 
blossoming right before the 1820s.48
For those Tertium Quid Republicans such as John 
Randolph who opposed both specialization and hierarchy in the 
legislature, Clay’s manipulation of  the Speaker’s appointment 
powers was doubly painful at a time when committees were 
gaining more practical autonomy through the growing practice 
of  granting themselves independence to report legislation 
on their own volition, rather than solely by commission of  
the Committee of  the Whole. While Clay only presided over 
the creation of  two new standing committees during the War 
Congresses and referred more business to his packed select 
committees, he would press for a fully-institutionalized system 
after the War of  1812, possibly to keep order in reaction to the 
breakdown of  his secure war coalition.49
While the warpath to 1812 facilitated dynamic 
developments in the House of  Representatives, the Senate 
remained relatively static during the course of  the 12th and 13th 
Congresses. Whereas the House was in the process of  laying 
down a standing committee system and selecting a powerful 
presiding officer in the eventful months leading up to war, the 
Senate remained the slow and cerebral body that the Framers of  
the Constitution no doubt had in mind. The Senate’s standing 
committee system would not be created until 1816, while the 
body’s small size and its lack of  a centralized leadership structure, 
specialized policy units, and electoral turnover relegated it 
to a position of  receiving the major foreign policy initiatives 
of  the day from either the House or the President. Thus, the 
majority of  the aggressive legislation related to the war and other 
overseas endeavors originated in the House during the years of  
1811 through 1815.50 This difference in initiative between the 
two chambers reflected their respective paces of  institutional 
development, especially with regards to standing committee 
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establishment.
While the House had slowly adopted a standing committee 
system (especially perpetuated during the past few years by the 
demands of  the war), the Senate had remained relatively stagnant 
and unchanging. Now in one fell swoop, it adopted a fully-fleshed 
network of  standing committees and surpassed the House with 
just one motion (the House’s standing committee system was 
still immature, with a sizable amount of  jurisdictions still under 
semi-standing committees, including foreign affairs). Although 
the senators, likely did not realize at the time the gravity of  
this motion, their adoption of  its institutional changes would 
fundamentally alter the upper house forever and decisively usher 
in the age of  American government by committee that one 
arguably still lives in to this day. 
The difference in legislative initiative was also reflected 
in public sentiment, which considered the Senate as the duller of  
the two powers in the legislative branch. Whereas Senate sessions 
were short and featured few speeches, the much greater volume 
and breadth of  colorful debate within the House ensured much 
wider publicity and awareness of  that chamber. It is consistently 
recorded during this period that while reporters jostled for 
position in the House gallery, the Senate scarcely attracted an 
audience; newspaper volume certainly reflected that.51 Writing 
to Secretary of  State James Monroe in late 1810, Clay reflected 
on his decision to run for election to the House despite his 
position in the Senate: “Accustomed to the popular branch 
of  the Legislature, and preferring the turbulence (if  I may be 
allowed the term) of  a numerous body to the solemn stillness of  
the Senate chamber, it was a mere matter of  taste that led me, 
perhaps injudiciously, to change my station.”52 While the dullness 
of  the chamber may have corresponded to the lack of  legislative 
initiative, the Senate’s deliberative manner had its own ways of  
influencing the war charge by acting as the brakes on the House’s 
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breakneck speed.
THE COERCION CHARGE
After exploring why the 12th Congress, the first 
“War Congress,” was in many ways a novel body and how it 
initiated many of  the institutional transformations that would 
accommodate the new legislative assertiveness of  its younger 
War Hawk members in particular, the actual path to and through 
the War of  1812 is equally riddled with legislation embodying a 
new diplomatic assertiveness in Congress. While the purpose of  
this work is not to document how Congress legislated the War 
of  1812, this paper will explore how the legislative body led the 
nation into the war and will investigate its impact on cultivating 
a new age of  congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs by the 
end of  the military conflict. The 12th Congress opened in the 
wake of  a series of  diplomatic volleys between the United States, 
Great Britain, and France that had begun shortly after President 
Madison had taken office two years earlier in March 1809.
Where Jefferson’s disastrous Embargo Act of  1807 had 
failed to assert American neutrality in shipping rights, Madison 
proposed an honorable peace when relations with Britain briefly 
improved in the honeymoon of  his administration: the British 
would repeal the Orders in Council (1807), which dictated seizure 
of  neutral shipping to France and to French continental allies, 
and the U.S. would repeal the recently-passed Non-Intercourse 
Act (1809), which prevented trade with both Great Britain and 
France.53 After Congress wholeheartedly accommodated this 
agreement with appropriate legislation in June 1809, Madison 
regretfully announced that the British Cabinet had rejected the 
agreement he had negotiated with British Minister to the U.S. 
David Erskine.54 And so, the trade restrictions were reenacted 
and the economic hostilities resumed. The relationship with 
Great Britain was deteriorating with each passing day.
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With Madison’s diplomatic efforts faltering, Congress 
decided to take matters into its own hands through the legislative 
process. Out of  the House Foreign Affairs Committee (still a 
select, or temporary, committee at this time), Chairman Nathaniel 
Macon (DR-NC) reported legislation supported by the executive 
administration (and championed by Madison’s Secretary of  the 
Treasury Albert Gallatin) that restricted French and British ships 
from trading in American ports. Macon’s Bill No. 1, as it became 
known, also stipulated that the President would be authorized 
to issue a proclamation lifting the sanction on either power that 
removed its edicts violating American neutrality. Nonetheless, 
the Invisibles in the Senate, who considered anything touched by 
Gallatin anathema, thoroughly amended Macon’s Bill No. 1 and 
sent it back to the House. After exchanging amendments amid 
fierce debate across both chambers for most of  the 1810 session, 
the House eventually acquiesced to the Senate and enacted a 
revised version that what would be called Macon’s Bill No. 2 on 
May 1, 1810, which Madison begrudgingly signed into law.55 
The new revision on international trade law lifted all bans 
on commerce with Britain and France for three months. If  either 
one of  the two nations repealed their edicts on seizing American 
shipping during this period, the President of  the United States 
would be compelled to proclaim a renewed embargo on the 
other (unless that nation also repealed its offensive edicts).56 
Congress hoped that one of  the two European powers would 
see an opportunity to damage their arch-nemesis through this 
legislation, and Emperor of  the French Napoleon Bonaparte 
did not disappoint the federal legislature. The French Emperor 
was quick to assure Madison that he would comply with the 
Americans to spite the British. In compliance with Congress’ 
legislation, Madison then issued a proclamation lifting any 
restriction on France and renewing the embargo on Britain. 
But to the Americans’ horror, Napoleon quietly reneged on 
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his promises and allowed French ships to continue marauding 
vessels originating from the United States. Meanwhile, tensions 
with Great Britain were at an all-time high: accidental naval 
skirmishes in 1811, first between the U.S.S. Spitfire and the 
H.M.S. Guerriere and then fifteen days later between the U.S.S. 
President and H.M.S. Little Belt, renewed concerns that the British 
were encroaching on American waters and impressing American 
sailors and citizens in the British Royal Navy. In these two naval 
incidents that smacked of  the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair with 
Britain just four years earlier and in the total inability to hold 
Napoleon to his word, the American public could not help but 
feel that the 11th Congress and President Madison had brought 
them back to square one.
This was the dire state of  affairs when the 12th Congress 
arrived in Washington D.C. to begin their session early at the behest 
of  the President. Clay and his allies immediately used Madison’s 
opening message reporting on the breakdown in diplomacy to 
appoint a new House Foreign Relations Committee that was to 
be headed by Chairman Peter B. Porter (DR-NY) and would also 
include War Hawk leaders Calhoun and Grundy. Unfortunately, 
Clay would also be forced to observe traditional seniority 
conventions and appoint John Randolph to the committee, but 
Clay hoped his War Hawks would drown out the shrill of  his 
dogged opposition leader.57 The committee immediately became 
the focal point in the American charge towards hostilities with 
Britain; just a little over a week later, the committee completed 
a report on the Little Belt Affair and concluded that the nation 
should prepare for the eventuality of  war by raising 10,000 regulars 
in the standing army and by providing for the contingency of  
50,000 volunteers.58 Upon formally introducing the report to the 
whole House for deliberation, Chairman Porter had no qualms 
in stating unequivocally that “it was the determination of  the 
committee to recommend open and decided war.”59
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Together with his colleague Senator William Branch 
Giles (DR-VA), de facto pro-war leader of  the Republicans 
in the Senate, Clay managed the charge for war by carefully 
controlling the flow of  defense legislation out of  committees in 
Congress.60 Over the course of  the next four months, Congress 
mainly legislated provisions for the war: in January, it provided 
for an army of  25,000 regulars (which the skeptical Randolph 
scoffed at) and appropriated $1.9 million in armaments for both 
the army and the navy; in February, it enacted controversial 
tax articles to finance the war; and in March, ig directed the 
President to borrow up to $11 million at six percent interest 
in order to meet any war-related contingencies.61 But in reality, 
these measures did little to truly prepare the armed forces (which 
relied almost entirely on local militias due to Republican fears of  
a national standing army) for war with the British. In an effort to 
save money, most articles were to be invoked only in the event 
that war was officially declared. Cutting corners on the defense 
legislation would cost the nation dearly in the coming conflict.62 
Clay and his allies were poised for success in the House by 
assembling a dominant coalition of  war-supporting members. 
All that remained was coercing those last holdouts in the Senate 
and in the White House into accepting what the War Hawks had 
already proclaimed was necessary.
By March 1812, President Madison was besieged on all 
sides by those treating war with Britain as inevitable. But he was 
reluctant to accept the dismal prospect of  prosecuting a war 
that he believed the nation was unprepared for, and deployed 
peace envoys to Britain to discuss terms under which war could 
be averted. Meanwhile, Clay and the House Republicans could 
hardly restrain themselves from knocking down the doors of  
the White House in their haste for war. Employing his mandate 
in the House, the Speaker designed a wholesale program for the 
executive administration to follow step-by-step so that Congress 
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could declare war. Through his actions, Clay was setting new 
markers in the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature, enhancing the agency and the initiative of  the latter. 
In a March 16 note to Secretary of  State Monroe, the Speaker 
directed:
That the President recommend an Embargo to last say 
30 days, by a confidential message: That a termination 
of  the Embargo be followed by War: and, That he also 
recommend provision for the acceptance of  10,000 
volunteers for a short period, whose officers are to be 
commissioned by the President. 
In the margins of  the same note, Clay explained why he was 
pursuing such vigorous action from the executive: 
Altho’ the power of  declaring War belongs to Congress, 
I do not see that it less falls within the scope of  the 
President’s constitutional duty to recommend such 
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient than 
any other which, being suggested by him, they alone can 
adopt.63
Clay thus instituted the convention in American political 
tradition for the President to send a war message to Congress before 
such a declaration was given.64 The President, apparently also of  
the opinion that the embargo should precede any declaration of  
war, acceded to the Speaker’s demands with the condition that 
it be sixty days long so that the diplomatic mission to Britain on 
the U.S.S. Hornet would have ample time to return. On April 1, 
1812, the President’s message was delivered to Congress as Clay 
had stipulated. As the measure was being debated in the House, 
Representative Randolph gained the floor and denounced the 
origins of  Madison’s recommendation: “it comes to us in a very 
questionable shape or rather in an unquestionable state… and is 
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not the wish or measure of  the Executive.”65 Randolph claimed 
that it was the House Foreign Relations Committee, not President 
Madison, which had designed the plan for an embargo followed 
by war and that the committee’s manipulation was leading the 
nation headstrong into an undesirable conflict.66 He was not far 
off  from the truth: Clay and his cohorts were orchestrating the 
war efforts in both political branches of  government through 
coercion and the newly-pronounced powers of  Congress that 
the young Speaker had managed to master in the course of  a few 
months. After some changes in the Senate, Congress enacted a 
90-day embargo. 
Sometime following the adoption of  this embargo, 
a committee of  War Hawk congressmen led by Speaker Clay 
forced a private meeting with Madison to discuss the President’s 
reluctance to commit to war. As was the case for the public 
then, there is no transcript or records of  that encounter; the 
proceedings were and still are entirely open to speculation by 
those not privy to its details. In fact, there may have been two 
separate meetings spread out between April and May, the first 
one regarding the War Hawks’ desire to strike a potential plan 
Madison was formulating to send fresh peace envoys to Britain 
and the second one involving the faction’s desire to force Madison 
to send a message to Congress asking for war. While the number 
of  meetings or the precise discussion may never be known, 
Federalists and Tertium Quid Republicans seemed confident in 
what was transpiring in front of  their eyes: Clay and the War 
Hawks were twisting the President’s arm in their insatiable quest 
for war. They claimed that the members had threatened to use 
the previously-discussed power of  the congressional caucus to 
withhold Madison’s re-nomination for President in 1812. They 
also denounced the act by implicating Clay and the War Hawks in 
floor speeches, letters, and newspaper articles for years to come; 
historians have still not resolved to what degree these coercive 
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meetings affected the nation’s entrance into the War of  1812. 
What can be ascertained, however, is that at least one of  the 
meetings did occur in May and pressure was applied in some 
fashion on Madison to produce a war message in the same 
manner Clay had demanded that the President recommend the 
embargo. Whether it was because the congressional faction left 
him with no other choice or because he sincerely believed that 
war was necessary, Madison would ultimately acquiesce to the 
War Hawks’ expectations. His decision was reinforced by the 
return of  the U.S.S. Hornet from Europe bearing no news of  
concessions from the British.67
On June 1, 1812, President Madison sent a confidential 
message to Congress outlining the grievances of  the United 
States against Great Britain and the current state of  affairs 
between the two countries, concluding, “We behold, in fine, 
on the side of  Great Britain, a state of  war against the United 
States, and on the side of  the United States a state of  peace 
toward Great Britain.”68 Madison recounted the reasons why his 
countrymen were so distressed: impressment of  citizens on the 
high seas, seizures of  naval vessels, violation of  neutral trade, 
encouragement of  Native American raids in the west, and a 
general lack of  regard for the sovereignty of  the nation. But the 
President did not go so far as to explicitly ask the Congress to 
declare war, instead deferring to the Congress to deliberate the 
necessity of  war:
Whether the United States shall continue passive under 
these progressive usurpations and these accumulating 
wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of  
their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the 
hands of  the Almighty Disposer of  Events, avoiding 
all connections which might entangle it in the contest 
or views of  other powers, and preserving a constant 
readiness to concur in an honorable re-establishment 
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of  peace and friendship, is a solemn question which 
the Constitution wisely confides to the Legislative 
Department of  the Government. In recommending it to 
their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that 
the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic 
councils of  a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.69
While Madison had certainly documented the extent to 
which British offenses constituted substantial threats to American 
sovereignty, his conclusion clearly lacked a decisive call to action. 
Never before (or never since) had there been such a vague “war 
message” delivered by a president to Congress. Astonishingly, 
Madison outlined equally the benefits of  not only a declaration 
of  war, but also those of  maintaining the peaceful status quo. 
One reads this conclusion and doubts whether he believed the 
U.S. should commit to war at all, and wonders if  Congress was 
truly influenced by the presidential message as it has been on 
several occasions since. Madison’s skepticism about declaring 
war was further complicated by his ambivalence over the role 
that he, as President, would play in resolving the complication at 
hand. Ultimately, without any appreciable executive pressure, the 
decision was truly left to the legislative body that had instigated 
armed conflict in the first place: the House of  Representatives.
Immediately following the war message, Randolph and 
his Tertium Quid Republicans moved that the measures for war 
be considered by a Committee of  the Whole. The majority of  
the House rejected this measure and Speaker Clay gained a major 
victory: the House Foreign Relations Committee would have sole 
jurisdiction of  drafting the articles of  war. This was a significant 
moment in the House’s history, as it confirmed the viability of  
the House Foreign Relations Committee as an autonomous unit 
that would generate its own opinions and legislation, well-suited 
to efficiently accomplish its diplomatic goals in insulation from 
rogue elements in the legislative body. Now-Chairman John 
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C. Calhoun led his committee to its private chambers to begin 
preparing a report and resolution for declaring war on Great 
Britain. Two days later, the South Carolina freshman would 
announce the committee’s findings: “The period has arrived 
when the United States must support their character and station 
among the Nations of  the Earth, or submit to the most shameful 
degradation.”70 It seemed from the swiftness of  the House’s 
mobilization (it was rumored that Calhoun’s report had already 
been written in the previous month) and the apparent origin 
of  the message’s impetus in Congress that Madison’s message 
was merely being employed by the War Hawks as an obligatory 
symbol to assuage concerns that the executive branch was not 
prepared to prosecute the war. With the way in which the war 
was about to unfold, it would seem as though these concerns 
were well-founded.
The House easily adopted the House Foreign Relations 
Committee’s report and its draft of  the declaration of  war on 
Great Britain, 79 yeas to 49 nays.71 Clay then had the engrossed 
resolution sent to the Senate for its consideration, beginning on 
June 14. The next thirteen days would leave Washington D.C. 
in limbo and the nation in suspense, as the Senate debated 
war behind closed doors. With the Clintonians, Invisibles, and 
Administration Republicans all favoring different forms of  war 
and the Tertium Quid Republicans as well as the Federalists 
opposing war outright, the process was excruciatingly painful; 
amendment after amendment and philosophical debate after 
debate mired the Senate down in procedure. The Senate’s 
convention of  unlimited speaking certainly did not hasten the 
process. In total, there were over eight key votes on war measures 
during the process; many were decided within the margin of  only 
one or two votes. Ultimately, the Senate adopted the House’s 
resolution, 19 yeas to 13 nays; this remains the slimmest margin 
in either chamber for a declaration of  war in American history.72
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Clay and the War Hawks finally had their war; they 
had successfully silenced their opposition in the Tertium Quid 
Republicans and Federalists while bullying the White House into 
accepting the burden of  prosecuting a daunting campaign against 
perhaps the greatest power on Earth at the time. Moreover, they 
had proven in the first major instance since the ratification of  
the Constitution that the impetus for landmark action in foreign 
policy could originate within Congress. No matter to what degree 
President Madison and his Cabinet may have favored war, the 
clear leadership had emanated from Congress. But Clay and his 
allies were about to learn that declaring war was by far the easiest 
part in the strenuous and bloody process of  directing the nation 
through conflict; the coming war was going to test Congress 
and make even its most ardent proponents of  war ponder the 
outcome they had so jubilantly celebrated in 1812.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE RISING
The war charge of  1812 produced another development 
in congressional statecraft whose significance has not been fully 
explored. With the prospect of  war seeming to dominate every 
aspect of  the country’s international consciousness when the 12th 
Congress opened session in late 1811, lawmakers searched for 
every possible opportunity to extend pressure on Britain beyond 
the single dimension of  bilateral Anglo-American relations; 
legislators realized that pressure could and must also be levied 
upon British allies and proxies in the Western Hemisphere. 
American leaders were particularly tempted by the possibility 
of  encumbering Britain’s key ally, Spain, whose vast empire 
remained a major impediment to U.S. ambitions to expand across 
the Americas.73 The opportunity seemed to present itself  in the 
crescendo of  the Age of  Democratic Revolutions in the colonial 
arenas of  Latin America. On the western shores of  the Atlantic, 
the Americas brimmed with the revolutionary energies first 
unleashed in the United States, France, and Haiti. The conflicts 
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were sparked by Napoleon’s invasion of  the Iberian Peninsula 
in 1808, which launched Spain and Portugal into absolute 
disarray. King Charles IV of  Spain was forced from his throne, 
while Portugal’s royal family fled for Colonial Brazil to escape 
Napoleon’s clutches; both the central governments in Madrid, 
Spain and Lisbon, Portugal collapsed with little warning to their 
imperial possessions.74
The Emperor of  the French installed his brother, 
Joseph Bonaparte, on the Spanish throne at the head of  a proxy 
government that claimed the entirety of  Spain’s vast overseas 
possessions. However, the reality was that Napoleon had chopped 
off  rather than replaced the head of  the already moribund Spanish 
Empire. With no central authority in Latin America remaining, 
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies established their own local 
juntas that claimed varying degrees of  loyalty to the beleaguered 
House of  Bourbon in opposition to the Bonapartists. Despite 
the nominal profession of  loyalty to Spain by many of  the Latin 
American colonies, major political and social upheaval that had 
been swelling beneath centuries of  rigid imperial rule was just 
beginning to touch the surface.75 Congress was well aware of  these 
profound developments in Latin America, considering the advent 
of  revolutionary movements a particularly timely opportunity 
for American statecraft in light of  the rivalry with Great Britain. 
Given that Spain was one of  Britain’s most important allies and 
that there was a chronic lack of  compassionate feeling between 
the U.S. and its imperial neighbor, there were many in both the 
House and the Senate of  the 12th Congress who wished to see 
the United States capitalize on developments southward in order 
to enhance American power and deter British influence. 
By 1810, President Madison and Secretary Monroe had 
deployed various classes of  agents across Latin America to 
provide reconnaissance on the deteriorating situations in the 
various colonies to the south, as well as to foster relationships 
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for American political and economic interests. Much to the 
expense of  their own nation’s interests, American agents 
witnessed the British making inroads with the revolutionary 
juntas by obtaining most favorable statuses in trade agreements 
and building hegemony over the region in the absence of  any 
comparable power.76 Given the collapse of  Spain and Portugal 
and the preoccupation of  France, the United States was the only 
nation in a position to independently deter the growing British 
influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
Although the Madison Administration had begun 
appointing agents across Latin America, harboring revolutionaries 
in the U.S., and allowing them to purchase munitions, there 
were still many gaps that needed to be filled in order to craft an 
acceptable American grand strategy to resist the British threat. But 
while the British were clearly winning on the ground, American 
agents suggested that it may not be too late to mount a challenge; 
there was discontent with the imperial superpower in nations 
such as Buenos Aires (later Argentina) and Venezuela, with many 
revolutionaries viewing the intensifying British imperial influence 
with suspicion. At the same time, these revolutionaries looked to 
their neighbor to the north to provide them with the natural 
support they felt they deserved in their efforts to proclaim 
independence under the banner of  republicanism.77 American 
agents stressed that the U.S. could use minimal resources to begin 
building its own rival sphere of  influence over the tumultuous 
dominions of  Latin America.
Correspondence with the Venezuelan Congress that 
implored assistance for their cause of  full independence 
provided the perfect opportunity for the U.S. to commit its 
attention southward while the great European powers were 
occupied in their struggle with Napoleon for control of  their 
own continent. There were many in the House and the Senate 
who looked favorably upon this development and supported an 
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American insertion in the revolutions of  Latin America. Chief  
among those in Congress intent on architecting a comprehensive 
Western Hemisphere policy in an era of  emerging juntas was none 
other than Henry Clay.78 The young Speaker would have his first 
of  many opportunities to shift the House’s attention southward 
after President Madison delivered his first message to the 12th 
Congress on November 5, 1811. While the communication was 
largely devoted to the ongoing tensions with Great Britain and 
other matters of  diplomatic importance, Madison mentioned 
in passing, “it is impossible to overlook those developing 
themselves among the great communities which occupy the 
Southern portion of  our own hemisphere, and extend into our 
neighborhood.”79
As was the practice at the time, the House of  
Representatives resolved itself  into several select committees 
based on particular topics touched upon in the President’s 
message to provide a substantial congressional response either 
in the form of  a report and/or some appropriate legislative 
action. Physician and scientist Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill 
(DR-NY) was chosen as the chairman of  the committee that 
was referred to address the small portion of  the President’s 
message that related to the Spanish American colonies. The 
following month, Representative Mitchill wrote to Secretary of  
State Monroe to request that any discrete information available 
regarding the independence of  Spanish American colonies be 
released to the House committee.80 Responding to Mitchill’s 
request, Secretary Monroe furnished a copy of  Venezuela’s 
declaration of  independence. According to Monroe, this 
copy had been specifically transmitted to the United States 
government by order of  the “Congress, composed of  deputies 
from those [Venezuelan] provinces, assembled at Caracas.”81 The 
House committee now knew that the Venezuelan Congress was 
actively soliciting the attention of  the United States, undoubtedly 
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seeking the legitimacy and support of  the first republic in the 
Western Hemisphere in their struggle for a certain measure 
of  sovereignty. Although this is the only such declaration that 
Monroe had received by the date of  his letter on December 9, 
1811, Monroe informed Mitchill, “it is known that most, if  not 
all of  them [Spanish American colonies], on the continent, are in 
a revolutionary state.”82
On December 10, Representative Mitchill reported on 
behalf  of  the House select committee on Spanish American 
colonies. Specifically, Mitchill presented a report on the origins 
and status of  the Latin American revolutions and recommended 
the adoption of  a resolution encouraging the establishment of  
independent democratic and federal unions by revolutionary 
forces in the Spanish American colonies:
Whereas several of  the American Spanish provinces, 
have represented to the United States that it has been 
found expedient for them to associate and form Federal 
Governments upon the elective and representative plan, 
and to declare themselves free and independent—
Therefore be it 
Resolved, by the Senate and the House of  Representatives of  
the United States of  America in Congress assembled, That 
they behold, with friendly interest, the establishment 
of  independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces 
in America, consequent upon the actual state of  the 
monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbors 
and inhabitants of  the same hemisphere, the United 
States feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that, 
when those provinces shall have attained the condition 
of  nations, by the just exercise of  their rights, the 
Senate and House of  Representatives will unite with 
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the Executive in establishing with them, as sovereign 
and independent States, such amicable relations and 
commercial intercourse as may require their Legislative 
authority.83
Mitchill’s report and its accompanying resolution was a remarkable 
first step in the formation of  a comprehensive American policy 
towards the burgeoning Latin American nations. While the 
young 12th Congress faced the daunting prospect of  war with 
the greatest sea power of  the age, it did not shy away from the 
prospect of  envisaging a grand framework for statecraft in the 
emerging community of  nations in the Western Hemisphere. 
The 12th Congress had gumption in proclaiming to Latin 
Americans that it felt “great solicitude for their welfare” and was 
congratulatory towards their ideological choice to dislodge the 
“actual state of  the monarchy to which they belonged.” 
As preeminent Western Hemisphere historian Arthur 
Preston Whitaker of  the University of  Pennsylvania pointed 
out in his landmark work, The United States and the Independence 
of  Latin America, 1800-1830, the Mitchill committee’s resolution 
was foundational because “it was the first statement of  the kind 
made by any organ of  the United States government.”84 The ideas 
expressed in the resolution defined two ideological principles that 
would become salient features in the language employed by U.S. 
politicians and officials to justify “solicitude” for the entirety of  
the Americas: hemispheric solidarity and republican fraternity. 
The former expressed the notion that the Western Hemisphere 
constituted a new world independent of  and removed from 
the European sphere, while the latter suggested that the U.S. 
felt obliged to care for the new Latin American nations due to 
their adoption of  the same republican and federal principles that 
characterized the U.S. Constitution. 
The sentiments of  Mitchill’s resolution would become 
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enshrined in American statecraft for decades to come as the 
justificatory cornerstone of  U.S. guardianship over the Western 
Hemisphere. These considerations in the select committee on 
the Spanish American colonies built upon the 11th Congress’ 
work just a year earlier in enacting the so-called “No Transfer 
Principle” by a joint resolution of  the House and the Senate. 
Tracing its origins to the Washington Administration and later 
arguments in Congress furnished by Federalists such as Senator 
Gouverneur Morris (F-NY), the No Transfer Principle sought 
to articulate U.S. opposition to the transfer of  certain colonial 
territories in the Americas from one European power to another, 
particularly Spanish colonies to British domain.85 This legislation 
would become another pillar of  American foreign policy in the 
nineteenth century.
Both the Mitchill Resolution and the preceding No 
Transfer Policy contained vital components of  the celebrated 
Monroe Doctrine of  1823. But while the Monroe Doctrine 
would only come over a decade after these first beginnings 
in Congress, the common narrative of  American diplomatic 
history seems to accord President James Monroe and Secretary 
of  State John Quincy Adams with complete credit for this now-
essential canon of  U.S. foreign policy principles. In other words, 
the Monroe Doctrine was an exceptional milestone architected 
with the energy of  the executive branch, however, the evolution 
of  this principle was at least a decade in the making and involved 
a collaborative process of  alternating action between both 
political branches of  government. The Mitchill Resolution was 
undoubtedly an important precedent to the Monroe Doctrine. 
Even the great American diplomatic historian Dexter Perkins 
mentioned the resolution in his discussion of  influences on 
the President’s foreign policy position in his tour de force, A 
History of  the Monroe Doctrine.86 Furthermore, it is important to 
realize that when President Monroe first unveiled the policy in 
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his speech, it did not seem at the time to be a groundbreaking 
transformation of  American foreign policy. In fact, between 
1825 and 1895, the “Monroe Doctrine” (as it would later become 
known) was almost absent as a recognized executive policy from 
the nation’s politics and history.87 When examining the full record 
of  policymaking with regards to U.S.-Latin American relations, 
the Monroe Doctrine seems unremarkable as a departure from 
existing foreign policy; it is more appropriate to consider it as 
a more substantive articulation of  policy that had already been 
burgeoning in Congress and the Department of  State for years 
since, at least, the Mitchill Resolution in 1811.
FIRST IN WAR, FIRST IN PEACE
While Clay and his allies had painted a rosy landscape 
of  a painless victory in which the U.S. would usurp the British 
from Canada and the entire hemisphere with little more than the 
Kentucky militia, the reality was that the young congressional 
faction had no clue as to how difficult it would be to wage war 
on the world’s foremost superpower at the time. Both before and 
after the 12th Congress took office in the fall of  1811, neither 
the House nor the Senate was inclined to seriously shoulder 
the tribulations necessary to arm the nation for its ostensibly 
“inevitable war.” This lack of  preparation translated onto the 
battlefields in the summer of  1812. In repudiating a solely sea-
based conflict and confirming that territorial expansion was 
indeed a goal of  the conflict, American forces first moved on 
Canada in a land expedition that was met with ignominious defeat 
and a counter-attack by the British on the garrison at Chicago in 
the U.S.-controlled Territory of  Illinois. When General Henry 
Dearborn attempted to resuscitate the American campaign 
in November, state militias refused to follow him into enemy 
territory; this served as a direct abrogation to Clay’s claims to the 
House earlier in the year that state militias could be relied upon 
for excursions into Canada.88 By the end of  1812, as Congress 
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reconvened in Washington D.C. for its second session, the 
American cause was looking lost before it had even really begun.
Now came the dirty work: Congress had to work with 
the executive administration to direct the war that the legislative 
body had produced. In his landmark dissertation, Congress During 
the War of  1812, William Ray Barlow chronicled the conduct 
of  the 12th and 13th Congresses and how they set precedents 
“criticizing, objecting, amending, and at times initiating war 
efforts.” While the President and Congress enjoyed a more 
collaborative relationship after the defeats of  1812, there were 
still several instances of  crossfire between the executive and the 
legislature on particular measures of  combat and diplomacy. Each 
attempted to influence the other with every new consideration. 
One such instance was the charter of  a national bank, which 
would become the central issue of  American politics in the 
coming decades: Congress insisted on instituting it to finance 
the war and President Madison resolved to veto the measure. 
Reverse instances came when the executive administration 
continually submitted appropriations necessary to maintain the 
war effort, with each item scrutinized by the House and rarely 
written off  in the amount requested.89
During the course of  the war, the House of  
Representatives was the leading body as it had been during the 
initiation of  the war. That chamber’s institutionalized committees 
and efficient, targeted operation resulted in its procurement of  
most war directives. Throughout the course of  the conflict, the 
Senate proved unable to manage the flood of  legislation the 
House sent; this would likely precipitate the establishment of  
the Senate’s own standing committee system after the conclusion 
of  the War of  1812. Meanwhile, the House considered major 
changes, including the institution of  a single Committee of  Public 
Defense to manage the war effort. After much deliberation about 
the practicality and safety of  such a system, the House resolved 
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to create the Military Affairs Committee that collaborated with 
the executive administration in much the same way that the 
Continental Congress war committees cooperated with General 
George Washington during the American Revolutionary War. 
Although not officially a standing committee in its own 
right, the House Committee on Foreign Relations remained 
perhaps the most powerful panel in the body like in the previous 
session. It claimed jurisdiction over diplomatic affairs and 
the general spirit of  the war. In describing the committee’s 
aggrandized role in the course of  the war, Representative Samuel 
Taggart (F-MA) wrote that it was “a junta composed of  5, 6, 7, 
8, or 10 [members]….” Representative John Randolph, prone to 
exaggeration, charged that the Committee on Foreign Relations 
had “outstripped the Executive [President Madison].” Randolph 
further implored, “Shall we form a committee of  this House, 
in quality a Committee of  Public Safety, or shall we depute the 
power of  the Speaker… to carry on the war?”90 While Clay 
and Calhoun possessed powers far from those maintained by 
leaders of  the sanguinary French Revolution (1789-1799), such 
as Maximilien Robespierre and Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, 
the allusion exudes the unprecedented power that a legislative 
committee was exercising over the formation of  foreign policy 
and the conduct of  diplomacy.
As the war carried on, the jostling between the Madison 
Administration and Congress reflected the dismal war effort. In 
general, American forces were being whipped on the continent but 
enjoyed surprising success in naval engagements despite British 
focus still being directed to the ongoing conflict with Napoleon 
in Europe. A year and a half  into the conflict, the war had 
exhausted hawkish passions and inflicted its substantial damages 
upon both belligerents. By early 1814, there was considerable will 
on both sides to resolve the conflict; subsequently, initial peace 
talks commenced. As then-Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-
Penn History Review     83 
The War That Congress Waged
WV) identified in his narrative history of  the Senate in 1988, 
the constitutional requirement for the upper house to provide 
its “advice and consent” to treaties has resulted in interesting 
quandaries over the years regarding the active participation of  
members of  Congress in the physical conduct of  diplomatic 
negotiation. The first time this occurred though was in 1814, 
when Speaker Clay joined Senator James Bayard (F-DE) in a 
bipartisan five-member delegation to negotiate a peace with 
Great Britain in the Flemish city of  Ghent, Belgium. While Clay 
had resigned from the House in order to attend and Bayard had 
not been re-elected for another term in the Senate, their presence 
in the negotiation of  the treaty stirred some speculation about 
their political role in securing congressional support for the peace 
accord and the constitutional consistency with the separation of  
powers.91 While this would be the first noticeable instance of  
congressional participation in diplomatic negotiation, it would 
not be the final time the presence of  senators and representatives 
on diplomatic delegations would be questioned.
Congress had its two representatives at Ghent to ensure 
the war it had waged was terminated on the federal legislature’s 
terms. Congress need not have worried that the result would 
be unsatisfactory, for the Western Star himself  was to bring 
the British to task. As Clay stepped down from the Speaker’s 
chair amid the jubilatory well-wishes of  his doting colleagues, 
one observer enthusiastically wrote at the time, “The war in 
which he had been most active in hastening, and most energetic 
in prosecuting, he was now to close…”92 Needless to say, 
Clay’s presence on the diplomatic delegation would guarantee 
smooth adoption of  the agreement back in Congress, while also 
establishing credibility for the treaty among the war’s initiators 
and the public. 
However, with Napoleon on his heels by April 1814, 
the British were reinvigorated in their aggression in America. 
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They stalled the peace negotiations through the summer while 
their forces defeated the U.S. Army at the Battle of  Bladensburg 
in Maryland and then occupied Washington D.C., burning the 
Capitol and the White House to the ground. President Madison 
and Congress were forced to abandon their residences and flee 
for safe havens; Clay and the other peace commissioners could 
only watch helpless from Belgium as the devastation of  the 
summer of  1814 unfolded. Congress returned to the capital in 
September 1814 to find the Capitol a smoldering pile of  rocks 
and ashes; in the meantime, it met in the lobby of  Blodgett’s 
Hotel while the citizens of  Washington D.C. desperately built 
the congressmen a temporary brick capitol building so that the 
federal legislature would not move the nation’s capital back to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Doubtless while sitting in the hotel 
lobby in post-mortem, members of  Congress would have 
reflected upon the lessons that the present war had impressed 
upon them. Thankfully for these legislators, Baltimore, Maryland 
was held in American control because of  the efforts at Fort 
McHenry, repelling the British Royal Navy in one of  the final 
major campaigns of  the year and likely ensuring the survival of  
the American Union and the arrival of  peace.93
With the failure to close the campaigns of  1814, British 
commissioners at Ghent now seriously began seeking a peace 
settlement with the Americans. Negotiations proceeded quickly 
and by December 24, 1814, the Treaty of  Ghent was signed 
by the two diplomatic delegations and ratified by His Majesty’s 
government three days later. The Treaty of  Ghent reached 
Washington D.C. in February 1815 and was ratified unanimously 
upon receipt by the Senate with little, if  any, debate.94 With blessed 
peace finally realized across the continent, there was a new sober 
recognition of  the hardships of  war: 2,260 American soldiers 
had been killed in combat and an additional 4,505 were wounded. 
In total, it is estimated that some 15,000 American soldiers lost 
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their lives as a result of  all causes related to the conflict.95 But in 
its wake, the United States emerged intact with independence 
firmly secured from the former imperial motherland. And with 
the simultaneous defeat of  the French at Waterloo (in present-
day Belgium), the Napoleonic Wars also drew to a close. 
For the first time since independence, internal American 
politics and foreign policy would no longer be measured in 
relation to the eternal struggle between Great Britain and France: 
the United States was now finally free at last to pursue its own 
destiny among the nations of  the world. American culture in 
the postwar flourished with new symbols of  national identity, 
including the poem “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and the zeitgeist 
reflected the optimism Americans had for their young republic’s 
future. The following Era of  Good Feelings (1816-1824), an age 
of  national political peace in which the Democratic-Republicans 
The United States Capitol was razed by the British expeditionary forces 
under Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cockburn and Major General Robert 
Ross on their march into Washington City on the evening of August 24, 
1814. The nation’s capital was almost totally destroyed and Congress 
had to relocate to a temporary meeting hall until the United States 
Capitol could be rebuilt after the War of 1812.
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virtually wiped out their Federalist opponents after the latter’s 
ill-fated secession attempts in New England, would allow the 
nation to heal and to begin building a bold new role for itself  
in the world beyond simply a pawn in the game between two 
imperial powers.
In addition to the conclusion of  the War of  1812 and 
the emergence of  the young republic from the Anglo-French 
dichotomy, the Age of  Democratic Revolutions was slowly giving 
birth to a constellation of  independent states in the Western 
Hemisphere; the United States would gain several sister republics 
in an increasingly-populated American neighborhood. When the 
French occupation of  the Iberian Peninsula was defeated by the 
alliance of  Britain, Portugal, and Spain in 1813, the American 
colonies were restored to their imperial authorities for a few 
years before rebellion broke out again. But the earlier Latin 
The British delegates, led by Admiral Lord Gambier (holding the Treaty of 
Ghent, center left), shakes hands with American delegate and U.S. Minis-
ter to the United Kingdom John Quincy Adams (center), concluding the 
War of 1812. Adams stands in front of Secreaty of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin. Speaker Henry Clay observes the scene from afar, sitting in the 
chair behind the standing Senator James Bayard (hand on hip).
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American juntas had introduced reformed government with 
democratic principles and localized sovereignty; Spain’s attempt 
to return the status quo of  central monarchical authority over 
these colonies in the wake of  Napoleon’s defeat in the Peninsular 
Wars, therefore, resulted in backlash and the resurgence of  the 
Latin American revolutions by 1815. Thus, the Americas would 
once again be reopened by the end of  the War of  1812 as a 
battleground for U.S. interests, which the young republic would 
consider pursuing more and more vigorously following its 
vindication in the “Second War for Independence.” In the next 
decade and a half, the earlier signs of  congressional statecraft in 
the Western Hemisphere, seen through legislation such as the 
Mitchill Resolution, would serve as important antecedents for 
further action and points of  contention for those seeking to 
remain faithful to a more reserved foreign policy.
But just as changed by the War of  1812 as the international 
circumstances surrounding it, the United States Congress would 
emerge from its first substantial instance of  foreign policy 
leadership as a renewed body vying for more agency in the 
accelerating statecraft of  the American Republic. By the end of  
Clay’s first two terms as Speaker in 1814, there was little reason 
to doubt that “Harry of  the West” would be remembered in 
the annals of  American history as “the most powerful man in 
the nation from 1811 to 1825.”96 In his mad dash to lead the 
nation into war and thus assert a sovereign American order in 
the Western Hemisphere, Clay had accrued substantial political 
powers into the previously impotent office of  Speaker of  the 
House. Contemporaneous to this centralization of  power, the 
House began establishing a viable standing committee system 
that would enable specialization, permanency, and independence 
in the legislative branch.
This first period of  congressional initiative in foreign 
policymaking led by the War Hawks and their precocious 
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chief  Henry Clay would precipitate the continued institutional 
maturation of  the House and the Senate’s power structures. With 
the War of  1812 as its harbinger, Congress would be transformed 
by these developments and the emergence of  a visionary 
generation of  lawmakers that would produce the first age of  
American statecraft empowered through legislative assertiveness. 
And this ascendant generation of  young lawmakers aspiring for 
the American Founding Fathers’ glory had their guide, their 
Western Star. The young Speaker of  the House was poised to 
lead Congress into an evolving age of  legislative preeminence 
in foreign affairs that would last through the nineteenth century.
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The Fallacy of the Ideological Press: 
How American National Newspapers 
Reacted to the French Revolution 
from 1789-1793
Aaron R. Senior
INTRODUCTION
“Many people read newspapers who read little 
else—They live in retired situations, and feel a 
strong curiosity to know the news, and to join in the 
opinions of  the day. To a retired man, a newspaper 
is always company—sometimes instruction.”1
– Benjamin Franklin Bache 
 According to Benjamin Franklin Bache, newspapers in 
the United States sat at a vital juncture between the citizens and 
their government. Newspapers gave citizens the opportunity to 
learn about current events and gave politicians and newspaper 
editors the chance to publicize their opinions through editorials. 
However, as Benjamin Franklin Bache noted, newspapers not 
only provided a prominent method for education, but also 
commanded public participation. As political leaders in the 
United States competed with each other for power and influence, 
they used local and national newspapers to express their opinions 
to the public. With the explosion of  newspapers during the 
1790s and the introduction of  partisan national newspapers, 
competing political communities formed as the gap between the 
government and the public closed. Newspaper editors, therefore, 
had an unprecedented amount of  influence during this time and 
this thesis will analyze such influence. 
***
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September 9, 1789 issue of the Gazette of the United States
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  From the establishment of  the original colonies through 
the ratification of  the Constitution in 1788, local newspapers 
served their purpose in providing the relevant political, 
commercial, and miscellaneous news to their readership. In 
1789, however, John Fenno, a young businessman from Boston, 
Massachusetts, decided to launch the new country’s first federal 
newspaper. With the help of  Rufus King and the support of  
Alexander Hamilton, Fenno hoped that his newspaper, the 
Gazette of  the United States, would be just that: a newspaper that 
covered and supported the newly formed government of  the 
United States. As Fenno wrote to King, the newspaper was 
“for the purpose of  demonstrating favorable sentiments of  the 
federal constitution and its administration.”2 For this reason, 
Hamilton gave Fenno full access to the government’s resources; 
in return, Hamilton was given a public forum to express his own 
political opinions. Indisputably, the Gazette of  the United States was 
courted, sponsored, and favored by the new government. 
 Toward the end of  1790, Benjamin Franklin Bache, 
decided to launch his own newspaper after returning from years 
spent in France. Bache originally launched his General Advertiser 
as a local Philadelphia newspaper, but it soon took on national 
distribution and significance. Bache was a staunch Republican 
and by the middle of  1791, Bache’s paper became fiercely 
partisan, arguing for the restoration of  republican principles 
in the government. Bache and his republican peers specifically 
disliked Hamilton’s fiscal plans, as they believed that a national 
bank would place too much power in the hands of  the national 
government and favor business elites over working class citizens. 
Instead, Bache and others argued for republican principles that 
would place more power in the hands of  the states.3 
 Yet Bache’s republican newspaper was not sufficient as 
the sole voice for the entire Republican Party. In October of  
1791, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison sought to launch 
a government-sponsored national newspaper that officially 
Penn History Review     97 
The Fallacy of the Ideological Press
represented their own republican views. They found their 
editor in Philip Freneau, a revered Revolutionary War poet and 
writer. Jefferson even hired Freneau as a translator in the State 
Department and gave him access to exclusive dispatches and 
government information. Freneau’s National Gazette directly 
opposed Fenno’s Gazette of  the United States, bringing Jefferson’s 
republican principles in direct public conflict with Hamilton’s 
federalist arguments. As this debate became transcribed in 
national newspapers, it was clear that partisanship had moved 
from President George Washington’s cabinet to the country-
wide public square.4 
 Almost every scholar who studied these national 
newspapers has made one key observation: as opposed to today’s 
strict separation between the government and the media, these 
Early-American gazettes served as unequivocal mouthpieces 
for the political elites. In describing Fenno’s relationship with 
Hamilton, historian Eric Burns writes, “Fenno was Hamilton’s 
employee, but he was federalism’s servant, and on one occasion, 
he went to extraordinary lengths, even in these times of  scorched-
earth journalistic practice, to do what he believed would promote 
his master’s interests.”5 
 This scholarly orthodoxy extends to the republican 
newspapers as well. Historian Jeffery Pasley writes in The Tyranny of  
the Printer, “The Virginia leaders [Jefferson and Madison] became 
so closely involved in Freneau’s operations that several subscribers 
wrote to Madison rather than the editor with complaints about 
delivery problems.”6 Scholars note that Jefferson and Madison 
maintained some distance from their newspapers, so as not to 
seem subversive to the federalist government. Yet they gave 
Freneau a job in the government, absolved him of  all financial 
risk by finding the newspaper a financial backer, and even helped 
Freneau assemble a list of  subscribers. Burns further points out 
that Jefferson and Freneau “virtually [had] the same relationship 
that Hamilton had with Fenno.”7 Madison published regularly 
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in the National Gazette on every topic, from fiscal policy to the 
French Revolution to his general dislike of  the federalists. 
 Scholars point to Benjamin Franklin Bache, ironically 
the national editor not directly associated with government 
affairs, as the most partisan editor of  the three newspapers. 
Pasley explained that by the end of  1791, Bache took the liberty 
of  outwardly polemicizing with Fenno, criticizing Washington, 
vilifying Hamilton, and supporting Jefferson’s republican 
principles.8 Although Bache did not take orders from Jefferson 
and Madison directly, Bache toed openly with the Republican 
Party line, denouncing politicians by name instead of  by their 
policies. For example, when the National Gazette launched an 
attack on Hamilton’s fiscal plans, Bache followed suit with an 
even stronger criticism of  Hamilton’s plan for a national bank.9 
Bache was a more extreme version of  Freneau and thereby a 
more extreme editor supporting the Republican Party line. 
Benjamin Franklin Bache (1769-1798), 
founder of the General Advertiser
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 There were moments when these three editors published 
something that diverged from the opinions of  their government 
patrons and their ideological pastors. For example, Fenno 
published a peculiar letter defending Jefferson, which said that 
criticisms leveled at Jefferson were “founded in the basest calumny 
and falsehood.”10 However, these moments were exceptional, as 
many scholars still maintained that Fenno, Freneau, and Bache 
aligned themselves ideologically on almost every major issue.
One of  the major issues that occupied the pages of  all 
three national newspapers was the French Revolution. Beginning 
in July of  1789, the French Revolution became an American 
obsession. In the Capitol, after violence broke out in 1791 and 
after factions in France began to develop, major disagreement 
arose within Washington’s cabinet. Broadly, Jefferson supported 
the French revolutionaries strongly, arguing that the French 
attempt to secure liberty and to check the monarchy was a 
laudable project worthy of  the American government’s backing. 
Hamilton and John Adams, on the other hand, criticized the 
radical and violent factions in France, proposing that they were 
leading the revolutionaries down a dangerous path. Quickly, 
support for France became the central partisan issue within 
the government. The issue became more polarized over time; 
from the Citizen Genêt Affair of  1793-94 to the Neutrality 
Proclamation of  1793 to the ensuing debates regarding military 
support for France, Washington’s advisors bickered about this 
issue throughout Washington’s entire presidency and beyond. 
Furthermore, Jefferson himself  admitted to Washington that he 
helped establish the National Gazette in the hope that it would 
cover French affairs more sympathetically than the Gazette of  the 
United States.
 Several historians over the past decade have covered the 
American reaction to the French Revolution, but almost none 
of  them devote research exclusively to the reaction of  these 
national gazettes. Historian James Tagg, as well as Burns and 
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Pasley, all give examples of  newspaper coverage of  the French 
Revolution, but this research is done as just another example 
of  how these editors mimicked the opinions of  their respective 
political elites. Scholars David Waldstreicher and Simon Newman 
discuss American celebrations of  the French Revolution and the 
coverage of  those events in newspapers, but these historians do 
not spend any time analyzing the opinions of  the newspaper 
editors themselves.11 Seemingly, they concur with the traditional 
narrative: the celebrations and their respective coverage in 
the newspapers fell along party lines with the Republicans 
supporting the French Revolution and the Federalists opposing 
it. Finally, historians Matthew Rainbow Hale and Colin Wells, 
among others, have devoted time to examining the American 
reaction to the French Revolution, but none of  them examine 
the nuances between any of  the particular newspapers.12 Each 
of  these historians thereby assumes that across the board, 
politicians, editors, and citizens alike fell into either the Federalist 
or Republican camp at almost the exact same time and in the 
same manner. Overall, historians have spent time examining the 
American reaction to the French Revolution and the debates 
that went on surrounding this issue, but none have analyzed the 
reactions over time of  the national gazettes themselves. 
 Do the three national gazettes between 1789 and 1793 
truly align themselves with the opinions of  the party leaders 
on the issue of  the French Revolution? Within the current 
scholarship we have no reason to assume that they did not align, 
but this essay will take a closer look. 
 Partisan politics in Early America has too often been 
studied through the lens of  political decision makers. This has 
allowed so many historians to mistakenly assume a homogeneity 
within each of  the emerging parties. The realities of  partisanship 
are often much more complicated. The diverse reactions of  the 
first national gazettes to the French Revolution is only one small, 
but important way of  complicating this conventional approach. 
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The opinions of  political elites are valuable and warrant further 
study, but these ideologically-driven politicians do not speak 
for everyone. Analyzing other political players within their own 
contexts and through their own words is therefore a necessity.
Devoting my analysis solely to these newspapers’ 
commentary on the French Revolution and the differences that 
existed between these newspapers on that very question, I hope 
to give a definitive answer to this currently underexplored and 
over-assumed topic. I hope to demonstrate that newspapers’ 
alignment with party ideology and political sponsors is an 
insufficient explanation of  each newspaper’s early thoughts on 
the French Revolution. 
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS LOOKING OUTWARD: 
THE INADEQUACY OF IDEOLOGY
 Despite the more than three-thousand-mile distance 
between Philadelphia and Paris, France, American newspapers 
were filled daily with news concerning French affairs. From 
military updates to legislative changes to open letters and 
anecdotes, editors during the early 1790s sometimes filled several 
pages of  their four-page newspapers with French matters. 
The three national newspapers of  the time were of  course no 
exception, and even had an advantage over local newspapers 
due to their closer proximity to and better relationship with the 
government. Although news took about three months to travel 
from France to the United States, these national newspapers had 
first access to everything, from French intelligence to private 
letters exchanged between political elites from both countries.13 
 Additionally, quantitative evidence further supports 
the claim that the French Revolution was a significant chunk 
of  newspaper reporting and discourse. Key words and phrases 
such as “France,” “French,” and “Louis” were prolific. The 
National Gazette, with only 207 issues in total, mentioned the 
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word “France” 1,166 times, the word “French” 1,340 times, 
and the word “Louis” 213 times. A similar search of  The General 
Advertiser’s 1,232 issues produced the same key words 3,743, 
6,557, and 557 times, respectively. Lastly, within the Gazette of  the 
United States’ 447 issues, these words appear 1,469, 1,531 and 293 
times, respectively. When examined on average usage per day, 
each newspaper produced similar results—using the first two 
words between three to six times an issue and the last word about 
once an issue.14 Therefore, the French Revolution was a major 
topic, if  not the major topic, of  American national newspapers 
between 1789 and 1793.15 
 The basic questions follow: why were American 
newspapers nearly obsessed with the French? Was it the historical 
connection between the United States and France? Was it the 
shared values and principles of  liberty, equality, and hatred 
for despotism? Or did newspapers highlight the topic because 
everyone around the world was writing about it too? American 
historians, unsatisfied with these cursory answers, provide insight 
into editors’ true interest in French affairs. The conventional 
scholarly account states that just as partisanship began to rise 
between Federalists and Republicans, each side looked at the 
French Revolution through its own ideological lens—using 
the French Revolution to argue for its respective philosophy.16 
In essence, the ideological approach that Washington’s cabinet 
members took toward the French Revolution was replicated 
in the national newspapers.17 On one hand, the Republicans 
supported the French Revolution due to shared principles of  
popular sovereignty and anti-monarchy. On the other hand, 
the Federalists opposed the French Revolution because it bred 
violence and it overthrew law in favor of  chaos. The French 
Revolution also abolished the orderly and hierarchical structure 
of  a stable government. In essence, this standard explanation 
views ideology as the main catalyst for the debates surrounding 
the French Revolution. 18 
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 This conventional approach is supported by 
overwhelming evidence, from the American thoughts on the 
Thomas Paine–Edmund Burke debates of  1789-95, to the 
letters of  Jefferson and Adams, to the Citizen Genêt Affair, 
to the Neutrality Proclamation, and to the Jay Treaty of  1794-
95. However, this perspective analyzes the political elites and 
assumes that every political actor below them—newspaper 
editors and citizen leaders alike—took the same approach.19 The 
Federalist and Republican newspapers say something much more 
complex though. As I will show through this essay, newspaper 
coverage of  the French Revolution—and particularly, the three 
main themes of  universal liberty, friendship, and monarchy—
did not always mimic these partisan divides based on ideology. 
This chapter will show in both the data and the reading of  the 
sources that this conventional approach does not apply well to 
the national newspapers of  the time. 
Universal Liberty
 One of  the most popular themes in American national 
newspapers was the French move toward universal liberty. 
The conventional account, therefore, claims that while both 
Federalist and Republican politicians and newspapers agreed 
in the beginning of  the French Revolution on the merits of  
France’s move toward universal liberty, the Federalists, when 
violence arose, ceased their support for liberty in favor of  order. 
While the Republicans remained strong in their support of  
the French cause since their ideology championed liberty, the 
Federalists, due to their ideological support for government 
stability, could not support the French Revolution’s actions any 
longer. However, as one will observe, there are two problems 
with this explanation. First, the Federalist press’ turn away from 
the French fight for liberty did not coincide with the beginning 
of  violence and radicalism in France. Additionally, opinions 
published in the Gazette of  the United States on French matters did 
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not coincide with the ideological debates of  leading politicians 
such as Adams and Hamilton in mid-1791. Rather, the Federalist 
and Republican newspapers agreed on the merits of  the French 
Revolution for much longer than expected—through the middle 
of  1792. Thus, the basic contention of  scholars does not hold 
up; while one would have excepted the Federalist press to oppose 
the French Revolution as early as 1791, the Gazette of  the United 
States’ opposition surfaced much later. 
Across all three newspapers, including the federalist 
Gazette of  the United States, the usage of  the word “liberty” rose 
over the beginning years of  the French Revolution. While in 
the 1789 issues of  the Gazette of  the United States, “liberty” was 
used in the French context only 9 times, it was used 29 times 
in the 1793 issues. Similarly, in 1791, “liberty” was used in the 
French context only 8 times by the National Gazette, but 30 
times in 1792 and 50 times in 1793. Finally, the General Advertiser 
mentioned “liberty” in the French context 20 times in 1790, but 
56 times in 1792 and 49 times in 1793.20 While these numbers 
may appear small, it is important to note that two of  the three 
newspapers published only four-page newspapers twice a week. 
Using “liberty” and “France” together in 50 articles over the 
course of  a year is a clear indication of  the rise of  this rhetorical 
connection. Violence began in July of  1791 with the killings at 
the anti-royalist demonstration at Champ de Mars and continued 
through 1792 and 1793 with the September Massacre and other 
counterrevolutionary feuds. Additionally, in June of  1791, 
Federalists such as John Quincy Adams wrote in opposition to 
Paine’s celebration of  the French cause, while simultaneously 
Jefferson despised the federalist newspaper coverage of  the 
French Revolution; but despite all of  this, opinions surrounding 
liberty during the French Revolution continued to rise in usage 
across the board. The supposed ideological divide is absent from 
these years. A further examination of  the newspaper content will 
shed a more complex light on both Federalist and Republican 
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support over these five crucial years. 
 From the very beginning of  the Federalist Gazette of  the 
United States, Fenno’s newspaper praised the French Revolution 
for its support of  universal liberty. As one will observe, the 
rhetoric from 1789 through 1792 consistently remained positive 
and even increased in frequency over time. The apparent 
violence in France and partisanship in Washington’s cabinet 
apparently did not affect Fenno. Buried on Page 2 of  the July 
29, 1789 issue of  the Gazette of  the United States, was a short but 
powerful passage, praising King Louis XVI of  France for calling 
the Estates-General to order on April 27th. The passage began:
The magnanimous policy conspicuous in the 
above speech—the openness, candor, and paternal 
affection which breathes in every line of  it, 
contrasted with edicts of  former Kings of  the same 
nation, evince the liberality, enlightened policy, and 
superior wisdom of  the present age—THE ERA 
OF FREEDOM—OF UNIVERSAL LIBERTY! 
In the Western world, she first broke the chains 
which held mankind in servitude—and having fixed 
her temple in our favored country, she is spreading 
her salutary reign throughout the world.21 
American writers viewed this calling of  the Estates-General in an 
exceedingly positive light. Three unique elements emerge from 
this celebratory piece. First, the American writer saw the French 
Revolution as a major shift away from tyranny and towards 
liberty by calling a meeting between the three French Estates—
the clergy (First Estate), the nobility (Second Estate), and the 
common people (Third Estate). Second, the author specifically 
praised the King of  France as the “wise and magnanimous 
monarch of  France.” Despite not altering the very structure of  
the French monarchy, the Americans still praised the French 
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monarch and considered the King’s move to be one of  “paternal 
affection.” Third, the author noted that this new French liberty 
was an extension of  American efforts, a symptom of  the ripples 
caused by the American Revolution.22 
Over the course of  the French Revolution, the Gazette 
of  the United States became almost obsessed with its global 
impact. On Page 3 of  the January 2, 1790 issue, three of  the 
seven articles in the folio discussed the French Revolution and 
its recent accomplishments. As the New Year’s edition of  the 
newspaper, the editor published several poems and articles that 
reviewed the previous year of  1789. 
 If  one had any doubt about the American interest in the 
French Revolution, one should look no further than the “Ode 
to the New Year.” With a full stanza dedicated to the French 
Revolution, the ode celebrated 1789 as the year that “saw our 
rights secured, and Europe freed.” Only months after the 
Storming of  the Bastille, the author shrewdly noted the immense 
historical significance of  the French Revolution’s beginnings, 
stating, “Long shall thy numbers, in our annals shine.” The 
author continued, “It almost finished; Europe almost free, / May 
Frenchmen use their power, so late retrieved, / In Humbling 
pride, and righting the aggrieved.” This dramatic applause of  
French accomplishments also demonstrated a deeper connection 
between the Americans and the French; the author used the 
viewpoint of  “ours” and not of  “theirs”—“in our annals shine” 
and “that saw our rights secured”—indicating a shared goal and 
project.23 
Although it started more than a year after the Gazette 
of  the United States began, the General Advertiser under Benjamin 
Franklin Bache employed similar rhetoric. On October 4, 1790, 
Bache published a letter by Madame La Chevaliere D’eon that 
stated, “Louis XVI: thou art the first Monarch in the world who 
has confirmed in the face of  heaven and earth the liberties of  
thy people…worthy the love of  the whole human race.”24 On 
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the next day, the newspaper printed additional letters and a toast 
about France. One letter claimed, “Liberty is a plant of  quick 
growth, takes deep root in short time, and spreads rapidly.”25 The 
toast read as follows: 
The Majesty of  the People. Universal Liberty. Those 
who have lost their lives in defense of  it. The father of  
our constitution. Those who have laid its foundation in 
their immortal works: Locke, Milton, Rousseau, Sidney, 
Needham, Mably, Price...The memory of  those who 
perished in the dungeons of  the Bastille. The United 
States. May the closest union, founded on a solid basis 
of  commerce and friendship, subsist between them and 
France.26 
Similar to the Gazette of  the United States, the author of  the toast 
used many of  the same themes: universal liberty, the United 
States’ role in that liberty, a celebration of  the Bastille, and the 
friendship between the United States and France.27 
This optimism and praise remained consistent through 
1791. On July 6, 1791, Fenno published an article that showed 
how individual writers were successful in both predicting and 
catalyzing the French Revolution through the spread of  their 
ideas. The article ended, 
The Philanthropist and Philosopher are highly gratified 
in reflecting that this Revolution has taken place, and 
upon such principles as must ensure its success; and 
may safely conclude from this pleasing prospect, that 
similar revolutions, in favor of  the rights of  humanity, 
and founded on similar principles, will soon pervade not 
only Europe but the world.28 
Despite reported violence and conflict at this time in France, the 
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federalist newspaper maintained this identical rhetoric. 
On November 30, 1791, the Gazette of  the United States 
continued to praise the French Revolution, remarking, “Liberty 
is not only secured against many former dangers, but it has fewer 
enemies to contend with. As knowledge spreads through Europe, 
it gains authority over the hearts of  its adversaries; Kings begin 
to talk like good republicans—they give a tone to the fashion 
of  being free.”29 Fenno cited republican sentiments themselves, 
making it clear that even in late 1791, positive sentiments toward 
the French remained. While the conventional historical approach 
expects Federalists to contend strongly with republicanism at 
this point, this is clearly not the case.
In his letters, Jefferson claimed that in April 1791 he and 
Madison commissioned Freneau to form a republican newspaper 
because he disliked Fenno’s coverage and opinion of, among 
other things, the French Revolution.30 However, when looking at 
Fenno’s newspaper up until this point, the supposed turn against 
the French Revolution is not found. From 1789 through 1791, 
Fenno remained true to the French Revolution’s effects and 
potential. This is further proof  of  a divide between the ideology 
of  leading politicians and the opinions of  newspapers and their 
editors. 
Some may point to the Publicola debates, however, as 
proof  that the federalist newspapers did turn against the French 
Revolution in 1791. At the end of  June 1791, John Quincy 
Adams penned an article under the pseudonym Publicola, which 
eventually was published in the Gazette of  the United States.31 In 
the article, he sharply criticized Paine’s Rights of  Man and drew 
a distinction between the American reformation of  the English 
constitution based on enlightened principles and (contrary 
to?) the French radical revolution that wished to overthrow an 
entire governmental structure. Adams argued that the French 
Revolution’s reforms would not take root because they did not 
impose natural and comprehensive change of  government. 
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Immediately, Publicola became a public focus, receiving 
no fewer than 25 responses under the pseudonym Brutus, whose 
articles were published in the General Advertiser in July and August 
of  1791. Critics took issue with almost every claim Adams made. 
However, the Gazette of  the United States’ support for the French 
Revolution and the liberty it produced did not change after 
Adams’ article was published. While Republicans were fast to 
criticize, they were indeed criticizing politicians including Adams, 
not the newspapers or their editors themselves.
Through 1792, praise of  French activities still remained, 
though most articles were relegated to the sides of  the 
newspapers under the “Philadelphia” section, which discussed 
events happening in the nation’s capital. Seemingly, the Publicola 
article was an exception, as praise for the French cause continued. 
On April 28, 1792, for example, the Gazette of  the United States 
defended the people of  France against governmental and 
religious censors. The article stated, “Two things are clear—
that the people adopted, and that they support the present 
government. It is the glory of  Americans that they have done 
this…The people of  America have as many good reasons to 
approve their own deliberate work, as the French nation.”32 
Invoking the principles of  republicanism, the author gave full 
support behind the revolutionaries who exercised their power to 
establish the government and tailor it to their will. Additionally, 
in celebration of  Bastille Day (July 14), the Gazette of  the United 
States recounted “various demonstrations of  joy,” as well as 
seventeen toasts, which included toasts to “The French Nation; 
their Constitution and King. May the Freedom which dawned 
encircle the globe. Victory to the French armies over the foes of  
Liberty. Liberty or Death. The President of  the United States.”33 
Indistinguishable from the toasts of  1791, this utterance further 
proves the extreme regard for liberty that the Federalists had and 
their strong alliance with the French cause. 
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Furthermore, Federalists maintained hope for the French 
Revolution, writing, 
The people of  the United States are now in possession of  
what [a] great part of  the European world are laboring to 
obtain—a government of  their choice…and while every 
real friend to the happiness of  mankind most ardently 
wishes success to the struggles of  oppressed humanity 
in the eastern hemisphere, he will spurn with indignation 
every insidious attempt to blast the prospects of  this 
country under the auspices of  that government whose 
basis is freedom, and equal rights of  man.34 
With caution, Fenno’s newspaper remained in strong 
support of  the French Revolution, not only for France’s past 
accomplishments but for its future potential. 
Fenno’s rhetoric was almost identical to that found in the 
General Advertiser and the National Gazette alike. Historians have 
explained that “During its two-year existence, the National Gazette 
was almost identical to the General Advertiser in its praise of  the 
French Revolution.”35 Established only at the end of  1791, the 
National Gazette immediately began covering and commenting 
on the French Revolution extensively.36 On December 12, 1791, 
Freneau published an article under the pseudonym Aratus, who 
claimed that the “assent of  the King to the constitution has 
completed the French Revolution.” With immense praise for 
French progress, Aratus linked it to human progress, asserting, 
“As the friend of  humanity, I rejoice in the French Revolution.” 
However, Aratus went on to write, 
But as the citizen of  America, the gratification is greatly 
heightened. From a variety of  circumstances, I have been 
led to believe, that if  their effort had failed, the calamity 
would not have been confined to themselves alone, but 
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have communicated its destructive influence to the noble 
fabric we have raised. The fate of  the two governments 
has appeared to be intimately linked together; and that of  
either dependent on the other. What their circumstances 
are, that should warn every good republican to stand on 
his guard.37
The rhetoric surrounding humanity’s progress and the United 
States’ influence were similar, but the National Gazette went a step 
further than Fenno and Bache. Aratus claimed that the results 
of  the French Revolution would be extremely impactful on the 
American project; if  the French were to fail, Aratus warned, then 
the American Constitution and its principles will be questioned. 
Accordingly, the French Revolution’s principles cannot and 
should not merely be admired from afar, but deeply and closely 
monitored. This indicated a slight shift in the thoughts of  
American newspapers, but surely not in any partisan proportions.
If  the federalist support for the French did not turn 
during the early chaos, riots, and wars abroad, as well as during 
the early partisan bickering at home, when does their support for 
universal liberty halt? Within the Gazette of  the United States, the 
first major criticism came on October 3, 1792, from an article 
published under the pseudonym Cato. This finding presents an 
immense sixteen-month lag between the violence in France in 
July of  1791 and Fenno’s eventual turn away from the French 
Revolution in October of  1792. During this period, Fenno 
expressed almost identical sentiments toward France and its 
praiseworthy pursuit toward universal liberty. This gap between 
Fenno and the partisanship of  elites, as well as the violence in 
France demonstrates that Fenno was not predominantly animated 
by Federalist ideology, nor was he the mouthpiece of  Adams 
or Hamilton. This lag indicates that Fenno acted autonomously 
when it came to the French Revolution, allowing the newspaper 
to express its own opinions and pursue its independent agenda.
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Finally, when Fenno’s newspaper turned against the 
French Revolution, the author known as Cato expressed “deep 
concern” over the progression of  the insurrection. Cato not only 
recounted and despaired over the violence, frenzy, and chaos in 
France, but also applied it to the United States in two ways. First, 
he stated that 
as men anxious for the happiness of  our fellow men,…
as Americans who gave example to twenty-five millions 
of  people,…as individuals possessed with sensibility, we 
cannot be indifferent to the future of  those individuals 
who…are endeavoring to procure for their own country 
a participation in that freedom, which they assisted in 
procuring for us.38
As Americans who both inspired the French Revolution and 
benefited from French assistance in the past, Americans must feel 
concerned with French affairs, which were in “extreme disorder 
and jeopardy.” Cato here maintained universalist rhetoric, but 
argued that the world was failing to achieve that universalism. 
Second, Cato argued that the factionalism and the chaos in 
France should worry Americans now, since the United States has 
men just like those in France who are “discontented” with the 
government and who wish to destabilize it.39 Cato thought that 
Americans should guard the country from those people, namely 
the Republicans, or else events that happened in France will 
unfold in the United States. Cato used the French Revolution as 
a polemical device, not because others disagreed with his analysis 
of  the French Revolution, nor because Cato and the Gazette of  
the United States suddenly realized that their ideology did not fit 
with the French Revolution. 
Additionally, in early November of  1792, the Gazette 
of  the United States took its first shot at Bache’s understanding 
of  the French Revolution. On Saturday, November 3rd, the 
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newspaper published a letter to Fenno signed by Philanthropis. 
The letter criticized the French Revolution, noting, “that the 
people of  France have swerved from the original principles of  
their revolution—that the new constitution has essentially been 
violated—and that reason and judgment are overwhelmed by 
the boisterous voice of  faction.” The Federalist view clearly 
shifted here against the violent wars and treatment of  the King. 
Furthermore, Philanthropis responded to those who claimed the 
violence was all due to the tyranny of  the monarchy by asking, 
But what despotism bears half  the ills in its train as that of  
anarchy and confusion, where every sacred mound raised 
for the security of  life, liberty and property, is levelled 
[sic] by the torment of  lawless power? The unhappy 
situation in France, while it demands our sympathy, 
presents a thinking example of  what is to be expected 
from the passion of  men uncontrolled by government 
and laws.
While the revolutionaries claimed that their actions were in line 
with liberty and security, in fact, they violated those principles 
by creating chaos and torment. The federalist newspaper here, 
therefore, completely flipped away from its original support of  
the French Revolution.40 
In the next issue of  the Gazette of  the United States, a 
Federalist reader used the Philanthropis article to parody and to 
criticize the Republicans. The author wrote, “Mr. Fenno, please re-
publish the following parody on the piece signed Philanthropis.” 
The new article was addressed to Bache and noted “that the 
people of  France have improved upon the original principles of  
their revolution, by a bold step of  rational republicanism, and a 
dereliction of  the gothic system of  inviolability in the supreme 
executive.” The author continued parodying the republican 
stance, adding, “As to the late excesses, they are the natural 
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effects of  the flings of  old wounds, received from the hands 
of  despotism” and further showed a “striking example of  the 
excesses that may be expected from the efforts of  men, rising 
from oppression and breaking the shackles imposed on them by 
lawless ambition.” The author closed the parody with a supposed 
message to Americans: “May America continue that happy 
country, where the supremacy of  the people, the best securities 
of  their liberties, shall always be superior to the restless efforts 
of  an aspiring law.” In a scathing and almost humorous parody, 
the author mocked what a Republican may write to Bache—not 
only are the excesses justified, but also that law in general may 
be disposed of  in favor of  the wishes of  the people. To that line 
of  argument, the author broke from the parody in an asterisk 
below, stating, “One of  the first principles of  republicanism is, 
that the Law is Supreme.” If  one assumed that the will of  the 
people is supreme, this writer argued, it would therefore create 
two Supremes—an impossible situation according to the author, 
citing the English playwright William Shakespeare. Without 
the sole supremacy of  the law, “Liberty almost expires in the 
contemplation—confidence is annihilated, and existence hangs 
upon a thread.” As Fenno turned against the French Revolution, 
he not only criticized the French themselves, but also poked fun 
at the domestic supporters of  the French Revolution.41 
While criticism of  France came from the Gazette of  
the United States, the republican newspapers stayed steady in 
their support for the French Revolution. The General Advertiser 
called the French Revolution “a glorious cause of  liberty” 
and led celebrations to commemorate every French act from 
the establishment of  the French Constitution of  1791 to the 
anniversary of  the establishment of  the French Republic in 
1792.42 The newspaper not only kept the language of  liberty 
intact throughout, but also frequently mentioned the strong 
connection between the French and American Revolutions. 
On January 2, 1793, the General Advertiser published a piece that 
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covered a large republican celebration of  the French triumph at 
Valmy—a crucial French victory. The article enumerated fifteen 
“truly republican toasts” including a toast to France, “may her 
republican form of  government last as long as the sun shines or 
the waters run,” and to President Washington, “because he is a 
friend to the rights of  man.” Additionally, toasts were given to 
ideas, including, “the undisguised political principles of  1776” 
and “May the sun of  liberty illuminate the universe.”43 In this toast 
and several others, Republicans showed that not only were their 
republican principles being applied in France and throughout 
the world, but also that the very principles of  the American 
Revolution and the Spirit of  ’76 were being applied in France. 
Thereby, the Republicans claimed to be the authentic carriers 
of  the American Revolutionary tradition. Throughout 1793, the 
General Advertiser covered all major celebrations including the 
Franco-American Alliance, the Storming of  the Bastille (July 14, 
1789), and the Insurrection of  August 10, 1792.44 
 Freneau’s National Gazette shared similar sentiments. 
In 1793, the National Gazette recognized a strong uptick in the 
popular sentiments around the French Revolution. An author 
wrote in 1793, “a year ago, the merits and importance of  the 
French Revolution, were confined…to but a few speculative 
politicians in this country. But at present…thousands who were 
then scarcely affected by its animating influence are now warmed 
and invigorated.”45 Although the tens of  celebrations from the 
beginning of  1791 debunk this theory of  popular inactivity, the 
author’s thought still shows how the French Revolution was 
central in 1793. This supposed increase in celebrations coincided 
with the federalist turn against the French Revolution. While 
some may claim it was the violence, wars, or King that caused 
this split, the newspapers themselves do not hint it, nor would 
this line of  thought explain the sudden republican rise from “a 
few speculative politicians” to the “thousands” of  supporters. 
Therefore, this phenomenon does not suggest a sudden 
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ideological divide between the newspapers, but a political one in 
which the Republicans highlighted their support for the French 
Revolution to break with the Federalists.
 In 1793, familiar rhetoric was used by the National Gazette 
including statements such as, “it is natural for every American 
to feel a peculiar interest in the affairs of  France since besides 
the common motives of  philanthropy and love of  liberty, he 
must consider the struggles of  France as a continuation of  the 
glorious struggles of  his own country.”46 The author, writing 
under the pseudonym of  Philadelphus argued that Americans 
should not only care about the humanitarian concerns and the 
common principles of  both Revolutions, but also about the 
contemporary well-being of  the country. Another author urged 
readers to “aid the causes of  republicanism in France, if  not 
from principles of  gratitude…[then] from motives of  your own 
prosperity.”47 Seemingly, the United States’ prosperity hinged on 
the outcome of  the French Revolution. Whether it tangibly hurt 
Philip Freneau (1752-1832), 
editor of the National Gazette
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the United States economically or it just theoretically called the 
vitality of  republican principles into question, the writer here 
showed that care for the French Revolution went beyond the 
classical principles of  republican ideology and fundamentally 
impacted American prosperity.48 
In their reactions to the French Revolution, national 
newspapers used the language of  liberty to celebrate the French 
cause. The language used in opinion pieces and celebrations 
typically repeated the concept of  universal liberty and the deep 
connection between the Americans and the French. Although 
a split over France did eventually fall along party lines, the split 
did not come when the politicians themselves split; between the 
end of  1791 through the end of  1792, the French Revolution 
was violent, the American political parties were forming, and 
yet everyone agreed on the French Revolution and its merits. 
Furthermore, even after the split occurred, both federalist 
and republican writers seemed to go beyond ideology in their 
rhetoric—hinting at more complex and political motives. By 
ignoring the day-to-day opinions of  newspapers, the conventional 
historical account fails to see the divide between republican 
and federalist newspapers and the ideological politicians of  the 
period. As one will later observe, the newspaper editors were 
more beholden to the ideas of  journalistic nonpartisanship than 
were their patrons.
Friendship and Sympathy
 Reading through the philosophical and political 
discourse on the French Revolution, it is almost impossible to 
miss the language of  sensibility, friendship, and brotherhood. 
After all, one of  the three French principles was fraternité, or 
brotherhood. While sensibility, friendship, and brotherhood are 
not synonymous with one another, they each imply a connection 
between the United States and France that runs deeper than 
just outside viewers and commentators.49 American newspapers 
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declared shared motives, goals, principles, and outcomes with 
the French Revolution. Toasts, poems, and celebrations not only 
served as intellectual congratulations, but also displayed emotional 
and familial relations between the countries. Additionally, these 
sentiments not only pervaded the top echelons of  American 
politics, but also were latent in the newspaper coverage of  
the French Revolution. Interestingly, however, politicians and 
newspapers used these phrases differently and at different times. 
This section will provide further proof  for the phenomenon 
displayed above—the commentary of  newspaper editors on 
the French Revolution was not driven by ideology, but by some 
other factor. According to Wells,
The language of  liberty owed its ascension in the 1790s to 
a very different discursive source as well: notwithstanding 
the political origins of  the discourses of  liberty and 
rights in Enlightenment thought more generally, it also 
drew particular power from the degree to which it also 
overlapped with another emerging discourse of  the 
time–that of  sensibility or sentimentalism, which had 
pervaded literary discourse (if  not political) throughout 
the 1780s in Britain and elsewhere.50 
Several other historians have also discussed this era of  sensibility, 
sentimentalism, and feelings and have shown its pervasiveness in 
popular political culture.51
 On October 27, 1789, the Gazette of  the United States 
published an article entitled, “Authentic Information,” discussing 
the concept of  sensibility in the United States. It declared, “A 
happy revolution of  sentiments is observed to have taken place 
throughout the United States: Local views, and narrow prejudices 
are universally reprobated—A generous national spirit pervades 
the whole Union…even the distinctions of  the states are 
scarcely heard…we are proud to be distinguished by the name 
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of  the Country we inhabit, Americans.” In a newspaper filled 
with local news and opinion articles, a sociological observation 
seems strange and out of  place. This puzzlement regarding 
the relevance of  the rise in national culture and sensibility was 
answered in the next paragraph though. According to the author, 
the United States in its sentimental and national state has the 
ability and the obligation to look past its borders and recognize 
its influence worldwide. When looking at France, the author 
claimed, “America may indulge [in] a laudable pride on this 
occasion” due to its ability to spread the ideas of  liberty through 
friendship.52
Picking up on the existing discourse of  the time, American 
newspapers like the Gazette of  the United States applied the language 
and ideas of  sentimentalism to their brethren across the Atlantic 
Ocean who seemed to be engaging in a similar revolution. This 
was the perfect opportunity for Americans to express their care 
not only for those within their own borders, but also those 
fighting for similar causes, no matter their location. As Wells 
noted, the form of  sentimentalism was a natural continuation 
from universal liberty—once a universal community is formed 
to fight for liberty, people within the community will sympathize 
with the struggles of  others within it.53 As the Gazette of  the 
United States commented in 1789, “Every citizen of  the world—
every friend to the rights of  mankind—and more especially 
every citizen of  the United States, must feel interested in the 
important transactions in the Kingdom of  France.”54 Friendship 
and citizenship, in short, require feeling and sensitivity.
 In this section, I hope to support two separate, but 
related, claims. First, the language of  sensibility does not seem 
to follow the supposed partisan divide, as Republicans failed to 
invoke the language of  friendship and sympathy until the end of  
1791. This furthers the claim that the French Revolution was not 
as ideologically driven as many people think. Second, the very 
nature of  these discussions brings the parties beyond ideology. 
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Through the language of  friendship and sensibility, newspapers 
showed not only their support for the French Revolution, but 
also a deep connection to it. From 1789 through 1791, the 
partisan paradigm flipped, as federalists displayed this deep, 
sensible connection while republicans did not. Then in 1792, 
the parties exchanged positions on this very issue. Whereas 
there was little partisan difference until late 1792 between the 
federalist and republican newspapers on the topic of  universal 
liberty, partisan difference existed immediately on the topic of  
friendship. The question is what motivated this partisan divide: 
differing ideology or some other factor? This back and forth 
between the newspapers indicates much more than ideological 
differences, as no ideological change was even reported at this 
time. The eventual departure on lines of  friendship shows 
that the terms of  this debate were about political legitimacy—
an argument not over philosophy, but over who were the true 
friends of  the American project. 
 One observes this trend explicitly in the usage of  the 
terms “friendship” and “sensibility” over this period. The Gazette 
of  the United States used “friend” and “France” in the same context 
4 times in 1789, up to 8 and 7 times in 1790 and 1791, respectively, 
and down again to 4 and 5 times in 1792 and 1793, respectively. 
Conversely, the General Advertiser used “friend” in the same 
context only 1 and 11 times in 1790 and 1791, respectively, but 
then 15 and 25 times in 1792 and 1793, respectively. The National 
Gazette also associated “friend” with “France” 9 and 17 times in 
1792 and 1793, respectively, as opposed to only 1 time in 1791.55 
Although the changes seem small and possibly insignificant, 
taken in relation to each other, there is a clear inverse trend 
between the federalist and republican national newspapers. 
The same analysis with the words “brother” and “France” 
uncover similar results. The federalist newspaper used “brother” 
and “France” together 1 time in 1789, then 10 times in 1790 
and 5, 4, and 5 times in 1791, 1792, and 1793, respectively—
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indicating a peak in 1790. The opposite is found in the republican 
papers. In 1790, the General Advertiser used these words together 
1 time, while it used them 5, 10, and 8 times in 1791, 1792, and 
1793, respectively. Similarly, the National Gazette used the words 
together only 2 times in 1791, but used them 7 times in both 
1792 and 1793. While no such trend exists in terms of  liberty 
over the same period, the trend within friendship is apparent—
indicating a partisan proclivity in terms of  American sensibility 
to the French Revolution, not a mere ideological difference. Only 
once republican usage went up while federalist usage went down. 
The graph below elucidates this trend for the word “brother.”
 Further analysis of  the usages of  friendship, brotherhood, 
and sensibility will illuminate these trends even more. As 
Americans became aware of  the French Revolution, writers 
urged their readership to support it. The line of  argument often 
went as follows:
The usage of the word “brother” by all three 
newspapers in the context of the French affairs
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The friends to the rights of  human nature, and 
particularly every American, must feel interested in 
the commotions which now agitate the Kingdom of  
France. The prospect that opened upon that people, 
of  a complete emancipation from a state of  abject 
despotism, impressed the most pleasing sensations 
upon every philanthropic mind. That they may 
finally establish a free government, is most devoutly 
wished.56 
Writers argued that as friends of  human nature, and ostensibly 
of  the enlightenment values of  human nature and freedom, 
Americans must be interested in the French Revolution. Not only 
are Americans believers in human nature, but they are also friends 
of  it—implying a deep connection and care for it. Additionally, 
authors invoked feelings of  interest, wishes of  free government, 
and pleasing sensations of  emancipation—all phrases expressing 
an authentically personal care for the French cause. 
 This type of  wishing and interest was a typical motif  of  
the federalists at the beginning of  the French Revolution. As 
opposed to acting or urging, the federalists watched with interest 
and pride as a caring friend.57 However, this motif  slowly lost 
popularity within the Gazette of  the United States, as support for 
the French Revolution eroded—at least, that is the approach 
most historians hold. In my view, the federalist shift within their 
newspaper is only in response to the republican change of  heart; 
therefore, we must first examine the republican shift. 
While the federalist newspaper discussed friendship and 
the French Revolution, the recently founded General Advertiser 
scarcely mentioned it in 1790 and throughout most of  1791. 
Some mentions spoke of  people as “friends of  the Revolution” 
or “friends of  mankind,” but seldom did the newspaper discuss 
deep sentiments between the United States and France.58 The lack 
of  sentimental care in these newspapers did not go unnoticed. 
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On November 24, 1791, the National Gazette published a letter 
which stated,
It has been observed by several foreigners, that, 
considering the immense benefits which the French 
Revolution promises to the human race, that grand event 
has passed in America with less éclat, less sympathy of  
joy, than could have been reasonably expected from a 
people, who but seven years before, had almost by dint 
of  mere enthusiastic bravery, emancipated themselves 
from the chains prepared for them by the parent state.59
 
With similar values and experiences, one would have expected 
the Americans to be more sympathetic, the author thought. In 
reality, the federalist press recounted sympathy, but for some 
reason the republican press had not. The explanation the author 
gave for the lateness in sympathy is even more telling, remarking 
that
…characters were not wanting in this country who 
exerted such abilities as they possessed, in endeavoring 
to persuade the people that the principles for which they 
had so recently fought and bled, were nugatory—and 
the right of  enacting laws and governing themselves lay 
not with the multitude of  any nation, but with certain 
favorites of  heaven, certain political magicians…the 
establishment of  a free government in France, has 
thrown a damp upon the advocates of  such doctrines.
 
In essence, the writer pointed to some people who did not 
want others in the United States to learn and to advocate for 
the same solution the French were promoting—namely, “the 
pure doctrines of  Republicanism” and the sovereignty of  the 
people. In a purely partisan and polemical fashion, the author 
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unjustly and maliciously blamed federalists—who apparently did 
not want others to find out about republicanism—for the lack 
of  sympathy in the United States. Ironically, the federalists had 
been the only ones using the language of  sympathy so far.60 With 
this malicious attack on federalists though, sympathy was used 
not as an ideological point of  departure, but as a political point 
of  controversy. 
 Not surprisingly, around the time of  this article, the 
republican usage of  sympathy and sentimentalism soared and 
these articles typically had a federalist jab attached as well. 
The main source for these sentimental articles was from the 
coverage of  celebration and toasts to the French Revolution 
and its various anniversaries. With the July 4th celebration in 
1792 rained out in Philadelphia, local officials decided to move 
the celebration ten days later to Bastille Day. Both republican 
newspapers covered the day extensively and their coverage was 
filled with references to friendship and sympathy. In the July 7th 
edition of  the National Gazette, after hearing that the firework 
show would be delayed to July 14th, a writer commented that 
on the anniversary of  the French Revolution, “it is expected, 
there will, in future, be a general rejoicing in every part of  the 
United States, by all who are friends to the French Revolution, 
and consequently real friends to the revolution in America.”61 The 
two words, “real friends,” packed a sympathetic connection to 
the French Revolution with a partisan polemic all in one. By 
celebrating the French Revolution, the republicans thought of  
themselves both as the friends of  the French and as the true 
protectors of  the American Revolution.62 Clearly, the unfounded 
invocation of  “real friends” highlights the political jousting that 
took place between the republican and federalist press. These 
debates were not the same ideological debates that political elites 
were having at this time; rather, the partisan press, by couching 
their rhetoric in true friendship, was engaging in a debate over 
which political party was truly legitimate. 
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 In 1793, these celebrations further intensified with the 
visit of  Citizen Genêt to the United States. Genêt arrived to sway 
American opinion toward France, as opposed to neutrality. While 
hundreds came out to celebrations for him across the country, 
this did not change President Washington’s decision in favor of  
neutrality. However, aside from the foreign policy outcomes, 
the result of  Genêt’s visit could be seen as more significant and 
impactful in terms of  the reaction of  the American populace. 
Genêt’s ability to bring scores of  people out to celebrations 
and festivals led historian David Waldstreicher to conclude that 
Genêt “enabled the people to celebrate themselves and their 
participation in national politics. It seemed to make ordinary 
Americans into makers of  foreign policy.”63 With such popular 
appeal, both Genêt and the population expressed feelings of  
brotherhood and friendship between the nation of  the United 
States and the people of  France. Genêt wrote in the General 
Advertiser,
I have received abundant proofs on my journey 
from Charleston to Philadelphia. In every place 
the general voice of  the people convinced me, in a 
most sensible manner, of  their real sentiments, and 
sincere, and friendly dispositions toward the nation 
which I have the honour to represent, and for the 
advancement of  that common cause which she 
alone supports with so much courage…I assure you 
that the day your brethren in France shall receive 
it [your sentiments], will be a day of  gladness to 
them.64
Saturated with references to sensibility and friendship, Genêt’s 
speeches served as the emotional conduit between the American 
public and the French people. Several citizens also published 
their letters to Genêt in the newspaper. One letter from Charles 
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Biddle stated, “For such feelings, sir, we have been naturally 
led to contemplate the struggles of  France with a paternal 
eye, sympathizing in all her calamities, and exulting in all her 
successes.”65 Biddle claimed that not only was France a brother 
and friend to the United States, but also that the United States 
was a paternal figure—caring for France and taking pride in all 
its successes. Another letter from P.S. Du Ponceau, the Citizen 
Minister of  the French Republic, contained an outpouring of  
feeling and connection between the French and the Americans. 
He wrote that when France still had its despotic government, 
many Frenchmen fled to the United States and were accepted 
openly. De Ponceau continued, “But in becoming Americans, 
they have not ceased to be Frenchmen; for no individual can 
be more intimately connected with either than the two nations 
are with each other…An union cemented by the blood of  the 
citizens of  both nations and founded on so solid a basis as 
similarity of  sentiment and principle.”66 Again, sentiment was 
central to the connection between France and the United States. 
For republican newspapers, Genêt’s visit was not seen 
primarily as a rally for tangible involvement in French affairs, 
but as a rally to express affection for the French. “An Old 
Soldier” wrote, “The bosoms of  many hundred freemen beat 
high with affectionate transport, their souls caught the celestial 
fire of  struggling liberty, and in the enthusiasm of  emotion, 
they communicated their feelings to the worthy and amicable 
representative of  the French nation.”67 The writer’s words display 
the broad-based excitement Genêt and the French cause brought 
to the United States. The celebration around Genêt, in summary, 
was not just a political rally to show support for his cause; rather, 
it was an outpouring of  American emotion, enthusiasm, and 
brotherhood. Consequently, these rallies had more of  an effect 
on its participants than on the policies for which they attempted 
to advocate. 
However, the purely emotional explanation behind 
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the Genêt visit obscures one key aspect of  this period: the 
partisan portion of  it. While I do not deny that some of  the 
popular display was genuine, the publication of  these long-
winded articles seems positioned for a different purpose. The 
article from the “Old Soldier” only dedicates the first paragraph 
praising Genêt and France, while it spends the rest of  the two-
page column discussing the federalists and their “royal folly.” 
Genuine philosophical feelings were not the only, or even the 
main, reason for publishing the articles related to the French 
Revolution; rather, political jousting seemed to be the true goal. 
By denouncing the federalists, this author and other republicans 
hoped to legitimize their own opposition. As one has seen 
throughout, rhetoric surrounding friendship rose among 
republicans when partisanship was at stake. Additionally, not 
only did rhetoric rise, but it also skyrocketed. The May 22nd issue 
of  the National Gazette spoke almost solely about Genêt and did 
so in a repetitive fashion. This extreme coverage and verbose 
language describing the French cause indicates a more complex 
yet fundamental motive. 
Once the republicans politicized friendship and searched 
for the “real friends” of  the Revolutions, the federalists were out 
of  options. The republicans had co-opted the 1780s language 
of  sentimentalism for their own partisan agenda.68 Broadly, the 
partisan flip-flop within the realm of  sentimentalism hints at 
something beyond ideology that moved back and forth. 
Monarchy
 In the practical sense, the many onlookers regarded the 
issue of  monarchy as the most important issue of  the French 
Revolution. From the Storming of  the Bastille until the end of  
1792, the revolutionaries attempted to salvage the monarchy, 
albeit curbing its powers through a constitution and a new 
legislative structure. However, with growing frustration, the 
revolutionaries abolished the monarchy, executed the King and 
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Queen, and established a new French Republic. 
 Watching closely, American newspapers commented 
extensively on the French monarchy, its merits, and its relation 
to the United States’ past, present, and future. The Gazette of  the 
United States between 1789 and 1793 used the words “King” and 
“France” in the same context 190 times; between 1790 and 1793, 
the General Advertiser used them 224 times, and the National Gazette 
between 1791 and 1793 used them 140 times. In other words, 
discussions of  the King were extremely common. Additionally, 
as expected, usage increased over the years, as the revolutionaries 
slowly began to consider terminating the monarchy. For example, 
during 1791 and 1792, respectively, the Gazette of  the United States 
made 40 and 54 mentions of  the King, the National Gazette 21 
and 66 had mentions, and the General Advertiser contained 84 
mentions during both years.69 As the monarchy became more 
relevant, American newspapers spoke about it more often. 
 As expected, many historians argue that the federalists 
favored the monarchy and considered the beheading of  the King 
barbaric, while republicans favored the abolition of  a powerful 
monarchy that perpetuated hierarchy, limited popular liberty, 
and perpetuated tyranny. Historians such as Wells even point to 
proof  from national newspapers. Wells cites Peter Pindar’s poem 
in the Gazette of  the United States entitled, “The Captive King” 
and Freneau’s article published under the pseudonym Brutus, 
“Louis Capet has lost his Caput.” Ostensibly, these articles show 
that “the ideological distance between this growing number 
of  critics and the Revolution’s unwavering supporters would 
be even more pronounced.”70 However, upon examination, 
neither of  these articles display a sharp ideological divide. “The 
Captive King” was written as a song that King Louis XVI recited 
while imprisoned. The song is surely dramatic, with lines like 
“No more these walls my grief  shall hear” and “When sorrow 
dies, and ruthless Fate can give the parting pang no more!” It 
also expresses empathy for the King and even states, “Behold, 
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a brighter crown is thine;” but lacks any deliberate claims that 
would align it with the supposed federalist position.71 The song 
never explicitly supported the monarch or the monarchy, nor did 
it make any partisan claims. Brutus’ article “Louis Capet has lost 
his Caput” does not align with the republican position either, as 
it begins, “From my use of  a pun [in the title] it may seem that I 
think lightly of  his fate. I certainly do. It affects me no more than 
the execution of  another malefactor.” However, the article was 
not meant to be the mainstream republican opinion. By his own 
admission and admonishment, Brutus ended the article, “Why 
then such a noise even with republicans about the death of  
Louis?” Apparently, many people, including republicans, pitied 
or even opposed the execution of  the King. While Brutus cannot 
comprehend such pity, this article nonetheless goes to disprove 
the conventional approach with respect to republicans, whose 
position on the monarchy, even in 1793, was not agreed upon by 
all.72 
 In searching for the true positions of  federalist and 
republican newspapers, one discovers two things. First, the 
supposed federalist support for the King is oversimplified and 
misunderstood. The federalist newspaper did at first support 
the King, but later came not only to dislike him, but also to call 
for the establishment of  a French Republic in his place. Second, 
there was never consensus among republicans on the issue of  
the monarchy. The General Advertiser and National Gazette present 
two different positions on the issue. Consequently, the complex 
issue of  the monarchy as told through the newspapers went 
beyond the straightforward ideology that was espoused by many 
of  the political leaders of  the time. 
At the very beginning of  the French Revolution, the 
federalist and republican positions were indistinguishable. On 
November 21, 1789, the Gazette of  the United States published 
a letter from Marquis de Caseaux, which proclaimed, “in very 
simple terms” that “the people is everything. No legitimate power 
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can exist but from them and for them.”73 Shockingly to some, 
this paradigmatic republican statement was a featured topic in 
a federalist newspaper. However, this line of  argument did not 
call for an immediate abolition of  the monarchy, but rather an 
end to tyranny and despotism. As the Gazette of  the United States 
declared, “At all men are tyrants by nature,” and it is up to the 
people to curb this tyranny.74 With statements such as, “Deliver 
from vestige of  feudal tyranny” the Gazette of  the United States 
was distinctly opposed to the French tyranny of  the past, not to 
the institutional monarchy itself.75
 Republicans and federalists alike simultaneously 
supported King Louis XVI and the French Revolution. Despite 
the thoughts of  some historians, republicans were not always 
opposed to the monarchy.76 For republicans, the form of  
government was not as significant as the amount of  liberty that 
was provided to the people. On October 4, 1790, the General 
Advertiser wrote, “Louis XVI: thou art the first Monarch in the 
world who has confirmed in the face of  heaven and earth the 
liberties of  thy people, which God and Nature have bestowed 
upon us all. Beloved Monarch! Worthy of  the love of  the whole 
human race, enjoy this day and the reward of  thy glory and thy 
virtue!”77 Not only did these proto-republicans tolerate King 
Louis XVI, but they also adored him and wished him to continue 
his policies of  liberty. 
Despite favoring an orderly, strong, and centralized 
presidency, as exemplified by the popular George Washington, 
the federalist newspaper also supported the deposition of  
the King—a break from the traditional understanding of  the 
federalist position.78 On November 7, 1792, the Gazette of  the 
United States published a piece of  French intelligence describing 
the popular march to the King’s palace in order to arrest him 
and his family. The march was bloody, as the entire Swiss Guard 
was murdered. As the author described, “the walls and floors 
were stained with blood, covered with broken weapons, and 
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the limbs of  men.” However, the scene was a “horror not to be 
exceeded. Yet even this horror might be endured, by recollecting 
who had been the inhabitants.” Amidst the chaos, the author 
recalled, “a strong mixture of  harmony, fraternity, sensibility, 
vengeance, generosity, and barbarity.” Even during the violent 
turn of  the French Revolution, the author published in the 
federalist newspaper still managed to see the positive qualities of  
the event. This is explicitly because the author blamed the King 
for all the violence in France. As the author noted, “By the side 
of  this scene sat Louis XVI, the author of  all these lamentable 
tragedies.” Lastly, the author closed by hoping that the royal 
palace and surrounding barracks would be used as the future 
hall for the assembly of  Bureaus and the apartments for “the 
Ministers and President of  the Republic.” Even as partisanship 
roared and violence was in clear sight, the author not only 
opposed the King—the supposed republican position—but also 
favored the establishment of  a French Republic.79 The federalist 
position, therefore, was not so simple.
Astonishingly, the National Gazette also maintained its 
support for the King through the beginning of  1793. Almost 
all published toasts in Freneau’s paper were toasts to the King 
himself  and to his health.80 However, the General Advertiser 
seemed to turn against the King much more quickly—beginning 
their criticism in 1791. The toasts Bache published did not toast 
the King.81 Additionally, many articles Bache published in 1791 
by Brutus severely criticized the monarchy.82 While the General 
Advertiser favored Washington in the toasts it covered, calling 
Washington “the Father of  Freemen” and “friend to the rights 
of  man,” this can be seen as a polemic against the French King— 
the National Assembly and Washington were praised, while 
King Louis XVI was omitted.83 By 1793, the General Advertiser 
published a toast stating, “May royalty and priest-craft expire 
together.”84 As one observed earlier in the article entitled “Louis 
Capet has lost his Caput,” republicans were split on the issue 
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of  the monarchy from 1791 through the execution of  the King 
in 1793. The support from the National Gazette shows that the 
republican position regarding the King was also not as simple as 
the consensus theory makes it out to be. 
Overall, the expectations surrounding the positions 
of  these newspapers on the French Revolution were not met 
in terms of  timing, content, or even ideological polarization. 
When discussing universal liberty, the Gazette of  the United 
States departed from the ideologies of  its political patrons by 
supporting and praising the French Revolution for much longer 
than many historians predicted. Despite rampant violence and 
the denouncement of  the French Revolution by many politicians, 
including John Adams, the Gazette of  the United States still praised 
the French pursuit of  universal liberty until October of  1792. This 
sixteen-month lag is unaccounted for within the conventional 
approach offered by historians. Additionally, republican writers 
used the concepts of  liberty often to polemicize with their 
federalist counterparts, hinting at something more complex at 
hand than just republican expressions of  ideology. 
When analyzing the usage of  friendship and 
sentimentalism in relation to the French Revolution, ones 
expectations were also not met, as the conventional approach 
cannot account for several aspects of  the analysis above. 
First, the newspapers were in much more agreement on this 
issue than the conventional approach would have one believe. 
Second, when the newspapers did disagree, the timing of  their 
departure did not line up with the violence and leading political 
partisanship of  1791. From 1789 through the middle of  1792, 
the federalist newspaper used these terms of  friendship and 
sentimentalism often to praise the French Revolution, while 
the republicans seldom used them. In the middle of  1792, one 
observes a flip, where republican newspapers began using these 
phrases often to polemicize with federalists, and thus, the Gazette 
of  the United States nearly stopped using these words altogether. 
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The conventional approach fails to explain this odd pattern. 
Friendship, it seems, was not used by the republican newspapers 
to express their ideology, but instead to delegitimize the other 
party while legitimizing its own opposition. 
Finally, in terms of  the newspapers’ opinion on monarchy, 
the newspapers agreed for much longer than the conventional 
approach predicted. Indeed, the republican newspapers showed 
that there was no consensus among Republicans regarding the 
institution of  monarchy. While the General Advertiser opposed the 
King in France as early as 1791, the National Gazette supported 
and even praised the King well into 1793. Additionally, the 
federalist newspaper even supported the deposition of  the King, 
contrary to what many historians would have expected from a 
federalist journal commissioned and supported by Hamilton. 
In short, the conventional approach cannot account for 
the complex and nuanced opinions of  these newspapers on the 
French Revolution. 
CONCLUSION
“The revolutionary wars of  Europe, commencing 
precisely at the moment when the Government of  
the United States first went into operation under 
this Constitution, excited a collision of  sentiments 
and of  sympathies which kindled all the passions 
and embittered the conflict of  parties till the nation 
was involved in war and the Union was shaken to its 
center.”85
– John Quincy Adams
In his 1825 presidential inaugural address, John Quincy 
Adams made essentially four claims in one sentence. First, 
the revolutions of  Europe—most prominently the French 
Revolution of  1789—coincided with the ratification of  the 
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American Constitution. Although Adams did not tell the 
audience why this is significant, it is safe to assume it related 
to his next claims. Adams then stated that the revolutions in 
Europe excited American sympathy toward those revolutions, 
and that those sentiments toward Europe’s revolutions led to 
a partisan divide that caused conflict between those parties. 
This third assertion likely relates to the significance of  the first 
claim, as only in a federal union under a constitution could the 
entire nation become divided along partisan lines. Lastly, partisan 
conflict became so bad that war broke out because of  it—shaking 
the very foundation of  the United States. 
 These four simple claims, comprising a single sentence, 
may be seen by many as a restatement of  the conventional 
approach on the impact of  the French Revolution on the United 
States. Since the 1790s, politicians and historians alike saw the 
French Revolution as a partisan divider within the new nation, 
creating such an ideological rift that the sentiments toward a 
revolution thousands of  miles away caused bitter political divide 
and culminated in a violent war.86 At its heart, the conventional 
approach claims that political philosophy and ideology are at 
the center of  the American political square. Looking outward, 
many American citizens and politicians understood the French 
Revolution through the lens of  their own political philosophies—
federalist or republican. To be fair, most of  the writings of  the 
political elite make this explicit. But the national newspapers 
paint a more complicated picture—a picture that Adams, if  read 
more closely, seemed to understand thirty years after the fact. 
In analyzing the federalist and government-sympathetic 
Gazette of  the United States alongside the republican General 
Advertiser and National Gazette, the expected reaction of  each 
newspaper to the French Revolution’s events was not always 
observed, especially between 1789 and 1793. Historians who 
take the conventional approach may have expected to see the 
republican newspapers tout French sympathies immediately, 
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while in reality, they only began expressing such sympathies 
in 1792. They also expected these republican newspapers to 
oppose monarchy and support the deposition of  the King, 
when in truth the Republicans could not come to agree on this 
issue, even in 1793. Additionally, the Federalists supported the 
French Revolution for much longer than expected, championing 
the pursuit of  universal liberty until 1793. Finally, the federalist 
newspaper itself  supported the deposition of  the King even 
after witnessing the bloodshed involved in his execution. 
What is clear from this analysis is that the republican 
and federalist newspapers had their fair share of  agreements and 
disagreements, but ideological differences between the factions 
were insufficient to explain them. Adams himself  admitted 
that the reaction to the French Revolution was not based on 
ideology, but instead pervasively expressed in sentiments and 
sympathies.87 Additionally, Adams said that the parties only 
formed after sentiments over the French Revolution were 
expressed and not beforehand. Furthermore, historians claimed 
that party ideology led the different parties to react in the unique 
way that they did, while Adams and the national newspapers 
claimed that the French Revolution itself  helped form these 
parties in the first place. This explanation is in disagreement 
with many other politicians and historians who claimed that 
the partisan split happened in 1791—only two years after the 
beginning of  the French Revolution. This analysis departs from 
the conventional approach not by refuting its claims about 
politicians and their beliefs, but by showing that when looking at 
other realms of  political discourse and controversy—namely, the 
partisan national newspaper editors—the narrative is much more 
complicated than assumed by these historians.
The simultaneous shift in the global and American 
political landscapes allowed American political elites and citizens 
to use international events to help shape the American trajectory. 
National newspaper coverage of  the time reflected the American 
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obsession with the French Revolution, but ideological alignment 
does not suffice to explain this obsession. Rather, the newly 
formed opposition party, the Republican Party, was faced with 
an impossible task—maintain the American sense of  unity while 
simultaneously opposing Federalist Party policies and opinions. 
To uphold unity, republican newspapers often agreed with the 
federalist government and even denounced faction at almost 
every opportunity. However, the Republicans had several points 
of  disagreement with the Federalists, including Hamiltonian 
fiscal policy, Federalist favoritism toward economic elite, and the 
Federalist proclivity toward monarchy and aristocracy. 
In order to express disagreement while still maintaining 
the perception of  unity, the republican newspapers often 
displaced their factionalism to the French context. Thus, the 
republican newspapers used their comments on French affairs 
to polemicize with Federalists and their policies. Primarily, the 
republican newspapers used the language of  friendship and 
sentimentalism to show that Republicans were the “real friends” 
of  the French and in turn republicanism, while the Federalists 
upheld the un-American ideals of  monarchy and despotism. The 
republican newspapers knew that the Federalists also used the 
language of  friendship and sentimentalism to refer to the French, 
but the republican newspapers hoped to show that federalist 
monarchical policies made these sentiments worthless. Adams’ 
explanation was thus precise—sympathies and sentiments 
surrounding the French Revolution did draw the parties apart, 
specifically allowing the Republicans to oppose and polemicize 
with the Federalists. 
Furthermore, as Adams pointed out, these partisan 
developments were only possible with the creation of  a national 
government. Accordingly, the newly established centralized 
government was now in charge of  setting policy for the entire 
nation. This naturally opened up debate, not only within 
the government itself, but also within the populace. This 
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phenomenon thereby placed national newspapers at the center 
of  the partisan conflict. These newspapers were commissioned 
by the government and provided citizens with the information 
they needed to inform their individual opinions. The newspapers 
themselves explained their significance: “Many people read 
newspapers who read little else—they live in retired situations, 
and feel a strong curiosity to know the news, and join in the 
opinions of  the day.”88 With this in mind, newspaper editors 
had tremendous influence on public opinion and in shaping the 
partisan landscape of  the time. This type of  national partisan 
conflict was only possible, as Adams noted, after the ratification 
of  the Constitution. 
President Adams continued his speech, “This time of  
trial embraced a period of  five and twenty years, during which 
the policy of  the Union in its relations with Europe constituted 
the principal basis of  our political divisions and the most arduous 
part of  the action of  our Federal Government.”89 According 
to Adams and other historians, European affairs, namely the 
conflict between Great Britain and France, served as the key issue 
of  partisan conflict from 1789 until the end of  the Napoleonic 
Wars in 1815. This essay calls that claim into question. The above 
argument shows that the partisan divisions of  1789 through 
1793 were not equivalent to the partisan divisions of  1793 and 
onward. After 1793, the newspapers indeed divided themselves 
based on their views regarding geopolitics, but from the very 
beginning of  the nation, the newspapers often used European 
affairs as a vehicle for partisan displacement, not as the source 
of  ideological quarrel. 
This narrative also serves as a case study on both the rise 
of  partisan politics in new republics, as well as the gap between 
political elites and the public. Partisanship in Early America was 
not welcomed by the newspapers, but rather discouraged and 
stigmatized. In turn, a two-party system was not established 
from the outset; instead, there was one party—the governing 
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party. Despite what Federalist No. 10 stated and despite being 
founded for partisan reasons, the national newspapers fought 
against the existence of  factionalism. While politicians such 
as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison explicitly broke on 
ideological ground with Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, 
republican newspaper editors attempted to uphold a more 
balanced approach of  unity and displaced partisanship. In order 
to maintain a perception of  unification and to follow, to some 
extent, the journalistic imperative of  impartiality, these editors 
opposed faction. The positions of  the newspapers eventually 
came into line with the opinions of  the political elites, but only 
when factionalism became more solidified and accepted within 
American political culture. In light of  what Adams discussed in 
his presidential inaugural address, the geopolitical issue of  the 
upcoming decades did become the central partisan divider for 
both the elites and the public alike, but it took four years for this 
to emerge. 
The emergence of  partisanship during the first four years 
after the signing of  the Constitution was not revolutionary, but 
evolutionary: it did not happen immediately, but rather became 
publicly more pronounced and accepted over time. In a new 
republic, opposition does not arise in full strength all at once. 
Only through evolutionary opposition can dissenting newspapers 
pronounce their disagreement while simultaneously maintaining 
a perception of  good intentions. As seen in the American 
context, those who favor the governing politicians will strongly 
resist any oppositional move. The federalist newspaper clearly 
understood the republican newspapers’ plan for displacement 
and accused them of  being enemies of  the republic. Striking 
the balance between opposition and unity may be extremely 
difficult, but it is an imperative step on the road to full-fledged 
partisanship and oppositional legitimization. As Adams noted 
in his presidential inaugural address, partisanship became an 
integral part of  American politics, but it did not start that way.
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“The Evil of the Age”:
The Influence of The New York Times on 
Anti-Abortion Legislation in New York, 
1865-1873
Sahand K. Rahbar
Princeton University
INTRODUCTION
But could even a portion of  the facts that have 
been detected in frightful profusion, by the 
agents of  the TIMES, be revealed in print, 
in their hideous truth, the reader would shrink 
from the appalling picture. 
– August St. Clair, Excerpt from “The 
Evil of  the Age” in The New York Times 
(August 23, 1871)
 When Augustus St. Clair elected to make a second visit 
to the Fifth Avenue private home of  Dr. Jacob Rosenzweig in 
July of  1871, he could scarcely have expected his life to be in 
great danger. Much to his own astonishment, however, he soon 
found himself  pointing a revolver at Dr. Rosenzweig before 
making a quick exit into the street. “I felt there was but one 
thing to do,” he later wrote, describing the circumstances which 
led Dr. Rosenzweig to grow suspicious of  his guest and prevent 
St. Clair from leaving his home, “either to be conquered or to 
conquer, and leave the house I must or else suffer violence at 
his hands.” St. Clair was a newspaper reporter for The New York 
Times (NYT), and his assignment that summer compelled him to 
go undercover in order to investigate the lucrative underground 
world of  abortion.1 In 1871, as many as two hundred abortionists 
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were thriving in a city that boasted fewer than one million 
residents.2 Dr. Rosenzweig was one such figure, and St. Clair had 
seen his covert advertisements in local papers. In the process 
of  making his hasty exit from the doctor’s home, St. Clair 
happened to spot a young lady standing on the stairs. Only days 
later, he would see that same woman again at the morgue, dead 
from a botched abortion procedure. In a NYT article entitled, 
“Something More Concerning Ascher’s Business,” St. Clair 
wrote, “I positively identify the features of  the dead woman as 
those of  the blond beauty before described and will testify to 
the fact, if  called upon to do so, before a legal tribunal.”3 In 
making this firm association, St. Clair provided a highly public 
and damning indictment against Dr. Rosenzweig and against 
the widespread practice of  abortion, one that also established 
the NYT as a public and widespread proponent of  moral virtue 
and righteousness in the period to come. This story represented 
but one of  many sensational examples of  abortion-related press 
coverage from the end of  the American Civil War onward, and 
these stories were emblematic of  the changing attitudes toward 
abortion during this era. 
CHANGING ATTITUDES, CHANGING LAWS
In the nineteenth century, the legal attitude toward 
abortion underwent a series of  gradual changes at the state 
level. This rising intolerance to abortion was evidenced by the 
criminalization of  abortion in all states by 1910.4 New York 
stood as a particularly compelling example of  these mounting 
changes, for New York lawmakers quickly altered the state 
abortion law in three distinct sessions between 1869 and 1874.5 
These adjustments are noteworthy, because they represent a 
surge of  exceedingly strict anti-abortion legislation following a 
period of  legislative inactivity on the matter. In fact, the only 
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previous abortion law in the New York criminal code went into 
effect in 1830. This law deemed the termination of  a late-term 
fetus to be second-degree manslaughter. It also imposed criminal 
liability upon the abortionist and not on the pregnant woman 
seeking the procedure.6 
With this historical context in mind, the changes made 
from 1869 to 1874 are significant, because they altered the legal 
recognition of  abortion. Prior to the passage of  the 1869 law, 
New York—like other states—approached the issue of  abortion 
with the quickening doctrine in mind. This doctrine stipulated that 
a pregnancy could only be verifiably recognized as a pregnancy 
after ‘quickening’—the moment in which a pregnant woman first 
perceives fetal movement, which usually occurs at the midpoint 
of  gestation.7 In Commonwealth v. Bangs (1812), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court established the widespread precedent of  
disregarding abortion cases in which quickening could not be 
established.8 The law in many states was unable to truly recognize 
the existence of  a fetus in criminal cases before it had quickened 
in the womb.9 This doctrine provided a wide degree of  legal 
tolerance for the practice of  early pre-quickening abortion in 
most states. The 1869 New York law, however, abolished any 
consideration of  the quickening doctrine and thereby made 
abortion a criminal offense irrespective of  gestation period. 
Not only did this law remove the stipulation of  quickening as 
a legitimate indicator of  pregnancy, but it also removed the 
consideration of  pregnancy altogether. The administration of  
abortifacients with the intent to induce miscarriage was deemed a 
criminal offense “whether [the woman] be or be not pregnant.”10 
In other words, state law no longer regarded a woman’s pregnancy 
status as a crucial component of  its anti-abortion statutes, thus 
mitigating the need to refer to a pregnant woman’s judgment in 
considering whether a pregnancy was sufficiently advanced to 
warrant prosecution in cases of  abortion. This naturally lowered 
the burden of  proof  on prosecutors as well, making it much 
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simpler to convict abortionists. The 1872 law, in continuation 
of  the increasingly strict trend, made abortion a felony for any 
woman who attempted it, successfully or not, upon herself  or 
who voluntarily sought an abortion from a practitioner, bucking 
the established practice that focused legal ire on abortionists 
rather than on pregnant women.11 Finally, the 1874 law allowed 
the dying testimony of  a woman to be used as admissible 
evidence in abortion trials, once again making it easier to convict 
abortionists.12 That such momentous changes—the utter 
elimination of  the quickening doctrine, the criminalization of  
abortion for pregnant women, and an overarching turn toward 
stricter legislation against abortion—would occur in such a short 
period of  time, between 1869 and 1874, is naturally the source 
of  much curiosity. 
Historians have previously sought to explain the timing 
by linking the surge in anti-abortion legislation to the intense 
lobbying activities of  the nascent American Medical Association 
(AMA). Historian James Mohr has demonstrated that the AMA, 
guided by Horatio Storer in the middle of  the nineteenth century, 
systematically worked to influence popular opinion against 
abortion and also influence related legislation.13 Historian Janet 
Farrell Brodie has noted that the efforts of  AMA physicians 
were largely predicated on their desire to “drive out irregulars 
and sectarians,” attract public respect for their profession, and 
present themselves as promoters of  virtue and arbiters of  
morality.14 Dr. Hugh L. Hodge of  the University of  Pennsylvania, 
for instance, outlined the prototypical views of  his profession in 
a lecture before an obstetrics course in 1869. “It seems hardly 
necessary to repeat,” he said, “that physicians, medical men, must 
be regarded as the guardians of  the rights of  infants. They alone 
can rectify public opinion; they alone can present the subject in 
such a manner that legislators can exercise their powers aright 
in the preparation of  suitable laws.”15 Dr. Hodge clearly viewed 
himself  and his medical colleagues as protectors of  virtue and as 
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important influences on legislative decisions.
Scholars have pointed out that the efforts of  the AMA 
and its constituent physicians were largely motivated by a desire 
to establish themselves as professionals rather than as ‘quacks.’ 
Quackery was an especially damaging charge in the first half  
of  the nineteenth century, when many doctors graduated 
from unregulated medical schools and formed a considerable 
population that challenged the so-called establishment physicians, 
who studied at respectable schools.16 Consequently, the efforts of  
the establishment doctors to restrict abortion may be interpreted 
as part of  a larger movement to push irregular physicians—
including abortionists, many of  whom were midwives—out of  
the way in order to grant increased authority in medical matters 
to the regular physicians. Although these arguments regarding 
the physician’s crusade against abortion explain the motivations 
of  a very prominent group of  anti-abortionists, they do not 
adequately explore the motivations of  another group: the 
legislators. This group is of  crucial interest precisely because it 
consists of  those individuals who made the decision to legally 
restrict abortion. These lawmakers were no doubt influenced by 
the various medical pamphlets that abounded in the Postbellum 
Period, many of  which singled out abortion as a vicious and 
unconscionable crime.17 But legislators, like most other citizens, 
consumed a great variety of  popular literature during this period, 
and newspapers may be counted as one of  the most prominent 
literary features of  the era. I argue that the newspaper coverage 
of  the NYT—including such extraordinary pieces as Augustus 
St. Clair’s “The Evil of  the Age” (“EoA”)—was highly influential 
in altering legal sentiment toward abortion in a process that 
culminated in the increasingly harsh criminalization of  the 
practice. This new legal sentiment was the gradual consequence 
of  journalistic practices that sought to raise the profile and the 
authority of  the NYT, while simultaneously preying on popular 
fears about the safety of  women and the supposed deterioration 
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of  the United State’s white, Protestant population. 
GENERAL SENTIMENT AND LEGAL SENTIMENT
It is important to distinguish the the attitudes of  the 
public at large from the attitude of  the lawmakers. General 
sentiment refers to the opinions of  the wider public. Accordingly, 
the general sentiment toward abortion should represent the 
prevailing attitudes of  all Americans, given a particular period 
and time. The use of  general sentiment, however, is flawed 
because it is far too broad. Women, for instance, will likely 
have a much different outlook on the abortion issue than men, 
and different subgroups of  women—the unmarried, the poor, 
women of  color, immigrant women, and so on—will also harbor 
different views. The recognition of  these important demographic 
differences fails to remedy the scarcity of  sources available to 
historians. Where evidence may be found, it skews in favor of  
the elite strata of  society—those who are white, literate, and 
“The Evil of the Age,” penned by Augustus St. Clair, 
sensationalized the abortion issue and set off a new wave of 
stylistically dramatic news coverage
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male—and thus prevents us from making accurate observations 
about other groups. 
Legal sentiment, which is the attitude displayed by 
lawmakers, is infinitely easier to gauge because it can be analyzed 
through codified statutes; one can witness the evolution of  
legal sentiment and see a change in the approach and stance 
of  lawmakers to pressing social issues. This evolution is clearly 
evident in the case of  New York, where one sees a series of  
major changes to existing anti-abortion laws within a span of  
six years. An illustration of  the importance of  this distinction 
between general and legal sentiment arises when considering the 
quickening doctrine. Mohr asserts repeatedly that the United States 
public was exceedingly tolerant of  abortion in the earlier decades 
of  the nineteenth century, in the absence of  later developments 
such as the lobbying efforts of  the AMA.18 In Mohr’s view, 
pregnant women who had not experienced quickening “believed 
themselves to be carrying inert non-beings…a potential for life 
rather than life itself.”19 Other scholars have challenged this 
view. Author Marvin Olasky insists on the popular acceptance 
of  the preformation doctrine, which held that humans were 
preformed and alive even prior to conception, existing in 
some inactive form either in the mother’s egg or in the father’s 
sperm.20 In a similar vein, historian Anthony Joseph complicates 
the widespread assumption of  tolerance by noting the various 
interpretations given by English legalists to the viability of  the 
fetus.21 According to Joseph, recent scholarship shows that the 
early nineteenth century understanding of  the permissibility of  
feticide relied not on actual cases, which were unknown until 
recent decades, but on the interpretations of  legal scholars who 
offered their own rules for measuring the validity of  life. None 
of  these various interpretations resemble the quickening doctrine 
as Mohr understands it.22 Instead, they suggest that the idea of  
quickening was not as universal or as widespread among all 
nineteenth century Americans as scholars once believed. Mohr’s 
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assertion that quickening played a crucial role in a woman’s own 
understanding of  fetal vitality holds for only some cases. In light 
of  Joseph’s evidence, Mohr’s assertion about general sentiment 
is problematic because it uses legal evidence—the absence of  
legislation as a marker of  widespread tolerance—even though 
this absence really only tells one about legal sentiment. 
As such, it seems that the quickening doctrine was simply 
a highly practical legal method of  verifying the existence of  a 
pregnancy, especially during a time when the absence of  medical 
technology could not verify pregnancy in any other manner. 
This means that the early legal sentiment towards abortion was 
tolerant based on the legal evidence available, which provides no 
basis on which to make claims about the general opinions of  the 
wider public. Legal sentiment is governed by a set of  principles 
hinging on practicality and provability. Individual lawmakers, 
like other Americans, may have considered the beginning of  
life to occur well before quickening, even before the established 
physicians encouraged that sort of  thinking. Nevertheless, 
lawmakers maintained the importance of  the quickening doctrine 
for its practicality. In the absence of  more sophisticated medical 
technology, the physical fact of  a pregnancy could only be legally 
established through the practical testimony of  a pregnant woman 
who had experienced quickening. 
This practicality would soon outgrow its usefulness in 
New York. Since one can trace the legal sentiment of  the state’s 
legislature through the language of  the law, one is able to link the 
three major legal changes made between 1869 and 1874 to the 
wider coverage of  popular print media on the nature of  abortion. 
My analysis of  the NYT will span the decade immediately 
following the American Civil War, from 1865 to 1874, and will 
involve curated insights from the examination of  over three 
hundred articles, some investigative, some opinionative, and all 
concerning abortion. This analysis will be chronological and 
separated into two sections, one covering the period between 
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1865 and mid-1871, and the other covering the period from late 
1871 to 1874. This chronological bifurcation serves to highlight 
several important differences between the earlier articles and 
those published after “EoA,” the famed mid-1871 article that 
sensationalized the abortion issue in New York.
SENSATIONALISM AND THE FIRST WAVE (1865-1871)
The first period of  abortion-related press coverage in 
the NYT was sensational chiefly in subject, whereas the second 
period following the publication of  “EoA” was sensational 
both in subject and in style. Sensational writing is engineered to 
provoke a “startling impression.”23 Contrary to its connotation 
and to popular applications of  the word, sensationalism is neither 
fundamentally harmful nor beneficial. In its most basic form, 
sensationalism merely draws a reader’s attention and supplies 
him or her with absorbing facts and details. The presence of  
sensationalism hinges on two features: subject and style. On 
one hand, there exist, in each particular time and place, various 
subjects that are naturally sensational, such as violent crime, 
supernatural phenomena, and political scandal. These stories do 
not require the assistance of  highly imaginative or descriptive 
prose in order to excite excessive interest in readers; people are 
naturally attracted to such topics. Style, on the other hand, relates 
to the presentation of  the material—the intensity of  the diction 
and the presence of  figurative language. A story about President 
Grover Cleveland’s alleged illegitimate child is a sensational 
subject, but only the writing of  the story or the manner of  its 
placement in the newspaper would make the story stylistically 
sensational. To put it succinctly, sensationalism consists of  two 
constituent elements, subject and style, and news stories may 
feature one or both components. 
The first wave of  these abortion stories in the NYT 
began in October of  1865, just a few months after the end of  
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the American Civil War. A measly four paragraphs—the last 
one no longer than a sentence—appeared at the bottom of  a 
column under the headline, “THE WOLFER MURDER” in 
the October 21st issue of  that year. The story about the alleged 
murder of  Emma Wolfer by Dr. Charles Cobell via abortion 
almost appeared as an afterthought, relegated to the very 
bottom of  the page and headlined with smaller print than the 
surrounding articles. Indeed, the paragraphs did not detail much 
in the way of  a story at all. Rather, the author presented a very 
brief  excerpt of  a courtroom narrative, providing summaries 
of  the courtly segments he witnessed—the testimony of  Jacob 
Wolfer, brother to the deceased, and his cross-examination by 
the defense attorney—followed by an addendum noting that 
the case will be continued the following week. The summaries 
were not overly-embellished and featured the sort of  brevity one 
would expect from hasty telegram announcements: “His sister 
was never married to his knowledge; went to the place because 
he was told she was there dying; she was vomiting when the 
medicine was sent for; would not have known of  her condition 
if  he had not been told.” The repeated omission of  the subject 
from every other clause betrayed an underlying urge to paraphrase 
and to narrate rather than to elaborate and to embroider. The 
actors of  the narrative were overshadowed by the events and 
the characters were displaced by the consequences. At no point 
did the author insert himself  into the narrative in order to 
personalize the stakes, as one saw in the case of  St. Clair. Nor 
did the author take pains to describe the witness on the stand. 
The only sensational aspect of  the article was the subject matter, 
which itself  was noted only by the premature mention of  the 
word ‘murder’ in the headline and the mention of  “death…by 
procurement of  abortion” in the first sentence.24 This snippet 
from the first sentence was emphatically sensational in subject, 
though in style it sounds awfully formal, emulating the legalese 
of  courtroom attorneys. The trend continued in a later article in 
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which the author summarized the testimony of  another witness: 
“…witness went into the room, when the doctor said he had 
delivered deceased of  a fetus.”25 The terminology here, once 
again, is formal to the point of  being practically clinical. The 
author made no effort to underline the tragedy of  the woman’s 
death or the demise of  her child; instead, he referred to the 
former as the “deceased” and the latter as a “fetus,” employing 
words that deprive the two of  vitality and personhood. 
The coverage of  the Dr. Cobell abortion case illustrated 
a few defining trends in the first wave of  sensational newspaper 
coverage. The first and most important trend was the nature of  
the sensationalism, which was epitomized principally through 
subject matter and not through any elaborate literary stratagem. 
In other words, the abortion articles were sensational because 
they were about abortion. This is manifested in another article 
from the summer of  1867 noting the arrest of  a Massachusetts 
doctor accused of  murdering a woman by means of  abortion. 
The author of  the piece provided the necessary details without 
adornment, mentioning that the “victim was unmarried, 18 years 
old, and [had] a father living in the city.”26 Despite the deceased 
woman’s apparent youth and unmarried status at the time of  
death, the author offered no additional stylistic ornaments to 
sensationalize the story. Indeed, in many cases—including that 
of  the Dr. Cobell case—the crime itself  appeared to be of  less 
interest than the proceedings of  the court. This may be taken to 
an extreme, as evident in the Strong divorce case that dominated 
a great expanse of  space in the pages of  the NYT from late 
November of  1865 to early January of  the following year. The 
headlines of  the Strong case certainly signposted the scandalous 
nature of  the court’s proceedings. The NYT showcased the 
most exceptional articles—particularly those that were part of  a 
series, as was the case in many ongoing trials—with multi-tiered 
headlines. Thirteen of  the fourteen Strong articles featured these 
terraced titles, with sensational subtitles such as, “Remarkable 
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Charges of  Murder, Bribery, Perjury and Corruption.”27 The 
references to abortion in this chain of  stories, however, were 
scarce, and the vast majority of  the coverage consisted of  
summaries of  the speeches and the testimonies given in 
court. Yet again, the editorial needs of  the NYT at the time 
favored the use of  summary rather than the presentation of  
an engaging story. This was perhaps a legacy of  the American 
Civil War, during which the accurate and timely conveyance of  
highly desirable information was among the chief  duties of  the 
daily newspapers.28 The Strong case nevertheless affirmed the 
existence of  sensational subjects in the NYT during the early 
Postbellum Period and revealed the tendency of  these authors to 
supply dry summary in lieu of  imaginative storytelling. 
The last two defining trends emblematized by the first 
wave articles were closely related. One was the total anonymity 
of  the author, whose name was not supplied to readers in a 
byline, contrary to popular journalistic practice today. Ford 
Risley, a professor of  communications at Pennsylvania State 
University, remarks that although the use of  bylines was not 
unheard of  even as far back as the 1830s, it most certainly was 
not widespread during the Postbellum Period, after which it 
gradually came into popular usage.29 Consequently, the author 
was a veritable nonentity and the authorship of  individual 
articles was instead relegated to the impersonal, faceless 
authority of  the newspaper publication itself. The first wave 
articles exacerbated this trend even more, since their authors did 
not insert themselves into the narrative. The authors related the 
action without doing any of  the acting—an effect that certainly 
seems credible and respectable from a modern perspective, but 
one that also necessarily diminishes the sensational elements of  
the stories by removing personal stakes from the narrative. In the 
Lattin case of  1868, for example, the NYT’s coverage consisted 
chiefly of  a summary of  the inquest presented as a sort of  rapid-
fire dialogue with questions asked to and answered by a doctor 
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involved in an abortion case: “Q—Did she at any time ask you 
to treat her for an abortion? A—No, quite the reverse, because 
she desired to have the child in order to make Houghton marry 
her.”30 This style of  journalism, in addition to summarizing 
the disclosures of  the inquest in question, narrowed the focus 
uncompromisingly on the subject for a long stretch of  time 
without distracting the reader with the intrusion of  ancillary 
characters. Without the author serving as a sort of  protagonist in 
the story, as St. Clair did in his encounter with Dr. Rosenzweig, 
readers have no surrogate with whom they can empathize and 
thus the news stories appeared less like sensational works, with 
all the literary trappings of  compelling fiction, and more like 
abridged, digestible chunks of  information—more like reading a 
dialogue than watching a play.
Finally, the lack of  a centrally featured, empathetic author 
also thwarted the publication’s ability to adopt a ‘crusading’ moral 
position on controversial issues covered in the articles. St. Clair’s 
decision to publicly denigrate Dr. Rosenzweig was all the more 
powerful because it boiled down highly contentious matters—
abortion and abortion-induced homicide—into a conflict 
between strong and identifiable personalities. It is much easier 
to support or to condemn distinct figures than it is to fight with 
shadows, and St. Clair and Rosenzweig served as suitable proxies 
for their respective factions, the anti-abortion moralists and the 
abortionists. Bereft of  this, the first wave articles more often 
featured objective description rather than subjective moralizing. 
Nevertheless, it would be improper to assert that the NYT was 
by any means toothless during the early Postbellum Period, 
even on the abortion issue. Newspapers are fundamentally 
curated publications; the final form of  each publication relies 
on the consent and the concord of  the publication’s overseers. 
Accordingly, even though the NYT did not publish stories of  
the crusading-type backed by its own moral authority, it may be 
said that the newspaper nevertheless expressed its views through 
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literary ventriloquism by voicing its outlook in the selection of  
articles it chose to publish. 
An 1868 article, for example, in summarizing the 
proceedings of  a State Medical Society meeting, quoted the group 
president speaking out against the crime of  abortion and its status 
in the law. “If  these words, ‘with a quick child,’ could be omitted, 
and the statute otherwise remain as it is, the period [during which 
the procurement of  abortion would be deemed second-degree 
manslaughter] would be made to cover the whole period after 
conception.”31 This speech was typical of  the view that many 
establishment physicians, as the self-avowed protectors of  life, 
had regarding abortion. It is significant that this article received 
from the NYT a rare byline—“From Our Own Reporter”—
thus emphasizing the NYT’s ownership over the collection of  
facts assembled in the report, and perhaps even its endorsement. 
Regardless of  these speculations, this extraordinary article 
represented a remarkable intersection between newspersons, 
lawmakers, and physicians, since it featured the wide circulation 
of  a prominent medical man’s idea for additional restrictions in 
the state abortion law. This dissemination of  medical opinion 
likely influenced passage of  the 1869 law that altogether 
dismissed the quickening doctrine, since the law was passed on 
May 6, 1869, a little more than a year after the publication of  
this article.32 Another article in 1868, headlined, “Responsibility 
of  the Medical Professions” and penned by an anonymous 
author, proposed additional legislative restrictions as well. The 
writer observed that abortion was “practiced at this day to a 
very alarming extent and some means, both by enforcing the 
present laws and by providing still more stringent ones, should 
be adopted to lessen it.”33 As a result, despite its unwillingness 
to declare a crusade against abortion at the time and despite 
the dearth of  stylistically sensational stories, the NYT provided 
its tacit endorsement to anti-abortion advocates and influenced 
wider sentiment, possibly even legal sentiment, by publishing the 
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viewpoints of  these advocates. 
THE STATE OF NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALISM 
IN 1870
For American newspaper publishers in the nineteenth 
century, sensational subjects provided an inexhaustible source 
of  consumer interest. In the Postbellum Period, newspapers 
were lucrative due to a rising urban working-class population 
that supplied an increasing number of  readers.34 By 1870, there 
were about 4,500 newspapers circulating in the United States, 
up from the 3,000 that proliferated in 1860 before the start 
of  the American Civil War. Most newspapers at the time were 
small weeklies, but daily newspapers such as the NYT were 
growing steadily in number, with 574 dailies throughout the 
United States by 1870.35 These newspapers benefited from a 
steady readership; in 1870, the total circulation of  urban daily 
newspapers was 2.6 million.36 The rising urban population—
itself  a product of  European migration to New York and the 
general migration of  rural Americans to cities in search of  
employment—and the abundance of  daily newspapers in 1870 
mingled with an additional characteristic of  the era.37 The 
United States boasted considerably high literacy rates in the 
latter half  of  the nineteenth century. In 1870, eighty percent of  
the total American population over the age of  ten was literate.38 
Significantly, only about twenty percent of  the black population 
was literate at that time, meaning that most newspaper readers in 
the immediate Postbellum Period were white.39 By 1870, demand 
for information and entertainment via newspapers was high, and 
this desire was met continuously by newspapers that published 
engrossing and entertaining content for their readers.
This rise in demand stemmed partly from influence of  the 
American Civil War, which casted a long shadow over journalistic 
practices and public appetite in the Postbellum Period. In fact, 
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the demand for information during the war was so great that 
the NYT began publishing its additional Sunday issue in 1861.40 
The war made newspapers indispensable and provided great 
eminence and respectability to journalists, who were presented 
as liaisons between newspaper readers and the horrors of  the 
battlefronts. As academic Karen Roggenkamp notes, newspapers 
in New York kept large staffs of  war correspondents to feed 
the abundant public hunger for war coverage. Readers came to 
see these correspondents as “adventurous, reliable storytellers,” 
and journalists at large found themselves moving progressively 
inward from the periphery of  public notice.41 This increased 
reliance on journalists stemmed partly from the invention of  
the telegram, which made it possible for war correspondents to 
report information very quickly—more quickly, in many cases, 
than military officials, who would then have to rely on newspaper 
reports for accurate information.42 Future Supreme Court Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. best expressed the public dependence 
on the press in 1861 when he wrote, “Everything else we can 
give up…Only bread and the newspaper must we have, whatever 
else we do without. How this war is simplifying our mode of  
being!”43 These American Civil War influences continued to 
affect the manner of  journalism years after the war’s end. By 
1870, newspapers were widespread and urban readers relied upon 
them and their writers for accurate and compelling information 
on various subjects. 
Yet not even the war could compel the NYT to publish 
overtly lurid stories. Though the “EoA” article ignited a stream 
of  subsequent sensational abortion articles, these contrasted 
sharply with the type of  journalism found in the NYT years 
earlier. Prior to the advent of  the 1870s, sensationalism existed 
in the NYT chiefly in the form of  subject, not style. This curb 
on explicit sensationalism may be attributed to the management 
of  the paper. The NYT was founded by Henry Raymond in 
1851 as a deliberate effort to produce a more reserved and 
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Henry Raymond deliberately co-founded The New York Times to 
publish non-scandalous news. His death in 1869 paved the way 
for the appearance of sensationalism in the newspaper.
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less scandalous publication than the two existing national daily 
New York newspapers, the New York Herald and the New-York 
Tribune.44 Newspaper historian Aurora Wallace contends that 
these rival newspapers sought to lure readers “through expanding 
coverage of  the city’s police, criminal courts, and political 
scandals,” whereas the NYT focused on news of  the “factual, 
noncrusading” variety.45 Raymond’s approach to the news was 
remarkably conservative, as typified by his own statement:
We do not mean to write as if  we were in a passion, 
unless that shall really be the case, and we shall make it 
a point to get into a passion as rarely as possible. There 
are very few things in this world which it is worth while 
to get angry about, and they are just the things that anger 
will not improve.46
Raymond’s editorial methodology was clearly not 
conducive to the sensationalism that would later creep into his 
publication. As noted by historian George H. Douglas, Raymond 
“wanted nothing to do with sensationalism, and he wanted 
nothing to do with crusading.”47 It is significant to note, then, that 
the second wave of  abortion articles, which were sensational both 
in subject and style, only appeared following Raymond’s death 
in 1869, after which the NYT ultimately fell into the complete 
supervisory authority of  Raymond’s co-founder, George Jones.48 
The NYT would achieve notable success in the 1870s under the 
leadership of  Jones, especially for its investigation of  the Tweed 
Ring.49 As such, the highly dramatic and more sensational tone 
adopted by the NYT journalists writing about abortion in the 
1870s may partly be credited to the standards of  a new authority 
figure. 
As is evident from the above, the ubiquity of  newspapers, 
the public demand for information, and the high literacy rates of  
the era made the influence of  press coverage on all Americans 
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a significant factor. But not all newspapers enjoyed the same 
gravitas. By 1871, the NYT had established its supremacy with 
an incredible exposé on corruption in the Tweed Ring.50 This 
style of  investigative journalism naturally elevated the status 
of  the publication and gave it more authority in relation to 
its peers. As such, the publication of  the Tweed investigative 
articles paved the way for further crusading endeavors carried 
out by the journalists of  the NYT—endeavors that would not 
have been tolerated in earlier years under the management of  
the more restrained Raymond. The new wave of  abortion stories 
was sensational both in subject and in style. This too may be 
seen as a natural consequence of  the Tweed articles. Political 
and economic scandal was inherently sensational, but the NYT 
flavored its stories with higher stakes by dramatically publicizing 
the attempts of  William “Boss” Tweed to form a company in 
order to buy out the NYT. Jones, as the new authority, boldly 
declared the following in a spring issue of  the NYT:
No money that could be offered me should induce 
me to dispose of  a single share of  my property to the 
Tammany faction, or to any man associated with it, or 
party whatever until this struggle is fought out.51
This sort of  engagement was the very essence of  sensationalism. 
The author, Jones, thrusted himself  into an ongoing conflict 
and presented it as a capitalistic clash—a “struggle” that must 
be “fought out”—between rival personalities: the stalwart Jones 
and his “property” versus Tweed and his “faction.” The effect 
of  such sensationalism was twofold. First, the author managed 
to raise his own respectability, made possible by his decision to 
position himself  in an existing news narrative and amplified in 
his self-presentation as a man unable to be influenced by the lure 
of  money. Second, the author managed to vilify an opposing 
individual in a highly public medium simultaneously. These 
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effects obscured the objectivity of  the narrative and transformed 
the news into a personal struggle featuring named actors. The 
result was a media-fueled crusade that disregarded any notion 
of  journalistic neutrality and instead championed a distinct 
outcome, whether that be the exposure of  a scandalous political 
machine or the prosecution of  abortionists. 
SENSATIONALISM AND THE SECOND WAVE 
(1871-1874)
The anti-abortion crusade began in remarkable fashion 
with the publication of  the “EoA” story in late August of  1871. 
St. Clair’s famous article set the precedent for future sensational 
articles regarding abortion. In brief, the article functioned 
as a call-to-arms and strove to raise public awareness and to 
encourage public outrage and action. St. Clair’s concluding 
words, which promote “the necessity of  taking some decided 
and effectual action,” hinted at the investigative, rather than 
descriptive, nature of  the article.52 St. Clair was not just writing in 
reaction to an event to chronicle it accurately for readers; rather, 
he hoped to expose an inadequately explored world of  crime—a 
desire that shaped his article and supplied it with a prescriptive 
and not merely descriptive tone. In doing so, St. Clair essentially 
enumerated a list of  active abortionists, many of  whom he found 
through advertisements in other newspapers. His descriptions 
evoked the atmosphere of  the various clinical spaces he visited 
and filled the reader with a sense of  foreboding dread at the 
prospect of  medicinal tablets, powders, and procedures. The 
most important distinguishing feature to notice was the presence 
of  a sensational style. The use of  style was especially important 
in “EoA,” because the sensational subject was left deliberately 
mysterious in the actual text of  the article—the word abortion 
was not mentioned once, though later articles used it freely. 
How, then, did St. Clair present his sensational style 
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in “EoA”? One of  the tools in his arsenal was the untethered 
hyperbole, by which he made grand and even outlandish claims 
without much substantiation. This hyperbole is manifested in 
the egregious statistics he mentioned as well as in the extreme 
register of  his diction. In the case of  the former, for instance, 
St. Clair made reference to the “thousands of  human beings 
[who] are…murdered before they have seen the light of  this 
world, and thousands upon thousands more of  adults [who] are 
irremediably ruined in constitution, health, and happiness.”53 
These numbers were not reliably sourced, nor were they meant 
to be taken seriously. They did, however, effectively project 
the impression of  a massive throng of  victims and collateral 
casualties, highlighting the extent of  the crime. St. Clair’s diction, 
too, portrayed a stark and unforgiving reality. His references 
to “great evils,” “depravity,” and “a systematic business in 
wholesale murder” combined to establish a link between the act 
of  abortion, utter moral laxity, and excessive greed.54 
Relatedly, the lack of  substantiation behind St. Clair’s 
outlandish statistics was aggravated by the proliferation of  
anonymous sources in his article. One source, a “retired 
practitioner,” told St. Clair how he gave his patients placebo pills 
in lieu of  actual abortifacients since the “retired practitioner” did 
not support abortion.55 This article, therefore, also featured two 
remarkable developments: the unapologetic use of  anonymous 
sources and the increased prominence of  the author, who was 
mentioned explicitly in the article as the “writer.” In the case 
of  the first development, one must recognize that St. Clair’s 
reporting thrived off  of  hearsay. After all, he noted that a book 
attributed to one of  the physicians he condemned “is said to 
have been plagiarized from a French author,” with the use of  
the passive voice eliminating the possibility of  assigning anyone 
responsibility for the origin of  the rumor.56 Though this might 
have made St. Clair’s comment seem unproven, paradoxically, 
it also made it difficult to disprove. Who can one question to 
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determine the truth of  the plagiarism? St. Clair’s reliance on 
hearsay appealed to the ever popular neighborhood authority 
of  gossip and poisoned the reader’s impression of  the so-called 
plagiarizer even without corroboration. W. Joseph Campbell, a 
scholar of  yellow journalism, points out that the implementation 
of  anonymous sources is one of  the hallmarks of  sensationalistic 
reporting, along with a tendency for self-promotion and for 
the promotion of  the newspaper and its achievements.57 The 
penchant for publication promotion was also evident in later 
stories. The author of  an article detailing the investigation of  
an abortion-linked murder in which a young woman’s body was 
found stuffed in a trunk was not hesitant to praise the role of  his 
publication in the unfoldment of  the whole affair. “The Press, 
therefore,” the author wrote, “became a powerful auxiliary to the 
Police, and, in fact, brought the case to a successful culmination.”58 
Though the author of  that article did not know it at the time, 
the NYT would soon assist the affair in a more dramatically 
powerful fashion, since the deceased young woman was the very 
one St. Clair later claimed he saw in Dr. Rosenzweig’s home. 
In the case of  authorial prominence, which was the second 
development mentioned above, it is intriguing to notice that St. 
Clair later even eschewed the convention of  avoiding bylines and 
signed his name at the end of  the article in which he dramatically 
announced his recognition of  “the blonde beauty” allegedly 
killed by Dr. Rosenzweig. St. Clair’s journalistic practices in this 
period serve to highlight the role of  the individual author as an 
active and engaging part of  the story.
At the same time, St. Clair’s representation of  the 
abortionists and the victims presented a prototypical model 
that later sensational articles also followed. In “EoA,” St. Clair 
enumerated countless abortionists whom he had discovered 
in scandalous advertisements. He even noted whether a given 
doctor was of  foreign origin. For example, he stated that Dr. 
Rosenzweig was either a Russian or a German Jew, a Dr. Evans 
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was from Scotland, and a Dr. Franklin was most certainly a 
German Jew.59 These subtle national markers served to further 
the distance between the abortionists and everybody else by 
imposing a racial divide between them, thereby associating the 
act of  abortion with foreign influence in a way that imperceptibly 
fed into nativist discontent with immigrants. But the abortionists 
were not the only individuals portrayed in the abortion articles. 
Without a doubt, the most important persons were the various 
unfortunate women who sought to procure an abortion. These 
women were all white and they were nearly always portrayed as 
victims. Take, for example, the NYT article about Emily Post, 
whose abortionist attempted to abandon her when she became 
ill. Post was referred to as an “unfortunate woman” and a “sick 
woman.”60 Both adjectives highlighted her despair and did little to 
underscore the triumph of  her story—her ability to write down 
her testimony prior to death. It was the propagation of  such 
stories that likely encouraged the New York Legislature to pass 
the 1874 law which declared the deathbed testimony of  abortion 
victims admissible in court. Notwithstanding Post’s testimony, 
later coverage continued to emphasize the tragic nature of  her 
demise by saying that her married lover “accomplished her ruin” 
after promising to marry her though he was already married.61 
Since sensational abortion coverage most often featured women 
who had died, the coverage of  the NYT suggested to readers 
a near one hundred percent mortality rate. Even in death, the 
author of  these articles often exaggerated the beauty of  the 
deceased, once again highlighting the tragic loss of  gorgeous 
femininity. The following is an excerpt from the first article to 
cover the abortion-related murder of  the young lady recognized 
by St. Clair:
…the young girl, for she could not have been more than 
eighteen, had a face of  singular loveliness. But her chief  
beauty was her great profusion of  golden hair, that hung 
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in heavy folds over her shoulders, partly shrouded the 
face, and lay in heavy masses upon her breast.62 
The language employed in the above description is highly 
evocative and even coquettish, lingering over the slender grace 
and loveliness of  a five-foot young woman whose corpse, it must 
be noted, was crammed into a box that was two and a half  feet 
long on the sides and eighteen inches deep.63 In spite of  this 
grotesque disparity between the macabre and the magnificent, 
the emphasis on the girl’s noticeably white phenotypical 
characteristic—her blonde hair—once again provoked nativist 
anxieties, this time about the future of  the white Protestant 
population. Scholar Sara Dubow illustrates just how pervasive 
this fear was in the late nineteenth century. In Dubow’s reckoning, 
physicians were the ones who tied existing anxieties about elite 
white “health, fitness and vitality” to racial concerns. In the 
face of  a dwindling European-American population, men such 
as the AMA’s Storer “championed the idea that the upsurge of  
induced abortion threatened the nation’s future.”64 Though the 
NYT never explicitly pronounced this view, the echoes of  these 
white anxieties were noticeable in the descriptions of  the female 
victims, who were predominantly white and dead by the time they 
were featured in articles. Faced with the frightening prospect of  
race suicide, which was spurred through the efforts of  the AMA, 
New York lawmakers may have considered the demographics of  
victimized women in the newspapers to be representative of  the 
actual demographics of  dying white women.
THE UPHEAVAL OF THE AGE
 The interconnections between the legislative sphere and 
the mass media are highly complex and ever shifting. Finding 
a direct causal link between the actions of  one group and the 
responses of  another is difficult enough to accomplish in the 
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contemporary world, much less in the world of  nineteenth 
century America. Nevertheless, by observing trends in the 
manner of  newspaper reporting in the Postbellum Period and 
linking these trends to the characteristics of  the era, one can 
better understand the myriad of  influences that coalesced to 
encourage legislative changes. 
Within this framework, the lawmakers reigned supreme. 
They were the individuals ultimately responsible for the drafting 
and passage of  laws, so it was their concerns and anxieties 
that must be considered when analyzing legal sentiment. As 
noted above, in the case of  American lawmakers, the primary 
concerns with respect to abortion were the provability of  
pregnancy, the safety of  women, and the potential dwindling 
of  the white population. So sensational and pervasive was the 
newspaper coverage in the Postbellum Period that the concern 
for provability was dismissed altogether in favor of  stricter laws 
that would hopefully protect women and safeguard the white 
population. This was partly the result of  newspaper reporting 
that consistently detailed horrific botched abortion procedures 
and abysmal mortality rates. Neither the NYT in particular nor 
all New York newspapers in general were primarily responsible 
for influencing anti-abortion legislation. Rather, sensationalized 
newspaper coverage was an important part of  the puzzle—albeit 
one that has been largely overlooked—and, in tandem with other 
pieces, such as the lobbying of  the AMA, it helped to shape 
public and legal opinion. 
 Although the lawmakers reigned supreme, the journalists 
and newspersons should not be discounted. The newsmen of  the 
NYT were largely motivated by a desire to promote themselves 
as respectable journalists, as in the case of  Augustus St. Clair, to 
increase the authority of  the publication they worked for, and 
to promote sales by increasing readership. Sensational stories 
provided the ideal avenue for pursuing all three goals at once. 
As exemplified in St. Clair’s “EoA,” the journalists of  the NYT 
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were certainly not hesitant to make all sorts of  callous digs at 
rival publications. In “EoA,” St. Clair consistently referred 
to the New York Herald as “a paper which contains strings of  
disgraceful advertisements,” employing an unflattering adjective 
that highlighted a self-imposed sense of  dishonor and thus 
juxtaposed this characteristic of  the New York Herald with the 
assumed moral superiority of  the NYT.65 In that same article, St. 
Clair repeatedly quoted multiple abortion advertisements, tracing 
each and every one to the New York Herald, thus establishing it 
as a publication filled with scandalous materials. Readers of  the 
NYT in the post-Tweed Ring period would consequently place 
a great deal of  faith in the newspaper’s expertise in matters of  
great social prominence, making them much more receptive to 
future investigations. Importantly, the crafty digs at opposing 
peer publications hinted at an underlying motive latent in the 
NYT newsmen. These journalists and editors were not only 
concerned with raising the profile and increasing the sales of  their 
own publication, but also in denigrating the quality and moral 
standing of  rival publications. Sensational articles thus served as 
a sort of  subliminal battleground for journalistic supremacy in 
an age when more and more newspapers were being printed and 
read by the masses. 
 The question of  age is an important one, for both the 
journalists and the lawmakers examined in this paper were 
the products of  their time. For journalists, the American Civil 
War fueled an insatiable demand to record and to provide 
information to the public—a demand that would not perish with 
the conclusion of  the war. For lawmakers—and, indeed, for all 
Americans—the American Civil War presented a traumatic and 
stark change from the usual modus vivendi. The war carried with it 
a staggeringly high casualty list. Such a palpable brush with death 
and a familiarity with its ensuing grief  may have awakened in 
all a desire to protect the sanctity of  life in all quarters, making 
lawmakers that much more susceptible to the influence of  
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the physicians and that much more alarmed by the reports of  
abortion and death in the newspapers. The factors, as promised, 
were many and complex, but they all mingled together to help 
explain why lawmakers were amenable to enacting legislative 
changes that would criminalize abortion to a greater extent than 
ever before.
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“There grows in the land here neither wine nor meat”: 
Governance and Conflict in the German Rule of  16th 
Century Venezuela
Ryan Anderson
This thesis examines a period in the early history of  Spanish 
Venezuela, wherein a company of  German speaking men, funded 
by a rich Augsburgian family, administered the colony for 28 
years on behalf  of  the Spanish Crown. In discussing this period 
of  colonial history, this work primarily discusses the reasons 
why the German administration collapsed with such speed and 
severity, fitting into a centuries-long historiography on the same 
issue. My approach, fitting with those of  historians writing in the 
past fifteen years, is to describe the difficult contexts in which 
a German administration had to work in a Spanish empire, and 
how multiple forces - poor administration, adventure seeking, 
and mistreatment of  the Indians on the Germans’ behalf, and 
a tide of  changing domestic opinion and scapegoating of  the 
German presence on the Spanish crown’s side - colluded to 
yield the colony’s demise. Secondarily, this thesis works to 
foster the growth of  an English-language historiography on 
the issue. Almost all histories written to this date have been in 
either German or Spanish traditions, a property that makes the 
furthering of  the study in English more difficult and lends itself  
to easy biases, e.g. a nationalist bent. I hope that this work will 
encourage other English speakers to study this peculiar trans-
(proto)-national phenomenon and enrich our understanding of  
its complications. My main primary sources for this study were a 
pair of  travel narratives, written by two of  the conquistadors in 
the 1530s and 1540s, as well as some of  their correspondences. 
However, the decrees of  the Spanish Crown on the German 
colony as well as near-contemporary histories on Venezuela were 
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critical additions to these materials. This research emphasizes 
overall the agency of  the Spanish elite and the Spanish Crown in 
the administration of  the German colony, suggesting that under 
the guise of  protecting the Indians yet motivated principally 
by their dismal financial returns, the King of  Spain moved to 
actively displace the Germans from his empire.
“To Preserve Them from Extinction”: Richard Henry 
Pratt and the Indian Education Movement
Emily Delisle
My thesis examines the establishment and operation of  the Carlisle 
Indian School, the first federal off-reservation residential school 
for American Indian children and young adults. The school was 
founded in 1879 by a man named Richard Henry Pratt, an officer 
in the United States Military who had served both the Civil War 
and the “Indian Wars” on the Western frontier which continued 
after the Civil War had come to a close. Pratt’s personal contact 
and experience with Native American peoples during his time 
in the West ultimately inspired his lifelong mission to assimilate 
Native American children through forcible acculturation and an 
educational program whose explicit intent to “kill the Indian, 
save the man” remains a deeply troubling episode in American 
history. My research, relying heavily on Pratt’s own writings and 
correspondences with both Native American individuals directly 
affected by his policies and the many government officials 
responsible for Indian Affairs at the time, investigates the racial 
ideology and federal policy behind the school’s establishment, 
the evolution of  Pratt’s work and thought both before and during 
his early years as the school’s superintendent, and the vast range 
of  experiences of  the Indian students themselves at Carlisle.
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Budding Life in a Barren World: The Revival of  Jewish 
Life and Community in the Post-World War II Displaced 
Persons Camps
Sarah Emmerich 
This thesis explores the rehabilitative process experienced by 
the Jewish survivors of  the Holocaust in the post-World War II 
Displaced Persons (“DP”) camps. In the immediate aftermath of  
World War II, a network of  DP camps was established by various 
Allied organizations. While these camps were organized and 
ran by Allied officials, the Jewish survivors took on remarkable 
leadership roles which allowed life within the camps to flourish. 
Between the years 1945 and 1951, life for the Jewish survivors in 
all its varied facets and capacities thrived within the DP camps. 
Just months after the liberation of  Hitler’s concentration camps, 
children were playing in the streets and attending schools and 
adults were regaining their health and receiving professional and 
vocational training. Moreover, in 1946, Jews were marrying on a 
daily basis and the Jewish DPs boasted the highest birthrate in 
the world. In the aftermath of  the war, therefore, those Jews who 
managed to evade Hitler’s Final Solution were able to establish 
a societal framework within the refugee camps in which they 
found themselves, and to recreate lives that had purpose and 
meaning amidst darkness. By exploring the confines in which 
this life emerged, this thesis analyzes the way in which the Jewish 
survivors created a life for themselves—with assistance from 
their liberators—in an otherwise hopeless time.
Moral Education in Public Schools: The Complexities of  
Teaching Controversy
Sarah Engell
In 1974 the proposal and adoption of  new language arts 
textbooks, that sought to emphasize themes of  multiculturalism 
and egalitarianism, sparked a violent year-long protest in Kanawha 
County, West Virginia. The opposition perceived the texts as 
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overly sexual, anti-American, and intrusive while supporters 
celebrated the diversification of  narratives and information. The 
ability of  newly adopted language arts textbooks to spark an 
explosive controversy reflects the impact of  textbooks and, 
more broadly, public education on creating a sense of  identity 
and belonging. Through objecting or supporting the textbooks 
and the language they contained, the citizens of  Kanawha 
County were bitterly fighting to protect their own definitions of  
what it meant to be a good student, parent, teacher, community 
member, and American. Furthermore, through protesting and 
ultimately reworking the process of  textbook adoption and 
inclusion, the citizens redefined who and what was included in 
their notion of  a good public school education. The research 
seeks to understand how a community’s perception of  public 
education and the role it should play in a child’s life impacts 
the inclusion of  the public in academic decision making as well 
as the insertion and definition of  controversial matter in the 
classroom. In addition, the research seeks to better understand 
the triangulation of  rights in public school between students, 
teachers, and parents.
“Prompt, Adequate, and Effective Compensation”: 
The Role of  American Businesses in Cuban-American 
Relations, 1959-1961
Taylor Evensen
The nationalization of  American property by the Castro regime 
totaled more than $1.8 billion, or $9 billion in today’s dollars. 
It was the largest property seizure in American history by a 
foreign government. 6,000 individuals and firms, including many 
Fortune 500 companies such as Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil, 
lost their holdings. This thesis examines the role of  American 
companies in Cuban-American relations from the passage 
of  the First Agrarian Reform Act in May 1959 to the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s support of  the Cuban exile invasion at the 
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Bay of  Pigs in April 1961. In doing so, this work aims to provide 
clarity to this tenuous period of  relations and expand on the 
work of  scholars who have focused almost exclusively on the 
role of  diplomats. This study includes an extensive examination 
of  the correspondence between U.S. government officials and 
corporate executives, as well as an analysis of  internal corporate 
documents and personal memoirs. The findings of  this research 
challenge the traditional historical notion that firms did not play 
a decisive role in American foreign policy. Although corporate 
executives disagreed with the Department of  State’s policies at 
times, they nevertheless regularly communicated with the U.S. 
government and provided valuable intelligence and insight into 
Cuba’s domestic conditions. Ultimately, as relations deteriorated, 
American companies emerged as an instrumental means for 
the U.S. government to apply pressure on Cuba without overtly 
breaking diplomatic ties.
Delinquents, Rebels, Lovers, and Lost Souls: 
Representations of  American and French Youth Culture 
in Film
Carolyn Grace
This thesis examines the various representations of  America’s 
youth culture over the postwar period, beginning in the early 
1950s and ending in the late 1960s. Specifically, this thesis will 
explore the representations of  American youth culture through 
one particular lens: a cinematic one. It addresses the film 
industry’s popular representations of  youth culture and its impact 
on Americans’ larger understanding of  youth. At this point in 
American history, youth underwent a lot of  public scrutiny, and 
for a variety of  reasons. In the 1950s, concerns about juvenile 
delinquency -- stemming from World War II -- reached levels 
of  mass hysteria. Hollywood perpetuated the image of  riled-
up, antisocial youngsters for moral and exploitative purposes, 
wanting to participate in the national conversation about youth, 
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but also wanting to attract audiences. By the 1960s, however, 
many elements of  youth culture that had once been reprimanded 
were now celebrated as wholesome aspects of  young American 
life. But this image did not last into the mid and late 1960s. In 
its place, the film industry presented youth who were uncertain 
and unsure of  their lives, unable to be satisfied in the present 
and incapable of  envisioning a brighter future. This shift in 
representation was due not only to major cultural shifts in the 
United States, but largely to the influence of  France and its 
movies representing youth culture. The subtle, stoic behaviors 
of  young French stars and the personal philosophies of  their 
directors made an impact on the shift between the way American 
films showed youth in the ‘50s and the way they portrayed them 
in the ‘60s. This became a part of  the two countries’ already-
existing transnational exchange of  experiences with youth 
culture. Although youth were viewed as the “other” in other 
forms of  popular media, the film industries in both France and 
the United States played a far larger role in perpetuating this idea 
given its visual dominance.
Redefining American Motherhood: Emily Mudd’s Mission 
at Home and Abroad
Helen Hunter
In 1929, Emily Hartshorne Mudd risked arrest by volunteering as 
a nurse at Philadelphia’s first birth control clinic. Visibly pregnant 
with her second child, Mudd relied on an antiquated law that 
barred the incarceration of  a pregnant woman in order to serve 
women in need of  contraceptive advice. Before this bold venture, 
Mudd had worked for a decade as her husband’s unpaid research 
assistant in immunology and had personally experienced the 
conflicting pressures on women in the early twentieth century 
who aspired to be both mothers and professionals. Over the next 
seventy years, Mudd became a key player in the development 
of  marriage counseling as a way to help women navigate their 
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maternal and professional ambitions. Scholars have remembered 
Mudd for her contributions to the field of  marriage counseling 
but have failed to recognize the extent of  her larger professional 
ambitions. This thesis reconsiders her achievements by examining 
her early career in the birth control movement and her trips to 
Germany and the Soviet Union around the Second World War, 
where she examined and warmly approved of  government 
support for working mothers. These missions characterize Mudd 
as a strong-willed and pragmatic realist making concessions to a 
slowly changing social order. 
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement 1934-
1939
Otto Kienitz
This thesis weaves the tale of  British Ambassador to Turkey Sir 
Percy Loraine through the fabric of  interwar diplomatic history, 
uncovering the personal relationships and key turning points in 
Britain’s foreign relations with the newly founded Republic of  
Turkey. Only years after the fierce animosity of  the First World 
War, Britain tentatively reached out to Turkey to form a political 
and economic ally in the Eastern Mediterranean, a partnership 
that could bring stability to the Balkan Peninsula, protect British 
imperial interests in the Middle East, and preserve the status 
quo in the Mediterranean Basin. Following the rise of  Fascism 
in Italy and Germany, the Anglo-Turkish relationship began to 
develop with a sense of  urgency, and one man stood at the center 
of  this diplomatic exchange. Sir Percy Loraine, one of  the last 
professional diplomats of  the old European state system, was a 
polished ambassador with a track record of  working with Eastern 
strongmen from Persia to Egypt. I explore Sir Loraine’s archival 
legacy, using his assiduous diary entries, official correspondences, 
and private papers to craft a narrative of  personal contacts and 
tête-à-tête conversations to provide a closer look at diplomacy 
in action. Tracing Loraine’s relationships with his Secretary of  
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States and his cousin in the Foreign Office in London, and his 
friendships with the Turkish President, Prime Minister, and 
Minister of  Foreign Affairs in Ankara, I am able to direct attention 
to the behind the scenes rapprochement that picked up speed 
between 1934-1939, and provide a more firsthand understanding 
of  the Anglo-Turkish alliance and the reasons for its collapse 
soon after the outbreak of  the Second World War. This thesis 
charts the personal, social, economic, political, and diplomatic 
underpinnings of  Anglo-Turkish relations in the interwar period, 
blending personal narratives with the geopolitics of  southeastern 
Europe to create an engaging exploration of  diplomatic history 
in vivo via Sir Percy Loraine’s ambassadorial savoir-faire.
Informed Mourning: Museum Representation of  the 
Holocaust in Berlin and DC
Alex Levy
This thesis examines the creation of  national memory of  the 
Holocaust in the United States and Germany. It traces the 
trajectory of  Holocaust memory from the end of  World War II 
in 1945 to the present day, in which world-renowned museums 
have been built in the capitals of  both countries. This expands 
upon existing research by synthesizing information about the 
museums in Berlin and DC while also connecting it to the 
process of  creating national memory. The research methods 
utilized include qualitative analysis of  the museums, newspaper 
articles, and interviews with prominent museum staff. Secondary 
accounts of  museums are included to supplement these sources. 
The findings of  this research conclude that while these museums 
have provided an accessible history of  the Holocaust, they have 
not eradicated the issues that inspired their creation. Therefore, 
the field of  Holocaust memory merits continued study and 
analysis.
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“Spies All Their Lives”: African Americans and Military 
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly Mayer
This thesis examines African American men and women’s military 
intelligence efforts during the American Civil War. In particular, 
it focuses on why and how African Americans participated in 
clandestine activities. In doing so, this work aims to challenge the 
disjointed nature of  existing literature that narrates the efforts 
and contributions of  African American spies. Most authors 
who engage the topic fabricate elaborate heroic narratives, a 
consequence both of  immense public fascination with the topic 
of  spies and the lack of  easily accessible sources. Where is the 
truth of  these people and their efforts noted in the history we 
read and write? This thesis, then, seeks to set the foundation 
for a cohesive body of  literature that compiles and narrates 
the efforts of  African American spies. It analyzes the military 
intelligence activities of  specific African American men and 
women and their contribution to the Union cause, and also strives 
to highlight the masses of  “intelligent negroes,” who, despite 
being unnamed, significantly assisted the northern war effort. 
Ultimately, this work confirms that African Americans became 
the Confederacy’s unanticipated yet undeniable “chief  source of  
weakness,” as they proved, time and again, their vast abilities to 
assist the Union army and navy. The independent slaveholding 
republic fell victim not just to Union forces but also, notably, 
to the determined resistance of  its enslaved population. War 
transformed enslaved men and women into an “enemy within” 
that the Confederate South was simply unable to suppress. 
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One Nation Overseas: The Statecraft of  the United States 
Congress in the Age of  Democratic Revolutions
Varun K. Menon
This thesis chronicles the influence of  the United States 
Congress in shaping the American encounter with the world 
through foreign policymaking, primarily documenting the 12th 
through 20th Congresses from 1811 to 1826. By presenting 
American diplomatic history during this tumultuous period of  
global revolutions from the perspective of  Congress, this work 
contends that the Legislative Branch began to actively assert its 
power in international matters that had been largely dominated 
by the Executive Branch under the first three presidential 
administrations. From the declaration of  the War of  1812 to the 
independence of  the Latin American nations, Congress began 
to exercise significantly more influence over foreign relations 
in response to various interests facilitated through the body’s 
institutional growth and maturation. Various actions throughout 
this period from declaring war, to negotiating and ratifying 
treaties, to regulating international commerce, to recognizing 
foreign actors, to confirming diplomatic nominations, to 
legislating and appropriating the nation’s foreign apparatus as a 
whole were subject to new assertions of  Congressional authority 
that set important precedents for where formal and informal 
power resides in the foreign policymaking process. Through the 
records of  Congress, its members, and its constituents, this thesis 
comprises a narrative of  how the membership and structure 
of  the Senate and the House of  Representatives transformed 
in order to act on and react to international events during the 
earliest decades of  the American Republic. In exploring the 
dynamic currents of  power over foreign relations first truly 
tested during the period under review, this work illuminates the 
role that Congress gradually constructed for itself  in the making 
of  the American relationship with the world and how the body—
and the country—changed as a result.
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Resolution 3379: Israel and Zionism at the United Nations 
Celine Moussazadeh
On November 10, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism a form 
of  racism and racial discrimination. This thesis examines 
the genesis of  this resolution, tracing its roots to geopolitical 
shifts in the 1970s that remade the world order and forever 
changed the conduct of  international affairs. Decolonization 
processes in the 1960s, coupled with Arab appropriation of  
the oil industry and a decline in American diplomatic prestige 
following the Vietnam War transformed the global balance 
of  power. An Arab-Soviet alliance quickly capitalized on 
American vulnerability, activating Third World hostility towards 
the imperialist West. Seizing upon the United Nations as their 
salvation, this coalition found itself  with an invincible majority at 
the General Assembly. The launching of  the Decade to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination enabled Arab and Soviet 
diplomats to delegitimize their enemies in Israel and the West by 
labelling them racist agents. I examine both arguments for and 
against the resolution, giving voice to claims of  Israeli injustice 
and discrimination against the Palestinians and articulating the 
corresponding defense of  Zionism as the legitimate nationalist 
movement of  the Jewish people. This resolution thus provides 
unique insight into the evolution of  Israel’s diplomatic standing 
and its legitimacy and sustainability as a Jewish state in the 
Middle East. The scholarship of  this resolution has largely been 
a footnote in the histories of  other subjects; it has never been 
meticulously dissected in and of  itself. Using archival resources 
from the U.S. State Department and academic articles drawn 
from the period, this thesis contributes a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of  this historical moment. 1975, 
indeed, marks a high tide of  anti-Israel sentiment throughout the 
world. Perhaps partially informed by entrenched anti-Semitism, 
the adoption of  Resolution 3379 in 1975 resulted from a much 
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more complex—and obscure—constellation of  forces.
Guns, Race, and Power: The Postbellum Rise and Fall of  
African American Police Forces in Two Southern Cities 
Efraim Saltzman
This thesis documents that the role of  race in policing, contentious 
in current times played a pivotal role in the Reconstruction 
South. It first examines the complicated political, social, and 
military factors which collided to precipitate the inclusion of  the 
first blacks in the police forces of  Wilmington, North Carolina 
and Charleston, South Carolina. It proceeds to provide an in 
depth vantage point of  the performance of  black police. Close 
examination of  the rule books guiding police behavior, census 
and city directory data all show that black police constituted large 
portions of  these two cities’ police forces. Examination of  black 
police and the forces they contributed to, through arrest records 
correspondence and both military and municipal records, reveals 
similar if  not more proficient service than their previously all 
white counterparts. Despite such valiant attempts to police a 
racist society, the south eventually returned to white supremacy 
through Redemption. In Charleston, white Democrats’ political 
might effectively ended black police. In Wilmington, as recounted 
by period newspapers white Democrats and supremacist violence 
combined to crush insurgent black police power. The story of  
the brave men in blue who defied the social order of  the South 
through policing whites, often risking their lives, is told in this 
thesis.
The Fallacy of  the Ideological Press: How American 
National Newspapers Reacted to the French Revolution 
from 1789 to 1793
Aaron Senior
Three important events of  the early 1790s fundamentally 
changed American politics: the creation of  a national newspaper 
Penn History Review     189 
Honors Thesis Abstracts
culture, the beginnings of  the French Revolution, and the 
birth of  political parties. The collision of  all three phenomena 
is the subject of  this thesis. Primarily, this thesis examines the 
conventional historical claim that the national newspaper editors 
of  the early 1790s served as mere ideological mouthpieces for 
their Federalist and Republican political patrons. The obsession 
with and reaction to the French Revolution in the Federalist 
Gazette of  the United States and the Republican National Gazette 
and General Advertiser serve as the test case for this historical 
claim. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of  these newspapers 
show that the Federalist-Republican ideologies are not sufficient 
to explain how these newspapers responded and reacted to the 
French Revolution. Instead, a major divide is observed between 
the writings of  the partisan newspapers and the opinions of  
the party founders. In explaining this divide, this thesis posits 
that the Republican press attempted to dissent from Federalist 
policies while also trying to maintain a perception of  unity in the 
United States. In order to escape the perception of  factionalism, 
the Republican newspapers displaced much of  their partisanship 
to their commentary on the French Revolution. Thus, the French 
Revolution served a key role within American political culture—
not so much as another ideological battleground, but instead as 
a haven for political dissent.
“Forcibly and Against Her Will”: Sexual Violence, Military 
Justice, and Race in the American Civil War
Anne Weis
This thesis explores occurrences of  sexual violence perpetrated 
by Union soldiers during the American Civil War and is based 
upon a close study of  a sample of  records for Union Army 
courts-martial for sexual crimes. It is both a study of  the ways 
in which sexual violence was carried out during the war and 
how the military justice system dealt with instances of  sexual 
violence perpetrated by its soldiers. This thesis seeks to be a part 
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of  an emerging scholarship on sexual violence in the Civil War 
that has been influenced by recent revelations about the uses 
of  sexual violence in warfare more generally. In addition, this 
project features a robust focus on race, and the story about the 
intersection of  sex, violence, and race during the Civil War that 
the courts-martial tell is at different moments surprising, tragically 
expected, confounding, and hopeful. This story both fits within 
a long and devastating narrative of  the sexual subjugation of  
black women that runs through our nation’s past like a poisoned 
vein, and breaks from that narrative in stunning ways.
  
  
